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INTRODUCTION

Injustice has many faces. We know this from our study, practice, and
teaching of law. But some injustices are not found in casebooks and law
reports. One such injustice occurs when a school neglects to honor an
illustrious graduate, a graduate whose uncommon worth and fame bring
respect and credit to his or her school. Although such an injury may not
rank at the top of the list of the world's great grievances, it is worth
addressing, especially when the graduate is a poet, and it happens to be
National Poetry Month. After all, lawyers are supposed to right wrongs
and redress injustice. "Wisdom too often never comes," Felix Frankfurter
reminds us, "and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes
late."'
This afternoon, almost a century after his graduation and more than
forty years after his death, we make amends for the glaring absence of any
New York Law School tribute to, honorary degree for, or article in this
Law Review about, a most accomplished graduate. This absence is all the
more poignant because the decision to go to New York Law School was
a turning point in our subject's life. Finally, in 1997 we give the lecture
that should have been given decades ago. Now we pay homage to a
graduate of New York Law School whose life achievements have become
an icon and exemplar of one of our growing contemporary schools of
jurisprudence: the law and literature movement. Today we try to do
justice-long overdue-to Wallace Stevens, New York Law School class
of 1903.

1. Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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I. THE DOUBLE SURPRISE

The blue guitarsurprises you
2
Wallace Stevens, "The Man With the Blue Guitar"

New York Law School's surprising failure to honor Wallace Stevens
can most likely be explained by his double life, by how apparently
successful he was in separating his literary life from his legal life. One of
the greatest, most important, and most influential graduates of this law
school made his lasting and wonderful reputation outside the field of law.
It was outside the law, of course, only if we reject Shelley's memorable
"3
statement that "poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.
With his manifold achievements, our graduate vividly demonstrated how
wrong Edmund Burke was when he famously said that the study of law
sharpens the mind by narrowing it. Wallace Stevens became, thank
heaven, a poet as well as a lawyer, and it is as a poet that we know,
remember, and revere him.
Among such luminaries as William Butler Yeats, T.S. Eliot, Hart
Crane, and Robert Frost, he stands in the ranks of major twentieth-century
poets. According to an eminent literary critic, Stevens is "the best and
most representative American poet of our time," 4 even "perhaps the major
American poet after Walt Whitman and Emily Dickinson."- Stevens has
6
"taken his place among the other cherished figures of our literature." His
7 and he is "one of the truly
poetry uses "rich and memorable language"
original figures in American literature."8 Some of Stevens's poetry "is
2. WALLACE STEVENS, The Man With the Blue Guitar, in THE MAN WITH A BLUE
GUITAR (1937), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS 163, 165 (Alfred A. Knopf 1981) (1954)
[hereinafter COLLECTED POEMS].
3. See PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, A DEFENSE OF POETRY 5-6 (Albert S. Cook ed.,

1890) (stating that "[ploets, according to the circumstances of the age and nation in which
they appeared, were called, in earlier epochs of world, legislators or prophets. . ."). Or,
as Herbert Hoover once said, "Sometimes a great poem can do more than legislation."
Christopher Darlington Morley, What the PresidentReads, 9 SATURDAY REV. LIT. 117
(1932).
4. Wallace Stevens, COLLECTED POEMS (Vintage Books 1990) (1954) (quoting
Harold Bloom on the back cover of the book).
5.

HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES

522 (1994).
6. Frank Doggett & Robert Buttel, Preface to WALLACE STEVENS: A CELEBRATION
at xi (Frank Doggett & Robert Buttel eds., 1980) [hereinafter A CELEBRATION].
7. Id. (speaking of Wallace Stevens's use of language in HARMONIUM).
8. Id. at xii.
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nothing short of miraculous."' He is "a poet to be mentioned on the same
breath as Eliot, Yeats and Pound" and is a "great poet indeed." 0
Stevens's magnificent achievement makes it all the more puzzling and
unfathomable that he has not yet received an honorary degree from New
York Law School. It in no way disparages or belittles the 156 people who
have been awarded such degrees to say that few, if any, of them equal
Stevens in their continuing significance and impact on our culture. Many
recipients of such honorary degrees are, unlike Stevens, not even graduates
of this law school. And several of them were awarded their honorary
degrees for non-legal work. An honorary degree from this law school to
Wallace Stevens is more than past due. Continued failure to give him
such an award posthumously is embarrassing. Surely it is only a matter
of time until New York Law School corrects its error."
Stevens and his great poetic contemporaries, despite any similarities
in stature or style, differed in at least one respect. Unlike most other great
poets of his time (and any time, for that matter), Stevens was a shirtsleeve,
workaday lawyer. To be precise, he was an insurance lawyer.' 2 He
earned his living as a lawyer, and from the beginning to the end of his
legal career wrote poetry in his spare time. Law was his day job all his
life, a life truly, fully, simultaneously and somewhat eccentrically lived in
law and literature.
Stevens's successful and productive double life is hugely intriguing,
even awesome. Exactly how did he pull off that daunting trick? Does his
double life hold special meaning? Did Stevens's life as a lawyer influence
his work as a poet? If so, how? As with all explorations of timeless
conundrums, the answers are less important than the reflection involved
in getting to them.
9. Helen Vendler, Stevens and Keats' "To Autumn, " in A CELEBRATION, supra note
6, at 171, 191.
10. George F. Lensing, Wallace Stevens in England, in id. at 130, 146 (quoting
Donald Davie).
11. Plans are being discussed for a symposium at New York Law School in 2003

to commemorate the centennial of Stevens's graduation. One hopes that a century's wait

will be enough.
12. Some tepid debate has arisen over whether Stevens should be regarded as a
lawyer or a businessman (or insurance executive). See THOMAS GREY, THE WALLACE
STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY 10-21 (1991) [hereinafter THE
PRACTICE OF POETRY]. The simple, indisputable fact is that he was a lawyer who did

legal work on surety bond claims for an insurance company. Stevens regarded himself

as a lawyer. Asked in 1922 for a brief biographical sketch to accompany a group of
poems, Stevens replied: "Do, please, excuse me from the biographical note. I am a
lawyer and live in Hartford." Letter from Wallace Stevens to Mr. Seldes (May 5, 1922),
in LETTERS OF WALLACE STEVENS, at 227 (Holly Stevens ed., Univ. of California Press
1996) (1966) [hereinafter LETTERS].
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To date, those basic questions have for the most part gone
unanswered, because the crucial and curious connection between Stevens's
poetry and his training and work as a lawyer has not been fully examined.
The existing literature linking law and poetry, two seemingly disparate
parts of Stevens's life, is slight. A happy milestone is a short (only 111
pages) but provocative 1991 book The Wallace Stevens Case:Law and the
Practiceof Poetry, by Thomas Grey, a gifted law professor at Stanford
Law School. However, even Grey's fine work barely scratches the
surface, and in some important respects, such as his conclusion that
Stevens's poems reflect no legal influence, is plainly wrong. Its many
good points cannot obscure its failure to deal adequately with the basic
mystery of Stevens's double life, lawyer by day, poet by night. Nor does
it begin to explore the true impact of Stevens's professional life on his
poetic work.
It is time to begin filling that void. Although some think Stevens's
double life has garnered "too much attention of the wrong kind, " 13 it has
really had too little attention of the right kind. The last line of Grey's
book contemplates further debate: "Thus closes [Stevens's] case, to be
reopened at your pleasure."' 4 We accept Grey's parting invitation to
"reopen" the Wallace Stevens case.
Stevens is emblematic of a fascinating and as yet practically untouched
subject radiating far beyond him. That deeper and wider black hole of a
subject is the unnoticed place of those with legal training in the actual
creation of art, the hitherto mainly unstudied role of the lawyer or lawtrained person as creative artist. 5 Stevens, it turns out, is merely one of
a surprising many:
What do Wallace Stevens, Edgar Lee Masters and Archibald
MacLeish, Ovid, Virgil, Petrarch, and John Donne have in common, aside
13. FRANK KERMODE, WALLACE STEVENS 1 (Faber & Faber Ltd. 1989) (1960).
See also preface to A CELEBRATION, supra note 6, at xii (noting the "prodigious amount
of idle astonishment that has been wasted on Stevens's role as an insurance" lawyer).
14. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 111.

15. Of course, biographies of those creative artists have noted their legal
backgrounds, but have usually not gone beyond that. One exception is an essay about

Robert Schumann that describes him as joining "that impressive band of musicians who
have abandoned law for music." Alan Walker, Schumann and His Background, in
ROBERT SCHUMANN: THE MAN AND His Music 9 (Alan Walker ed. 1972). "Others
have included Handel, Tchaikovsky, Von Billow, Sibelius and Stravinsky. One wonders
what the musical profession might have been like without them-to say nothing of the
legal profession with them." Id. at 9 n.2. Of course that wonder is not confined to
musicians only, but embraces all creative artists who left the law. See also Steven

Richman, EdgarLee Masters and the Poetics of Legal Realism, 31 CAL. W.L. REV. 103
(1994); Steven M. Richman, Sidney Lanier and the Poetry of Legal Morality, 25 CUMB.

L. REV. 309 (1995).
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from being significant poets? What do Gustave Flaubert, Pierre Corneille,
Jean Racine, Moliere, Leo Tolstoy, Honor6 de Balzac, Franz Kafka,
Robert Louis Stevenson, Henry Fielding, Walter Scott, William
Makepeace Thackeray, James Fenimore Cooper, H. Rider Haggard, and
Henry James have in common, aside from being noteworthy writers?
What do Peter Tchaikovsky, George Friedrich Handel, Robert Schumann,
Igor Stravinsky, and Jean Sibelius have in common, aside from being great
composers? What do Henri Matisse, Paul C6zanne, Wassily Kandinsky,
Edgar D6gas, and Gustave Caillebotte have in common, aside from being
important modern painters? What do they all have in common with each
other?
They are all creative artists, to be sure, but in different fields.
Similarly, they are all dead, white, mostly European males who
contributed to Western civilization, but that is obvious. Rather, the most
interesting and perhaps least well-known link among these disparate
writers, poets, composers and painters is that they all, believe it or not,
had legal training of some sort. Every one of them-from Flaubert,
Balzac, Matisse, and C6zanne in nineteenth-century France, to Tolstoy,
Tchaikovsky, Stravinsky, and Kandinsky in Russia, to Masters and
MacLeish in America-studied, like Wallace Stevens, to become a lawyer.
And this list does not even include writers, such as Dickens and possibly
even Shakespeare, who worked in law offices and later drew on those
experiences for their writing. 6 For all of them, law played a role of
varying significance in their development and their attitudes.
This unexpected discovery, this second surprise, stimulated by the
example of New York Law School's own Wallace Stevens, stirs a host of
absorbing questions. Does it seem strange to us that law is a common
denominator for many accomplished creative artists in different fields? Is
it counterintuitive? Is this a paradox, coincidence or mere happenstance?
And what, if anything, does this pattern mean?
To answer these questions, about Stevens in particular and other lawtrained artists in general, we will undertake a number of intellectual tasks.
First, we look at the outer aspects of Stevens's double life. From that
look emerges a framework to see if and how legal training influenced
Stevens's poetry. Next, we try to explain how Stevens successfully lived
the double life of law and literature. Then we juxtapose Stevens's
experience of the double life with that of another prominent lawyer-poet,
Archibald MacLeish, who rejected the double life, choosing poetry over
law. After that, we can imaginatively set sail into uncharted, exciting
waters, searching for a deeper, more encompassing explanation in a
16. See, e.g., EDGAR JOHNSON, CHARLES DICKENS: His TRAGEDY AND TRIUMPH
42-45 (1952); W. NICHOLAS KNIGHT, SHAKESPEARE'S HIDDEN LIFE: SHAKESPEARE AT

THE LAW 1585-1595 passim (1973).
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possible, if somewhat elusive, link (Stevens's "necessary angel") between
legal thinking and artistic creativity.
Following this measured exploration of Wallace Stevens, human
nature, intellect, and the creative process, each of us can then decide
which of two attitudes, which seem fundamentally opposed, is more
accurate. One is represented by the remark of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., that "the law is not the place for the artist or the poet. " 17 The other
is exemplified by Gustave Flaubert, who, in his masterpiece Madame
Bovary, wrote: "Every lawyer carries within himself the debris of a
poet." 8 Each of us can decide who is right, Holmes or Flaubert. Or
perhaps we can discover, as Wallace Stevens did, that whatever tension
exists between these points of view is more apparent than real.

17. Conclusion of a lecture from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Undergraduates of
Harvard (Feb. 17, 1886), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, at 218 (Richard A. Posner ed.,
1992) [hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES]. In a similar vein, Holmes said 11 years
later that "artists and poets shrank from [the law] as from an alien world." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, Brown University-Commencement 1897, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 164, 165 (1920).
18. GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, MADAME BOVARY 342 (Le Livre de Poche 1972) (1857)
("Chaque notaire porte en soi les debris d'un pofte"). This quotation is often wrongly
attributed to Clarence Darrow. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Man of the Law, and of
Letters as Well, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1994 at B8 (claiming Darrow said: "inside every
lawyer is the wreck of a poet"). Darrow apparently never said it, but his most popular
biographer did. Irving Stone wrote: "In the breast of the firm of Darrow and Masters
there was now harbored the wrecks of two poets." IRVING STONE, CLARENCE DARROw
FOR THE DEFENSE 160 (Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1941). Stone's passage was corrupted
and collapsed by later writers into an erroneous attribution to Darrow. Despite the
misattribution, Darrow in fact tried hard to become a literary success. One biographer
describes him as an "auteur manqui who happened to practice law." KEVIN TIERNEY,
DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY 146 (1979). Therefore, we can include Clarence Darrow on our
list of our lawyer-writers.
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II. OUTER SHIELDS

The less legible meanings of sounds, the little ends
Not often realized, the lighter words
In the heavy drum of speech, the inner men
Behind the outer shields
Wallace Stevens, "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"' 9
Inquiry starts with Stevens's life, or rather, his double life. Although
the New Critics say it is the work rather than the life that counts, it is
difficult to dissociate the work from the life.2" After all, a writer writes
out of his or her whole life experience, and the world wants to know how
poems or stories, paintings or music came into being. We need to address
the character and personality of the subject; we need to sort out themes
and patterns. The goal is to find the elusive, flamelike human spirit.
Any study of Stevens must come to terms with the central question of
his life: how did he manage to succeed so well at law and poetry at the
same time? We must engage the mystery of his double life. In this
process we may begin to deepen our understanding of Stevens as an
individual, a lawyer, and a poet. Only then will we have an appropriate
backdrop against which to analyze the poetry in light of his legal training.
By definition, writers' outer lives tend to be unexciting. Writers sit
and write mostly about exciting experiences of other people (real or
fictional) or about exciting ideas. Their inner lives may be in turmoil, but
their outer lives are often placid, even dull. No exception to this general
rule, Wallace Stevens's life, like Shakespeare's, was "lackluster in
outward event or excitement" 2 (except for his wild fistfight with Ernest
19. Wallace Stevens, An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, in THE AURORAS OF
AUTUMN (1950), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 409, 465,
20. The pendulum swings back and forth between critical focus on "work" and
"life," and discussion of those swings is not confined to obscure literary journals. While
eating Sunday brunch, for example, one might pick up the newspaper and read: "After
some 50 years of New Criticism and the Death of the Author, the author is raging back.
Texts are not enough. We must penetrate the lives of their creators, and that can create
problems." Philip Weiss, Herman-Neutics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, § 6 (Magazine),

at 60.
21. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 61 ("In our own time, among writers of the first order,
only the life of Wallace Stevens seems as lackluster in outward event or excitement as
Shakespeare's."). See also ANNIE DILLARD, THE WRITING LIFE 44 (Harper Perennial

1990) (1989) ("It should surprise no one that the life of the writer-such as it is- is
colorless to the point of sensory deprivation.").
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Hemingway in 1936).2 The basic facts of Stevens's legal-literary
23
life-what he would call the "outer shields"-are fairly straightforward.
A. Legal Shield
Law was in Stevens's blood. His father was a successful lawyer in
Reading, Pennsylvania, and his two older brothers also went to law
school. Stevens, born in 1879, attended Harvard for his undergraduate
work, writing poetry and prose for various campus publications and
presiding over a literary magazine there. In 1900 he left Harvard without
graduating and went to New York City hoping to become a writer. For
a number of months he worked as a reporter for the New York Tribune,
but then told his father that he wanted to quit journalism and go to Paris
where he could devote himself exclusively to writing. Stevens's father,
like any other parent in the same situation, reacted by strongly urging his
son to come to his senses and take up a more conventional career with
more financial security-law.
And Stevens, like many another financially (and perhaps emotionally)
insecure young person in the same circumstance, yielded to his father's
advice. In October 1901, after a brief stint as an assistant editor on a
current affairs magazine, Stevens "rather reluctantly" began to study law
at New York Law School.' Unfortunately for us and for posterity, New
York Law School has no records of Stevens's law school days, no
transcript of his grades, no student papers or exams, no moot court briefs,
no teacher evaluations. Nor do Stevens's letters or journals deal with his
two years-the standard course of study then-at New York Law School.
But we do know that during his summer vacation and his last year in law
school he clerked in the office of New York attorney W.G. Peckham, and
that he graduated on June 10, 1903.
22. This extraordinary fight took place in Key West, Florida, after Stevens spoke
badly of Hemingway to Hemingway's sister, who, reduced to tears, went and told her
brother. Hemingway then confronted Stevens, who tried to punch Hemingway.
Hemingway, age 34, won the fight, knocking down the 56-year-old Stevens several times.
Stevens broke his hand on Hemingway's jaw. PETER BRAZEAU, PARTS OF A WORLD:
WALLACE STEVENS REMEMBERED

97-99 (1983).

23. For a small sampling of the many discussions about Stevens's life, see MILTON

J.

BATES, WALLACE STEVENS: A MYTHOLOGY OF SELF

(1985);

BRAZEAU,

supra note

22; A CELEBRATION, supranote 6; THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supranote 12, KERMODE,
supra note 13; George S. Lensing, WALLACE STEVENS: A POET'S GROWTH (1986);
JOAN RICHARDSON, WALLACE STEVENS: THE EARLY YEARS 1879-1923 (1986); JOAN
RICHARDSON, WALLACE STEVENS: THE LATER YEARS 1923-1955 (1988).
The
biographical facts in this section are drawn from these sources.
24. BRAZEAU, supranote 22, at 8-9.
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We also know a thing or two about New York Law School in 1901.
In that year, the Law School was located in lower Manhattan, at 35
Nassau Street (now the site of an office building). Ten years old, it had
a fine reputation as an institution for training young lawyers, often recent
graduates from the best colleges in America. New York Law School had
spun off from Columbia Law School in 1891 when Timothy Dwight led
other law professors who agreed with him that law should be taught more
as an integral part of the reality of the City and its commerce. The
founding faculty of New York Law School believed that a law school
should not be uptown, but in a city's center, amid the bustle of
government, business, finance, and courts.
After graduating from New York Law School, Stevens met with little
professional success, although that would change. For a year after
graduation, he continued to clerk for attorney Peckham, who was a crucial
role model for young Stevens. The older man had successfully combined
a prosperous legal career in New York with a vital and continuing interest
in literature and art.' Stevens was admitted to the New York bar in June
1904, but had trouble earning a living in private practice. He formed a
short-lived partnership with another young lawyer, then drifted in and out
of three private law firms in three and a half years. It was not an
auspicious beginning. At age twenty-eight, he gave up on Manhattan law
firms.
Unable to make it in private practice, and out of work for three
months, in 1908 Stevens went "in house" as a lawyer for an insurance
company handling claims made on its surety bonds, a field Stevens had
experience in. Then, in 1916, he was, at age thirty-six, unemployed
again. He moved to Connecticut to do legal work on surety-bond claims
for the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and there, thirteen
years after graduating from New York Law School, Stevens "finally found
his niche as a lawyer"2 6 and cultivated it. Two years later, he took charge
of the Hartford's fidelity and surety claims division, and there he stayed
until his death in 1955 at age seventy-five, long past compulsory
retirement age. He was promoted to one of only four vice-presidents in
1934, but turned down all chances for further corporate advancement.
Stevens excelled at the practice of insurance law. He mastered his
small and specialized domain, and was widely respected for his expertise
in the field of suretyship law. 27 Although Stevens did not personally go
to court, trying cases-as those of us who practice law and even litigate
know-is far from all a real lawyer does. Stevens still had plenty of law
25. LENSING, supra note 23, at 36.
26. BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 6.
27. See id. at 30, 77. He was regarded as "the dean of surety-claims men in the
whole country." Id. at 67.
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work to do in his job. He was heavily involved with litigation, managing
it and farming it out. He met and worked with lawyers all over the
country. He wound up, according to his own testimony, "knowing every
county courthouse in the United States."2 8 Much of his work involved
legal research and legal judgment. Stevens was not a frustrated English
professor who went to law school by mistake, but rather an excellent
insurance lawyer who also had a great talent for poetry.
B. Literary Shield
Widely respected as Stevens was in his legal field, it was his literary
life that would bring him much greater fame than his practice of law at its
most successful could ever have done. Stevens was not the first lawyerwriter-poet in his family. Like law, literature was, in a sense, also part
of his heritage. His lawyer-father wrote sketches, stories and poems for
a Reading newspaper, and his letters to Wallace are filled with comments
about books. One need not be a Freudian to see in this the potential for
competition, tension and conflict between father and son. As things
developed, the two did have a poor, distant, and stressful relationship.
Through it all, from the beginning to the end of his legal career,
Stevens's early interest in writing persisted, albeit sometimes in creative
bursts that depended on, among other things, his professional workload.
Although he continued to write poetry from the start of his legal career,
Stevens did not try to make a living by his poetry. He versified in
obscurity until 1914, when he published poems in magazines for the first
time since college. His adult literary life had begun. From then on, he
published poetry regularly, with his first book of poems, Harmonium,
coming out in 1923. Ultimately he would publish several volumes of
poetry, among them modem classics such as Ideas of Order, The Man
with the Blue Guitar, and The Auroras of Autumn.
Literary honors and public recognition did not come until the end of
Stevens's life. In 1949 he won the Bollingen Prize in poetry. Two years
later, he was awarded the National Book Award for The Auroras of
Autumn. In 1955, the year he died, he pulled off a rare literary double
play, receiving both his second National Book Award and the Pulitzer
Prize for his Collected Poems. He was awarded a number of honorary
degrees, but, curiously and sadly, none from his own law school. By his
death, he had achieved genuine literary stature, although Stevens thought
that poetry is and should be for the poet "a source of pleasure and
satisfaction, not a source of honors."'2 9
28. WALLACE STEVENS, Surety and Fidelity Claims, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS 237
(Milton J.Bates ed., 1989) (1957) [hereinafter OPUS POSTHUMOUS].
29. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in id. at 184, 202.
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Thus did Wallace Stevens live two lives in one. Both of his
lives-law and literature-were accomplished and filled with achievements.
Both were admirable and craftsmanlike. But merely to limn the outlines
of Stevens's curious and impressive double life is not to show that they
overlapped. For that, it is necessary to go next to Stevens's writing.
III. INTERIOR MADE EXTERIOR
It is the philosopher'ssearch
for an interiormade exterior
30
Wallace Stevens, "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"

Once past our awed admiration of the double life of Stevens and other
lawyer-artists, we must try to relate the life and the work. Knowledge of
an artist's life and of the circumstances in which a work of art was created
may add to an understanding and appreciation of that work. What is
interesting is how an artist's life shaped his or her art, what caused the art
to be the kind of thing it was. In the case of Stevens, this interest has
special force, for Stevens himself has told us that "the mind of the poet
describes itself. . . in his poems."31
Taking our cue from Stevens, we need to see if the "legal mind" of
Stevens describes itself in his poems. We have to explore what, if
anything, Stevens's legal background has to tell us about his poems,
whether his involvement with law played a role, central or otherwise, in
his poetry. Until recently, critics concentrated exclusively on Stevens's
poetry, ignoring how he earned his living. They saw no connection
between his literary output and his legal career; rather they viewed his life
as compartmentalized. In 1991, a thoughtful columnist for the New York
Times concluded, after
reading Grey's book, that Stevens's poems "show
32
no hint of the law."
But we need not slavishly follow this popular view, unless the
evidence points in that direction. We should, in Stevens's words, conduct
an independent "search for an interior made exterior." In short, we ask
30. Wallace Stevens, An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, in THE AURORAS OF
AUTUMN (1950), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 409, 465.

31. WALLACE STEVENS, The Figure of Youth as Virile Poet, in THE NECESSARY
ANGEL: ESSAYS ON REALITY AND THE IMAGINATION 37, 46 (1951) [hereinafter THE
NECESSARY ANGEL].

32. David Margolick, At the Bar: In Search of Wallace Stevens, a Poet-Lawyer
(Lawyer-Poet?)Prizedfor His Very Ambiguity, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1991, at B7.
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if Stevens's legal training makes any difference33 in what we think of his
poems. Will it change our views of his work?
A. Lawyers Beware!
In some ways Stevens's poetry resembles the poetry of other great
modern American poets. It is, above all, dense, opaque, ambiguous,
obscure, vague, and difficult. It is often filled, as Stevens himself
admitted, with "nebulous brilliancies," 34 "words without meaning," 35 and
"a sense in sounds beyond their meaning. "36 Like much of modernist
culture, it is abstract and inaccessible, though often sensual, provocative,
"3
and beautiful. Stevens "abandoned the received poetic of his century 1
and created "new forms of language"
;38 he was "a revolutionary imagining
39
new aesthetic possibilities."
To get something out of Stevens and his fellow modern poets, a reader
needs to pay attention to every word. Each word counts. To be
appreciated fully, the poems should be read aloud. One must read and
ponder, and the rewards, significant and exquisite, will follow. Who,
having read Stevens's "Sunday Morning," "The Man with the Blue
Guitar," "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction," "An Ordinary Evening in
New Haven," or "The Auroras of Autumn," will not be a different,
better, more sensitive person, however so slightly?
33. In connection with this task, one is reminded of A.S. Byatt's novel Possession
in which two literary scholars discover new information about a Romantic poet and the
following exchange occurred:
"I-I don't know what I've found yet ....

"

"Was it important?" asked the

grey voice, with no indication of whether the "importance" was scholarly,
passionate, or cosmic.
"I don't know. It might change our views of-of his work, I suppose, a bit."

A.S. BYATT, POSSESSION: A ROMANCE 225 (1990).
34. Wallace Stevens, Esthetique du Mal, in TRANSPORT
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 313, 317.

TO SUMMER

(1947),

35. Wallace Stevens, The Motive for Metaphor,in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947),
reprintedin id. at 288.
36. Wallace Stevens, Pieces, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947), reprinted in id. at
351, 352. In "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," Stevens likewise referred to the
"less legible meanings of sounds." Wallace Stevens, An Ordinary Evening in New

Haven, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947), reprinted in id. at 465, 488.
37. HELEN VENDLER, THE MUSIC OF WHAT HAPPENS: POEMS, POETS, CRITICS 86

(1988).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 80. His "imagery derives from eternal or universal human situations
and reverberates with echoes of philosophic implications." Preface to A CELEBRATION,
supranote 6, at xi.
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A word of warning: because of our professional training and habits
of mind, we lawyers probably need special advice on how to read
Stevens's poetry. Perhaps the first rule should be: don't read it like a
lawyer. Do not read a Stevens poem literally or analytically, as if it were
a contract or a promissory note. Do not try to analyze, understand and
explain every word, every phrase, every image, every line in wholly
rational terms, as if it were a linear exposition. You will only end up
frustrated and at a loss. The poetry of Wallace Stevens, this great but
difficult poet, is not easily or readily susceptible to that type of rational,
literal, linear, lawyerly approach. Like music, it is difficult to describe
Stevens's poems. No one ever accused Wallace Stevens of "excessive
lucidity"; he is no Rudyard Kipling, no Robert Service, no Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow. 4
Lawyers who worked with Stevens learned this lesson from the poet
himself. One lawyer once told Stevens that his poetry was hard to grasp.
He asked Stevens if he could give "any clue or key that would enable the
man to understand his writing." Stevens, with a "combination chuckle and
snort," responded by saying: "Oh forget it. You're much too literalminded!"4" Another lawyer who told Stevens he did not understand his
poetry was informed: "That's all right. You haven't got that kind of a
mind. "42 These are no idle comments, but vital cautions for the rest of us
literal-minded lawyers who read Stevens's poetry.
We lawyers who spend so much time reading for information and
understanding must learn to read Stevens's poetry differently. Just as we
learned a "special kind of reading" for law, 43 when we read a poem by
Wallace Stevens we also need to develop a special way of reading. We
must think of reading, in James Boyd White's apt phrase, "as a species of
40. In a famous passage about Kipling's poetry, T.S. Eliot wrote: "The task is the
opposite of that with which we are ordinarily faced when attempting to defend
contemporary verse. We expect to have to defend a poet against the charge of obscurity:
We have to defend Kipling against the charge of excessive lucidity." T.S. ELIOT, A
CHOICE OF KIPLING'S VERSE 6 (Faber 1973) (1941).
41. BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 23-24. Stevens's colleague was merely echoing an
age-old problem typified by the painter's question to the poet: "How shall I understand
you?"

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TIMON OF ATHENS act 1, sC. 1.

42. BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 68. Here, Stevens sounds like an earlier poet,
William Blake, who once wrote: "What is grand is necessarily obscure to weak men.
That which can be made explicit to the idiot is not worth my care." Letter from William
Blake to Dr. Trusler (Aug. 23, 1799), in THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 34 (Geoffrey

Keynes ed., 1956).
43.

JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES'

POETICS OF THE LAW

57 (1985) [hereinafter

Bow:

ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND

HERACLES' Bow].

19971

THE DOUBLE LIFE OF WALLA CE STEVENS

thought."' Stevens makes reading his poetry difficult because he is in
love with the glamour of the unsayable. Like most poets, he writes
sensations rather than thoughts or argument. To grasp them, Stevens
himself instructs us: "One reads poetry [especially his poetry] with one's
nerves.45
Stevens's poetry is in some ways the verbal equivalent of abstract,
non-representational art, with similar strengths, weaknesses, appeal, and
problems.
One does not look the same way at abstract art and
representational art; one does not read all poetry alike; one programs
oneself at the outset with different expectations for the poetry of Wallace
Stevens and the poetry of, say, Robert Service. Stevens explained the
warning by saying:
Things that have their origin in the imagination or in the emotions
(poems) very often have meanings that differ in nature from the
meanings of things that have their origin in reason. They have
imaginative or emotional meanings, not rational meanings, and
they communicate these meanings to people who are susceptible
to imaginative or emotional meanings. They may communicate
nothing at all to people who are open only to rational meanings.
In short, things that have their origin in the imagination or in the
emotions very often take on a form that is ambiguous or
uncertain. It is not possible to attach a single, rational meaning
to such things without destroying the imaginative or emotional
ambiguity or uncertainty that is inherent in them and that is why
poets do not like to explain.'
Stevens constantly stressed the limits of rationality. "There are things in
a man besides his reason," wrote Stevens in an echo of Pascal.4 7 As
Stevens says in "Description without Place," "we do not need to
understand," 48 and, elsewhere, "nothing need be explained." 49 He
44. Id.
45. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra note 28, at 189.
46. WALLACE STEVENS, Poetry and Meaning, in id. at 249.
47. Wallace Stevens, Pieces, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947), reprinted in
COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 351. Pascal's famous comment was: "The heart
has its reasons of which reason knows nothing." BLAISE PASCAL, PENS9ES No. 423, at

154 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., Penguin Books 1986) (1670).
48. Wallace Stevens, DescriptionWithoutPlace, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947),
reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supranote 2, at 339, 341.
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produced works of pungency and luminosity, with completely irrefutable
power to convince, works that cause the reader to be visited, dimly,
briefly, by revelations that cannot be produced by rational thinking. In
essence, according to Stevens, "poetry must be irrational."s °
To lawyers (and many others) who spend most of their professional
lives explaining things, Stevens's attitude toward poetry might seem a bit
non-Euclidean. They might read a Stevens poem and, using one of
Stevens's own phrases, think of it as "the poet's gibberish."5 But before
giving up on Stevens, we should remember how alien, difficult and
incomprehensible legal language is to the non-lawyer, and was to us when
we first started to study law. Even now, do we not occasionally think a
lawyer, judge or-impossible thought-a law professor is spouting
gibberish?
More seriously, in recent years commentators have
increasingly recognized that essential components of sound legal
judging-for instance, pragmatic wisdom, experience, "horse-sense" and
practical know-how-cannot be explained, reduced to a method, or
articulated theoretically to the satisfaction of the cold intellect. 52 In a
similar vein, Stevens genuinely felt that to try to explain a poem is to spoil
it. Poetry, like music, cannot be written about directly-not the feeling
part of it.
49. Wallace Stevens, A Rabbit as King of the Ghosts, in PARTS OF THE WORLD
(1942), reprintedin id. at 209. As the poet who won the 1996 Nobel Prize for Literature
said in her Nobel Lecture: "It's just not easy to explain to someone else what you don't
understand yourself." Wislawa Szymborska, The Nobel Lecture: I Don't Know, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1996, at 27, 28. See also JOHN KEATS, Lamia, in THE POETICAL
WORKS OF JOHN KEATS (H.W. Garrod et al. eds., 1820) ("Do not all charms fly/At the
mere touch of cold philosophy ....
Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings/Conquer all
mysteries by rule and line ... ).
50. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supranote 28, at 184, 188.
"The only kind of art worth quarreling about is art that reveals structures of thought and
feeling you couldn't-or wouldn't-get at otherwise." Margo Jefferson, Willingness to
Transcend the Trappings of History, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at Cll.
51. Wallace Stevens, Notes toward a Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER
(1947), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 380, 396.
52. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 209-25 (1993); JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP passim
(1995); Daniel Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); Brian Leiter, Heideggerand the Theory
of Adjudication, 106 YALE. L.J. 253, 278-81 (1996); Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues
and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to JudicialSelection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1735 (1988). Other fields besides law are coming to the same realization. One
celebrated analysis implies that science is not a purely rational search for the truth either,
but rather an act of construction bound to social forces and constrained by habits and
biases. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970);
see also Isaiah Berlin, On PoliticalJudgment, N.Y. REV., Oct. 3, 1996, at 26.
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According to Stevens, a reader should use his or her own imagination
from Stevens's words. He disliked explaining what his poems. mean,
stating:
When we find in poetry that which gives us a momentary
existence on an exquisite plane, is it necessary to ask the meaning
of the poem? If the poem had a meaning and if its explanation
destroyed the illusion, should we have gained or lostP
Something more valuable than understanding, Stevens is saying, is at risk.
Such an aesthetic theory is foreign to many lawyers, although it may be
somewhat analogous to the legal notion of exclusionary evidentiary
privileges that protect values higher than a trial's search for truth. 4
A cynical legal mind, educated and trained to prize clarity and
understanding above all, might well dissent from Stevens's view. One
leading literary critic, who holds Stevens in high esteem, still finds that he
seems to many readers "remote, enigmatic, indecipherable, even
inhuman." 56 Another highly respected Stevens fan finds some of Stevens's
poems "impossible" to interpret,57 "notoriously elusive" and
53. Wallace Stevens, The IrrationalElement in Poetry, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra
note 28, at 224; see also BATES, supra note 23, at 145; LETTERS, supra note 11, at 294,
396 (noting Stevens's fear that readers would lose interest in poems they could not

comprehend fully); Wallace Stevens, The Novel, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947),
reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 188, 219; cf. Stevens, supra note 51,
at 459 ("And one trembles to be so understood and, at last, to understand, as if to know
became/The fatality of seeing things too well"); cf. Jacques Barzun, Is Music
Unspeakable? 65 AM. SCHOLAR 193 (1996) ("And we have all heard the anecdote of the
composer who played his latest piece to his guests, after which one of them asked what
its meaning was. The composer sat down at the piano again and played the piece through
once more.").
54. See HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR

395, 406 (1977) (referring to a section

from Simon Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society); Marvin
Frankel, The Search for Truth-An Umpireal View, 30 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 14
(1975).
55. On the other hand, some leaders of the law and literature movement, themselves
trained as lawyers, completely agree with Stevens that a poem cannot be "explained" or
reduced to a logical message "without impoverishment." RICHARD WEISBERG, POETICS:
AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 5 (1992). See also HERACLES' Bow,
supra note 43, at 83, 94. The language is itself part of the poem.
56. VENDLER, supranote 37, at 77.
57. HAROLD BLOOM, WALLACE STEVENS: THE POEMS OF OUR CLIMATE 90
(Cornell Paperbacks 1987) (1977).
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A fellow insurance
trying to read Stevens's poetry explained:
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after

to me it's the biggest bunch of gobbledygook. In fact, I've said
to people, Wallace was a great kidder .... I've often wondered
if he didn't write a lot of these things with his tongue in cheek,
and the country picked up on him and said he was a great
poet-and probably he was-and he was having the biggest private
laugh of anyone in the world. 9
When another office colleague told Stevens he did not understand his
poetry, Stevens "was very glad I was honest, because most people
pretended that they understood it and didn't."6' Given such reactions,
some may well wonder whether the author of "The Emperor of Ice
Cream" resembles the tailor in "The Emperor's New Clothes."
Like other obscure modem literary works that play on the sounds as
well as the meaning of words-Joyce's Ulysses, for example-Stevens's
poetry may often be best appreciated as an artistic "experience" of music
and imagery 6' that we let wash over us, as we catch its drift, if not its full
meaning. "To read a poem," Stevens tells us, "should be an experience,
like experiencing an act." 62 Of course, that advice does not mean we
should give up on rational analysis altogether, or that feeling counts more
than thought. What it does mean is that lawyer-like close analysis is
neither the only nor necessarily the best way to approach certain works of
art, including Stevens's poetry. But this is just talk. You have to read the
poems. "The truth must be," as Stevens himself says, "that you do not
see, you experience, you feel." 6 We must keep this caveat in mind as we
canvass Stevens's poetry for legal influences.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 168.
BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 65.
Id. at 49-50.
See BATES, supranote 23, at 128.

62. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra note 28, at 184, 191.
See also HERACLES' Bow, supra note 43, at 83 (stating that "the meaning of a literary
work is not in its message but in the experience it offers its reader"). "It is impossible
to describe or analyze this experience completely." Id. at 95.
63. Wallace Stevens, Poem Written at Morning, in PARTS OF A WORLD (1942),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 188, 219. Cf. Barzun, supra note 53,
at 194 ("The meaning is inside any work of art and it cannot be decanted into a
proposition.").
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B. The Quest
Even with the poet's advice to "feel" more than "understand," candor
requires an admission at the outset of our search for law in Stevens's
literary work. It is a quest that is neither obvious nor easy. It is unlike
looking for legal themes in Shakespeare or comments on lawyers in
Dickens. Nothing quite like that obvious abundance occurs in Stevens.
That being said, however, the quest is not hopeless.
The precise goal of our quest must be clear. We are looking for legal
influences on Stevens's poetry, to see if the membrane between his two
lives was permeable, whether the supposed "abyss" 64 or "chasm" 65
between his legal work and his literary work was really so vast and
unbridgeable. We seek to test the seemingly taken-for-granted assumption
that law does not intrude on Stevens's literary output. We want to see for
ourselves if law breached a subconscious Maginot Line in Stevens's psyche
and invaded his poetry.
Our inquiry does not necessarily posit that his poems are "about" law,
which Judge Richard Posner categorically rejects. Nor does it mean that
Stevens's poetry was "law related," which Professor Grey mostly rejects. 67
Rather, our quest is narrower and more modest. Can we, in all
intellectual honesty, find in Stevens's literary work anything that reflects
his legal mindset? Can we see the "interior made exterior"?
C. Grey's Error
Professor Grey, a thoughtful commentator on many far-ranging legal
issues, 68 gamely but only half-heartedly sets out on this quest. Along the
64. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 10 (noting that "an inexplicable
abyss divides the Stevens who made so respectable a bourgeois living as a vice-president
of the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company from the Stevens who wrote the gaudy,
exotic, mysterious poetry for which he is remembered.").
65. Milton J. Bates, Preface to OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28, at viii.
66. "Wallace Stevens was also a lawyer ... but no one supposes that Stevens's
poetry is about law." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION 179 (1988).
67. See THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 22.
68. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1984); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv.
703 (1975); Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1980); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes andLegalPragmatism,41 STAN.
L. REv. 787 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1
(1983); Thomas C. Grey, Modem American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996)
(book review).
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way, he is seduced, betrayed, and misled by the beguiling, chameleon-like,
spell-casting, mind-clouding, all too familiar Monster of Misinterpretation.
As a consequence, Grey never finds the grail of legal influence on
Stevens's poetry. He is fooled. He is able to see things that do not exist,
but not what does exist. In his stimulating and useful 1991 book on
Wallace Stevens, Grey makes fundamental errors about legal themes
(mainly about their non-existence) in Stevens's poetry. Despite a usually
careful and sensitive outlook, even Grey nods here and neglects to analyze
Stevens's poetry correctly in a number of respects.
First of all, Grey sees but one possible legal theme in Stevens's
poetry, and that one is faint even by Grey's own admission. In reality, the
legal theme barely discerned by Grey turns out to be so strained as to
probably not even be there. Somewhat surprisingly in light of his other
interdisciplinary work, Grey is highly ambivalent about the whole law and
literature venture, a conflicted attitude on his part that may cause some of
his confusion about Stevens and a desultoriness about the quest itself.
Finally, he ignores Stevens's own warning and becomes so literal-minded
that he fails to see the real legal themes there to be seen. Anyone thinking
about Wallace Stevens, law and literature must be grateful to Grey for
starting the journey, but must in good faith and intellectual candor identify
where Grey lost his bearings.
Grey errs when he finds only one legal aspect-and a tenuous one at
that-in Stevens's literary work. According to Grey, Stevens's poetry on
the theme of the relation between imagination and reality by way of
language "embodies a philosophical (and specifically pragmatist) portrayal
and account of the mind's workings . . . that can be of special interest to
the theoretically inclined lawyer."69 Grey further suggests how Stevens's
"poetic version of pragmatism" bears on the perennial debate between
strict law and equitable discretion.7'
"If the poet Stevens speaks to
lawyers," hypothesizes Grey, "it is to teach us pragmatist philosophy." 7'
Then he sets up, only to claim to knock down, three "separately
formidable barriers" to his own hypothesis.7"
Grey's effort is
fundamentally flawed.73
The legal theme that Grey thinks he sees in Stevens is a mirage. In
seeing what is not there, Grey dashes his own hopes. "The connection of
Stevens's poetry and legal thought," writes Grey, "emerges only from
69. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 9.

70. See id.
71. Id. at 103.

72. See id.
73. For other critiques of Grey's effort, see generally Steven L. Winter, Death is the

Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARv. L. REV. 745 (1992) (book review).
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strenuous (though I hope not strained) interpretation. "74 But his reading
is precisely what he hoped to avoid, that is, a "strained" interpretation to
find a legal theme in Stevens. To find a distinctively "legal" pragmatism
in Stevens's poetry, as Grey asserts, is to read into the verse something
that plainly is not there, or otherwise can be found in almost any poet.
Grey's supposed discovery is, in the language of equal protection analysis,
both underinclusive and overinclusive.7 It is so flimsy and implausible as
to be wholly unpersuasive.
Grey's failure here may be attributable to his marked ambivalence-his
admitted "conflicting initial impulses" 7 6-about the entire law and literature
approach. To be sure, Grey says his "main interest is in what the poetry
of Wallace Stevens has to do with law."' He then spends half his book
bringing out what he describes as "the stark gap between Stevens's poetry
and the usual concerns of lawyers." 7 8 He is unsure about the whole law
and literature venture; he calls the search for law in Stevens an "unlikely
enterprise. "79 Grey aligns himself, at least in part, with Judge Posner's
view that "[t]he literary should be a sphere apart from the legal."80 He
agrees with Posner that "the idea that literature has direct and immediately
practical uses for lawyers and judges has been seriously oversold." 8' Grey
articulates his beliefs, saying:
Judge Posner was only stating the obvious when he denied any
legal significance to the poetry of the lawyer Stevens. On the
face of it, that body of difficult lyric-meditative verse has nothing
at all to do with the legal world in which the poet made his living,
and in which lawyers practice today. 82
From these unenthusiastic premises, it is no wonder that Grey fails to see
the several genuine legal influences in Stevens's literary work. His heart
74. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note

12, at 103.

75. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (discussing the
classification of "both underinclusive and overinclusive"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-4 (2d ed. 1988).
76. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra 12, at 3.

77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 7.

0

79. See id. at 1. Grey thinks that efforts to splice together law and poetry "are

likely to breed ungainly hybrids." Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 3 (quoting POSNER, supra note 66, at 302).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2.
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is not in the task. It is a little like asking Rush Limbaugh to describe
President Clinton's good points.
Not only is the one supposed legal theme in Stevens's poetry identified
by Grey not really there, but Grey totally misses all the considerable
evidence of other, real legal influences. What Justice Holmes said on
another occasion applies equally well here: "we need education in the
obvious more than investigation of the obscure. "83 Grey overstates his
case and falls into the trap of being too literal-minded when he claims that
Stevens "rigorously excluded law from the explicit purview of his
poems. "84 Grey compounds his error when he adds that Stevens "tends to
baffle the quest of a lawyer in search of professional instruction. "85 For
all his good points, Grey has blinders on. He does not see in Stevens's
poems what there is to be seen.
D. The Evidence
To the question, can we find evidence of Stevens's legal thinking in
his poetry?, the answer is a definite, objective, unqualified yes. The
search for law in Stevens's poems turns up several interesting and
important discoveries. An open-minded lawyer with eyes to see and ears
to hear will find ample professional instruction in Stevens. Stevens's
poetry, on close inspection, occasionally supplies significant evidence, or
at least unmistakable telltale traces, of the poet's legal training, thinking,
and experience.
Perceptible legal influences in Stevens's poetry can be usefully
grouped into twelve categories: (1) explicit legal references; (2) advocacy
in the poems; (3) law and imagination; (4) order versus chaos; (5) legal
reasoning; (6) words as traps; (7) stress on language; (8) ambiguity; (9)
poetic style; (10) "poetic method" for law; (11) pressure of reality; and
(12) interdisciplinary approach. These twelve groups are legitimate and
83. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in THE ESSENTIAL HOMES, supra
note 17, at 145, 146. The position of Grey and Posner intimidates one who sees the need
to contradict it. The situation is reminiscent of a fictional scene in which a Yeshiva
student gives an answer that contradicted the commentaries:
"That can't be right, Rebbe. It contradicts everyone." "It contradicts,
Besser?" said Ray Sharfman. "So? The commentators understood everything?
It is all finished? We have nothing to say? We are swallowers, Besser? That
is all? We swallow the waters they give us to drink? We can make no living

waters of our own?"
CHAIM POTOK,

IN THE BEGINNING 378-79 (1975). We can try to make some living

waters of our own.
84. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note

85. Id.at 21.

12, at 103.
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genuine proof of the mental traffic, conscious or subconscious, between
Stevens's vocation and avocation. They are real and not strained.
1. Explicit Legal References
The first and most obvious evidence to look for would be express
references by Stevens to law, lawyers, or legal terms and images. They
exist, and should not be ignored. Distinctly legal terms appear in a
number of Stevens's poems. Three examples are illustrative.
One of Stevens's most famous poems-"Peter Quince at the
Clavier"-is his reaction to the famous, if apocryphal, legal case involving
"Susanna and the Elders." 86 In that case, the beautiful wife of a wealthy
man is falsely accused of adultery by two judges (the elders) whose
attempts to sleep with her were repulsed. First Susanna was wrongly
convicted, but then Daniel proved her innocence by skillful crossexamination of the two elders out of each other's presence, so that crucial
inconsistencies in their stories came to light. Although Stevens's poem has
other components, it at a minimum reflects an interest in justice and
fairness in legal proceedings. Such an interest may not be the exclusive
property of lawyers, but it is surely within their zone. It also highlights
the case that may have originated the salutary rule about excluding
witnesses from the courtroom during a trial.'
In stanza XII of "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," for a second
instance, Stevens writes:
The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the res itself and not about it."8
Would anyone other than a lawyer deploy the word "res" like that?
Likewise, in a short, six-line poem called "The Surprises of the
Superhuman," he refers to "the palais de justice of chambermaids" and
"the brave dicta of its kings. "8 Such phrases, with their legal
connotations, understandably flow easily from an attorney's pen.
86. Wallace Stevens, Peter Quince at the Clavier, in HARMONIUM (1931), reprinted
in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 89. See The Story of Susanna in THE
APOCRYPHA 347 (Edgar J. Goodspeed trans., Modem Library 1959).
87. See FED. R. EVID. 615; JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT
COMMON LAW §§ 1837-1838 (revised by James H. Chadbourn, 1976).
88. Wallace Stevens, An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, in THE AURORAS OF
AUTUMN (1950), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 465, 473.

89. Wallace Stevens, The Surprises of the Superhuman, in HARMONIUM (1931),
reprintedin id. at 98.
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These are just three of many explicit legal references in Stevens's
poetry, "merely instances," as Stevens would say.' From time to time,
Stevens also used legal words such as "law," 9 "lex," 92 "dicta," 93
"dictum," 9 4 "law and evidence," 95 and "moral law" 96 in his poetry.
Another commentator has identified legal words such as "'ward,'
'pandect,' 'entailed,' 'femes,' 'in camera,' 'chits,' 'exchequering,' and
'fises.'"97 One poem is even entitled "Re-Statement of Romance," 9' which
reminds us of the Restatements of Torts, Contracts, and so on-all of
which first came into being, with much fanfare within the legal profession,
during the early 1920s. 99 The link became even more explicit when a
prestigious law review recently
published a quasi-humorous article called
" °°
"Restatement of Love. '
Stevens's use of such legal terms does not appear to reflect any special
attitudes to or about lawyers. It is more a matter of vocabulary, and a
commerce between his poetic and legal vocabularies.' 0 ' One of his poems
90. Wallace Stevens, Theory, in HARMONIUM (1931), reprintedin id. at 86, 87.
91. See WALLACE STEVENS, Le Monocle de Mon Oncle, in HARMONIUM (1931),
reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supranote 2, at 13, 17; WALLACE STEVENS, Life on a
Battleship, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28 at 107; WALLACE STEVENS, The
Greenest Continent, in id. at 90; Wallace Stevens, The Sail of Ulysses, in id. at 126, 129;
WALLACE STEVENS, Recitation After Dinner, in id. at 114.
92. Wallace Stevens, The Comedian as the Letter C, in HARMONIUM (1931),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 27, 36.
93. WALLACE STEVENS, Lettres D'un Soldat, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra note 28,
at 29, 33.
94. WALLACE STEVENS, The Woman Who Blamed Life on a Spaniard,in id. at 66.
95. WALLACE STEVENS, Life on a Battleship, in id. at 106, 107.
96. Id. See also Wallace Stevens, A High-Toned Old Christian Woman, in
HARMONIUM (1931), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 59.
97. BATES, supra note 23, at 158.
98. Wallace Stevens, Re-Statement of Romance, in IDEAS OF ORDER (1936),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supranote 2, at 115, 146.
99. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 58-59 (1974) [hereinafter THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT]; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 273-76 (Univ. of Oklahoma Press 1985) (1973); Grant Gilmore, Legal

Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Thomas C. Grey, Modern
American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 499 (1996) (book review).
100. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF LOVE (Gretchen Craft Rubin &Jaunie G. Heller,
Tentative Draft), in 104 YALE L.J. 707 (1994).
101. See BATES, supranote 23, at 158 (discussing Stevens's legal works of fiction).
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is even entitled "Memorandum," 102 as if a lawyer were
writing an internal note for the files, and another "Agenda.
Stevens expressly refers to lawyers in his celebrated "Notes toward a
Supreme Fiction." There he writes:
On Sundays, lawyers in their promenades
Approach this strongly-heightened effigy
To study the past...
The lawyers disbelieved.1' 4
In context, the lawyers' disbelief means their professional distaste for the
past, their revolutionary attitude. 5 Stevens's lines become a comment on
legal thinking and what Stevens perceives as its skepticism of precedent,
a vital concept for Stevens.
In "Lions in Sweden," Stevens once again makes an explicit,
unmistakable legal reference:
Fides, the Sculptor's prize,
All eyes and size, and galled Justitia,
Trained to poise the tables of the law. 0 6
Similarly, when Stevens received the National Book Award for poetry in
1955, he referred to his profession. "When a poet comes out of his
"even if
cavern or wherever it is that he secretes himself," Stevens said,
07
it is a law office," the poet is confused and uncomfortable.
These cannot be meaningless, randomly selected choices. Rather, they
are intentional or subconscious. At the least, they show some seepage, if
only in terms of vocabulary, from Stevens's professional life into his
poetic life. At most, they show much more. Neither part of his life was
hermetically sealed; both were vibrant and interacting aspects of a single
mind and personality.

102.

WALLACE STEVENS, Memorandum, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS,

103.

WALLACE STEVENS,

supranote 28, at

116.

Agenda, in id. at 72.
104. Wallace Stevens, Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER
(1947), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 380, 391.
105. See HELEN VENDLER, ON EXTENDED WINGS: WALLACE STEVENS' LONGER

POEMS 105 (1969).

106. Wallace Stevens, Lions in Sweden, in IDEAS OF ORDER (1936), reprinted in
COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 124.
107. WALLACE STEVENS, On Receiving the NationalBook AwardforPoetry (1955),
in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra note 28, at 288.
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Advocacy in the Poems

The effects of legal training, practice and thinking on a poet's literary
work are not confined to explicit references to the law. A professional
discipline can affect poetry in less obvious, but no less real, rhetorical
ways. Structure and style, the very form of a poet's argument, may
provide persuasive proof of the law's lasting impression on the lawyerpoet's mind. How someone writes and the rhetorical shape of a
composition may signify professional training just as surely as express
references. Grey overlooks this important structural evidence. Quite apart
from their express legal references, Stevens's poems also bespeak law's
influence in their rhetorical reliance on advocacy.
Stevens is often an advocate in his poems. Like a lawyer, he relies
on the science of rhetoric and seeks to move by persuasive speech. When
he writes love poetry, he tries-as a poet-advocate-to seduce or rekindle
his beloved. In his other poems, he at least attempts to persuade his
reader of a point of view. In these senses, the lawyerly attribute of
advocacy runs through Stevens's poetry.
Take, for instance, his "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction." Consider
it for a moment not simply as a poem but as a piece of advocacy. It is,
in a way, a lawyer-poet's brief about what constitutes a good poem.
Stevens divides his brief into three main points, introduced by point
headings set off in italics, just as a lawyer might. Point I is "It Must be
Abstract"; Point II is "It. Must Change"; and Point III is "It Must Give
Pleasure." Difficult as it may be to understand in every line, the grand
brief-like structure of "Notes" unmistakably reflects the lawyer's touch.
Several other poems by Stevens bear the stamp of lawyerly advocacy.
His many poems explicitly about poets and poetry form an unusual series
in which he marshals, in his poetical style, the evidence in support of his
literary theories. In his poems, he often mounts a defense of obscurity.
To his muse, he pleads for inspiration. And then, of course, there are his
poetical arguments in favor of the irrational.
Those arguments by Stevens in support of the non-rational highlight
another aspect of advocacy-its occasional clash with reason. One of the
arts of persuasion is to use emotion to move someone. Such advocacy can
incapacitate our reason with language that makes us susceptible to
emotions we would otherwise resist. Advocacy sometimes overwhelms
reason, reaches a different plane of argument, or makes the weaker
argument appear to be the stronger." 8 Read any great jury summation,
listen to any defense statement at a criminal sentencing, think about the
O.J. Simpson trial, and you will see what every trial lawyer knows, in his
108. Anthony Julius, Love Poetry and the Art of Advocacy 15 (May 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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or her bones, that, as Stevens says: "There are things in a man besides
his reason." The greatest challenge for the courtroom advocate is often
to figure out how to appeal to those non-rational but very powerful
wellsprings of decision.
3.

Law and Imagination

Even beyond explicit references to law, lawyers, legal terminology,
and the advocacy in his poems, there are what Stevens might call "implicit
clarities" 10 9 about legal themes in Stevens's poetry. As anyone even
slightly familiar with Stevens's poetry knows, the most central, repeated,
core theme of Stevens's poetry, its consuming idea, is imagination, and his
treatment of it reflects certain legal influences. Stevens championed
imagination in, among other poems, "The Man with the Blue Guitar" and
"Notes toward a Supreme Fiction." The blue guitar is, for Stevens, a0
symbol of lyrical imagination, "[t]he world washed in his imagination," 1
and "'[t]hings as they are/Are changed upon the blue guitar.' i ll
Elsewhere in his poems he speaks of imagination as "the magnificent
cause of being .... the one reality [i]n this imagined world"" 2 and "the
will of things."" 3 In "To the One of Fictive Music," a poem to his muse,
he wrote: "Unreal, give back to us what once you gave: The imagination
that we spurned and crave. "114 He decried "The World without
Imagination,"' said "Politic man ordained [i]magination as the fateful
109. WALLACE STEVENS, Mr. Burnshav and the Statue, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS,

supra note 28, at 78, 83.

110. Wallace Stevens, The Man With the Blue Guitar,in THE MAN WITH THE BLUE
GUITAR (1937), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 165, 179.
111. Wallace Stevens, The Man With the Blue Guitar, in THE MAN WITH THE
BLUE GUITAR (1937), reprintedin id. at 165. At least one commentator has questioned
whether Stevens was truly preoccupied with the imagination versus reality issue, or
whether that issue was really his passionate feeling raised to another level. She describes
the imagination-reality issue as "reductionism" that has spawned "commentary of
extraordinary banality." HELEN VENDLER, WALLACE STEVENS: WORDS CHOSEN OUT
OF DESIRE 10, 53 (1984).
112. Wallace Stevens, Another Weeping Woman, in HARMONIUM (1931), reprinted
in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 25.
113. Wallace Stevens, Colloquy with a Polish Aunt, in HARMONIUM (1931),
reprintedin id. at 84.
114. Wallace Stevens, To the One of Fictive Music, in HARMONIUM (1931),
reprintedin id. at 87, 88.
115. Heading of Wallace Stevens, The Comedian as the Letter C, in HARMONIUM
(1931), reprinted in id. at 27.
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sin, "116 and thought "God and the imagination are one."".7
Stevens sets imagination off against reason, which may well symbolize
law. One might even wonder, as at least one commentator has, if
Stevens's experience as an attorney with legal fictions contributed to his
fundamental poetic concept of a "Supreme Fiction."" 8
One might also wonder if the following stanza from "Six Significant
Landscapes" reflects Stevens's view of his fellow attorneys, well known
for their coldly rational approach to problem-solving:
Rationalists, wearing square hats,
Think, in square rooms,
Looking at the floor,
Looking at the ceiling,
They confine themselves
To right-angled triangles.
If they tried rhomboids,
Cones, waving lines, ellipses -As, for example, the ellipse of the half-moon
-19
Rationalists would wear sombreros.
It is fair to speculate, at least within bounds, about whether Stevens had
20
lawyers in mind. As Stevens might say, "it could be, could be."
The possible legal relevance of Stevens's advocacy of imagination has
not gone completely unnoticed. The exciting book that launched the
modern law and literature movement in 1973-The Legal Imagination by
James Boyd White-makes a telling reference to Stevens. At the
beginning of a chapter entitled "The Imagination of the Lawyer," White
quotes three lines from Stevens's great poem "Notes toward a Supreme
Fiction."' 2 ' In that thrilling chapter, White attempts to show "that the
116. Wallace Stevens, A cademic Discourse at Havana, in IDEAS OF ORDER (1936),
reprinted in id. at 115, 143.
117. Wallace Stevens, Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour, in THE ROCK
(unpublished), reprintedin id. at 499, 524.
118. See e.g., BATES, supra note 23, at 158, 201-02. Grey thinks this is no more
than "speculating ingeniously." THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 14.
119. Wallace Stevens, Six SignificantLandscapes, in HARMONIUM (1931), reprinted
in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 73, 75.
120. WALLACE STEVENS, Desire & the Object, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supranote 28,
at 113.
121. JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF
LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 757 (1973). The quoted lines are:
How simply the fictive hero becomes the real;
How gladly with proper words the soldier dies,
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activities which make up the professional life of the lawyer and judge
constitute an enterprise of the imagination, an enterprise whose central
performance is

. .

. the translation of the imagination into reality by the

power of language. "122 It is altogether fitting and proper that such a
chapter in such a law book should start with an epigraph from Stevens.
Even Stevens's most basic metaphor for poetry has a large legal
component. Stevens distinguishes between "imagination" and "reason" as
fighting for reality." Might those not be code words for poetry and law?
If so-and it is fair to assume so-then the contest for reality becomes a
contest between the two parts of Stevens's consciousness. Yet, according
to Stevens, "The poet, in order to fulfill himself, must accomplish a poetry
that satisfies both the reason and the imagination."' 24
Stevens's outlook in this regard-and in others-resembles that of a
leading American jurisprudential thinker whose life overlapped (and in
some important biographical and psychological ways parallelled) Stevens's:
Oliver Wendell Holmes.'1 5 Holmes, the great legal philosopher and judge,
also sought a balance. One of his more famous lines-"to know is not less
than to feel" 126-embodies that balance and must have caught Stevens's
eye, for it came only two sentences after Holmes declares the law to be off
limits to the artist or poet. For Stevens, this quoted line of Holmes must
have been riveting, especially since Stevens tended to lean the other way
("you do not see, you experience, you feel"). 2 7 But this link between
Stevens and Holmes-even when they differ-is fruitful. They often seem
to be talking to each other, and their conversation shows shared common
ground on a number of jurisprudential points.
This significant Stevens-Holmes nexus supplies a needed corrective to
the conventional wisdom that law played no role in Stevens's poetry.
Additional, persuasive, and concrete proof from a primary source
conclusively demonstrates that Stevens was a reader of Holmes beyond his
Supreme Court opinions. As a mature man, Stevens kept a journal or
If he must, or lives on the bread of faithful speech.

122. Id. at 758.
123. See WALLACE STEVENS, Imagination as Value, in THE NECESSARY ANGEL,
supra note 31, at 131, 141.
124. See WALLACE STEVENS, The Figure of Youth as Virile Poet, in id. at 37, 42.
125. Holmes lived from 1841 to 1935; Stevens from 1879 to 1955. For the parallels
between Stevens and Holmes see infra pp. 100-05.
126. Conclusion of a lecture from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Undergraduates of
Harvard (Feb. 17, 1886), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 17, at 218, 219.
127. Wallace Stevens, Poem Written at Morning, in PARTS OF A WORLD (1942),
reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 219. But see WALLACE STEVENS,
Presence of an External Masterof Knowledge, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra note 28, at
131, 132 ("the right to know/Is equal to the right to be").
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commonplace book in which he, among other things, copied quotations
from books he was reading. In that journal for 1942, Stevens made two
entries of12 lines from Holmes's published correspondence with Frederick
Pollock. 1
Those entries almost surely mean that Stevens was familiar with
Holmes's other non-judicial writings, which were far more famous and
important than his exchange of letters with even so eminent an English
lawyer-judge as Pollock. If Stevens read Holmes's correspondence, then
he almost certainly read his speeches, legal papers, and jurisprudential
writings. One does not usually read a famous person's correspondence
without having first read something more substantial. And to reconstruct
a person's reading is at least "partially to map the topography of his
imagination."129 Going out on a limb, we can hazard the opinion,
grounded in common sense and reasonable inference, that Holmes was a
profound influence on Stevens, both as to law and to the ideas and
philosophy expressed in his poetry. Hence we start to discern the distinct
jurisprudential figure of Oliver Wendell Holmes in the shag carpet of
Wallace Stevens's poetry.
Stevens's pronounced and oft-repeated stress on the limits of
rationality is another way of stating one of the most basic modern ideas of
law, often credited to Holmes. It is an idea that was current when Stevens
studied law at New York Law School, and it grew in importance as he
128. SUR PLUSIEURS BEAUX SUJECTS: WALLACE STEVENS' COMMONPLACE BOOK
75 (Milton J.Bates, ed. 1989). The search for more evidence of the law in Stevens's
reading is, unfortunately, both fruitless and inconclusive. Stevens's letters and journals,
often a "commentary on what he was reading," turn up no legal references. J. M.
Edelstein, The Poet as Reader: Wallace Stevens and His Books, 23 BOOK COLLECTOR
53, 57 (1974). Moreover, the reconstruction of Stevens's library "if it is ever to be
undertaken, will not be easy; it may even be impossible. Too much is missing." Id. at
55. Over 500 of the books owned by Stevens are now located in the Huntington Library
and the library of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Review of the titles of
those volumes uncovers none about the law or legal philosophy. See Milton J. Bates,
Stevens's Books at the Huntington: An Annotated Checklist, 2 WALLACE STEVENS J. 45
(1978); 3 WALLACE STEVENS J. 15 (1979); Peter Brazeau, Wallace Stevens at the
University of Massachusetts: Check List of an Archive, 2 WALLACE STEVENS J. 50
(1978). But hundreds of other books belonging to Stevens were sold by his widow to a
dealer who kept no record of them. Edelstein, supra at 56. If among them were some
books by Holmes, Cardozo or Jerome Frank, we could draw some powerful inferences.
After all, "what a man buys or keeps for his edification cannot he dismissed out of hand
as unimportant." Edelstein, supra, at 68.
129. Milton J. Bates, Stevens's Books at the Huntington: An Annotated Checklist,
2 WALLACE STEVENS J. 45 (1978). It is highly significant that the quotes from Holmes
occur in Stevens's commonplace book, for, "One often feels the presence of the poet in
Stevens's marginal notes, but nowhere so palpably as in an entry in his commonplace
book." Id.
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practiced. How different is Stevens's emphasis on the limits of rationality
from Holmes's great and famous sentence in the first paragraph of his
1881 book The Common Law that, "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience?" 130 Those thirteen words, published twenty
years before Stevens started law school, form one of the most celebrated
sentences in all legal literature. Stevens followed the trail blazed by
Holmes and other Legal Realists, and it is inconceivable that he did not
know it.'
Holmes's essential thrust is an attack on prevailing authority. Holmes
broke with the accepted view of how legal rules are formed. In the place
of sterile deductive reasoning-Legal Formalism-Holmes called for
sensitive analysis and weighing of competing policy considerations.
Holmes explains his highly imaginative theme again and again, in language
that echoes in Stevens's writing.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed. The law ...cannot be
dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a
1 32
book of mathematics.
Holmes's stress on the limitations inherent in the logical method as applied
to law sounds eerily like Stevens's similar stress regarding poetry. When
Holmes talks of the "failure of all theories which consider the law only
from its formal side" of logical deduction, 133 he is frankly acknowledging
the crucial role played by irrational forces, just as Stevens does. At least
here, even for Holmes, to feel is not less than to know.
At this point, it is well worth recalling some of Stevens's comments
on irrationality in poetry. It is almost as if his work as a lawyer, his daily
use of logic and rational argument in the cause of advocacy, taught him
the limits of logic and rationality. In 1936, in a lecture on the subject at4
Harvard, he stated that "pure poetry is both mystical and irrational." 1
130. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (S.J. Parkhill & Co. 1909)
(1881) [hereinafter THE COMMON LAW].
131. On American Legal Realism, see generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); TWINING, supra note 99.
132. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 130, at 1.
133. Id. at 36.
134. Wallace Stevens, The IrrationalElement in Poetry, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS,

supra note 28, at 224, 227-28.
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Elsewhere he wrote that "poetry must be irrational" 3 ' and that "there are
things in a man besides his reason."136 In one poem, Stevens strikingly
contrasts the "man that thinks," who "thinks and it is not true," with the
irrational "man below" who "was born within us as a second self."
Stevens writes that man
Imagines and it is true, as if he thought
By imagining, anti-logician, quick
With a logic of transforming certitudes.' 37
He refers in the same poem to the "thinking man" as a "sterile rationalist"
and we wonder if that, in Stevens's personal thesaurus, is a synonym for
lawyer. The suspicion grows
when in another poem, he compares
"science" and "sentiment. " 38 Then in his masterpiece, "Notes toward a
Supreme Fiction," he writes:
You
Become the soft-footed phantom, the irrational
Distortion, however fragrant, however dear.
That's it: the more than rational distortion,
39
The fiction that results from feeling. Yes, that.1
With such affinities, one even suspects that Holmes would have
appreciated the poetry of Stevens. 4
They agree on another basic point as well-how the irrational can be
dressed up in a logical form. For instance, Stevens, in "Esth~tique du
Mal," refers to "logical lunatics" who know that
The politics of emotion must apear
To be an intellectual structure.

135. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in id. at 184, 188.

136. Wallace Stevens, Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER
(1947), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supranote 2, at 380, 396.
137. WALLACE STEVENS, Sombre Figuration, in id. at 96.
138. WALLACE STEVENS, Good Man, Bad Woman, in id. at 65.
139. Wallace Stevens, Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER
(1947), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 380, 406.
140. None of the Holmes biographies or published collections of his correspondence
refers to Stevens. But Holmes was a great reader of contemporary literature and poetry.
Stevens's first book of poetry was published when Holmes was 83 years old.
141. Wallace Stevens, Esthetique Du Mal, in TRANSPORT TO SUMMER (1947),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 313, 324.
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Holmes adopts a similar stance in describing how judges clothe their
irrational grounds for deciding cases in the garb of logical analysis. "The
language of judicial decision," Holmes wrote in "The Path of the Law,"
"is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter
that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind.
But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." 4 2
Stevens and Holmes see eye to eye here.
Considered from the perspective of intellectual history, Holmes and
Stevens have much in common.
They are part of the modern
antirationalist movement, typified by Nietzsche in philosophy and Freud
in psychology. 143 Toward the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth centuries, as Stevens was coming to intellectual consciousness,
these thinkers and others rebelled against the formal rationalist systems
dominating their fields. In exposing the limitations of pure rationalism,
Stevens joined Holmes and others (including the Legal Realists) as a
revolutionary modernist thinker.
The consequences of Stevens's intellectual choice were far-reaching.
One might think that the literary analogue of Legal Realism would be
literary realism, as typified by Emile Zola in France and Theodore Dreiser
in America, with their descriptions of social conditions and their stress on
social change. But this was not the case. Writers of the realist school still
used conventional forms of language, though often in the service of
progressive social change. The true literary analogue of Legal Realism
was modernism, where words and language no longer followed logic and
rationality. As refracted in Stevens's poetry, Legal Realism differed from
literary realism.
Political revolutionaries still used language
conventionally, cultural revolutionaries did not.
Doubtless Stevens, in his legal studies and practice, came across
Holmes's thoughts about the limited utility of logic in the law. Doubtless
Stevens found such an intellectual attitude congenial to his own cast of
mind, even if Stevens would have put more weight than Holmes on
feeling. Doubtless the Holmesian legal outlook surfaced in Stevens's
142. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66

(1897).
143. Stevens was interested in both Nietzsche and Freud. See KERMODE, supra note
12, at xvii, 74, 79, 82-83; WALLACE STEVENS, Descriptionwithout Place, in TRANSPORT
TO SUMMER (1947), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 339, 342 (three
references to Nietzsche in one poem); WALLACE STEVENS, The IrrationalElement in
Poetry, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra note 28, at 224, 225 (referring to Freud as "one of
the great figures in the world" who "has given the irrational a legitimacy that it never had
before"). In the realm of art, non-representational, abstract modern painting had a
profound effect on Stevens. See generally GLEN MACLEOD, WALLACE STEVENS AND
MODERN ART: FROM THE ARMORY SHOW TO ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM

(1993).
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poetry about the irrational aspects of the imagination. For Stevens, the life
of poetry was not logic; it was irrational experience.
4. Order versus Chaos
Reinforcing these observations about tension between imagination and
the law in Stevens's poetry is his constant theme of order versus chaos.
Now, however, the points get reversed. For Stevens, the concept of
order-so important in legal thinking-is central to his literary work. His
first book of poetry was called Harmonium and another was entitled Ideas
of Order. One of his most renowned poems is "The Idea of Order at Key
West," in which he praises the "Blessed rage for order ... The maker's
rage to order words of the sea. " 144 It would not be straining to infer that
Stevens's professional habits as a lawyer and the lawyer's natural
preoccupation with order as a high virtue are at work here. But the drift
seems at odds with some of Stevens's other concerns.
5.

Legal Reasoning

In two separate essays in The Necessary Angel, Stevens argued, in
essence, that poetry depended on the same type of reasoning as law. To
be sure, Stevens did not put it quite that way. He never explicitly
mentioned law or legal reasoning, but the point still holds, as a glance at
those essays shows. In one essay, for instance, Stevens explains that
"[p]oetry is a satisfying of the desire for resemblance" or "partial
similarity between two dissimilar things.""' From this statement, it is
only a small step to say, as Stevens might, that poetry is resemblance
between things, which is reasoning by analogy, which is at the heart of
legal reasoning.
Stevens drives the point home in the second essay, significantly titled
"Effects of Analogy." In that essay, our lawyer-poet speaks of the use of
poetic analogy in language distinctly legal. He quotes from a book on
logic that defines "inference by analogy" as "inferring that, since two
cases are alike in certain respects, they will also be alike in some other
respect."' 46 This type of logic is, of course, the classic statement of legal
reasoning.
144. Wallace Stevens, The Idea of Order at Key West, in IDEAS OF ORDER (1936),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 128, 130.
145. WALLACE STEVENS, Three Academic Pieces, in THE NECESSARY ANGEL, supra
note 31, at 69, 77.
146. WALLACE

STEVENS,

Three Academic Pieces, in id. at 105, 110.
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As Edward Levi, former Attorney General of the United States and
past president of the University of Chicago, put it at the start of his classic
book on legal reasoning:
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It
is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process
described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition
descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and then
applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity
is seen between cases; next the rule inherent in the first case is
announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second
case. 147
Stevens could not possibly have been unaware of the legal overtones of
what he was saying about analogy in poetry.
6.

Words as Traps

To a lawyer, words are basic tools, they are how we do our job. But
in one poem, "The Comedian as the Letter C," Stevens writes, with a
lawyer's weariness perhaps:
"The words of things entangle and
confuse. "148 What lawyer, what layperson, has not had the same lament
about legal documents, opinions and decisions? Maybe sensing a gulf
between the lawyer in him and the poet in him, Stevens had a character in
a short play Bowl, Cat and Broomstick, say: "A man with so firm a faith
149
in the meaning of words [i.e., a lawyer?] should not listen to poetry."
The idea of words as a snare crops up from time to time in Stevens's
poetry. Consider, for example, a Stevens poem entitled "Not Ideas About
the Thing But the Thing Itself." The very title itself expresses an
important aspirational goal of legal education and thinking. As the last
line of that poem says, such an approach will yield "A new knowledge of
reality."'
Stevens makes the same point in another poem:

147.

EDWARD

also CASS R.

H. LEvI,

SUNSTEIN,

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
LEGAL

INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
LIKE A LAWvYER (1996).

REASONING

(1996);

AND

POLITICAL

1-2 (1949); see
CONFLICT:

AN

KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING

148. Wallace Stevens, The Comedian as the Letter C, in HARMONIUM (1931),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 27, 41.
149. Wallace Stevens, Bowl, Cat and Broomstick, in OPus POSTHUMOUS supranote
28, at 168, 169.
150. Wallace Stevens, Not Ideas About the Thing But the Thing Itself, in THE ROCK
(1981), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 500, 534.
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It is never the thing but the version of the thing
The fragrance of the woman not herself. 15'
This is a theme Stevens returns to.
In "An Exercise for Professor X," Stevens explores it again. The
poem is:
I see a camel in my mind.
I do not say to myself, in English,
"There is a camel."
I do not talk to myself.
On the contrary, I watch.
And a camel passes in my mind.
This might happen to a Persian.
My mind and a Persian's
Are as much alike, then,
As moonlight on the Atlantic
52
Is like moonlight on the Pacific.
Here we see a short poem that every lawyer should memorize, lest he or
she think unclearly or draft or interpret documents improperly. Think
about a camel, not the word camel. In a field as abstract and
conceptualized as law, clear thinking is vital, and enhancing that clarity
was much in the air at the time Stevens was writing poetry. It is another
crucial point where Stevens and Holmes intersect.
The greatest jurists of Stevens's day proclaimed the same approach.
No less an authority than Holmes wrote in a famous law review article a
year before Stevens entered New York Law School that "we must think
things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into
151. Wallace Stevens, The Pure Good Of Theory, in TRANSPORT To SUMMER
(1947), reprintedin id., at 329, 332.
152. Wallace Stevens, An Exercise For ProfessorX, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supra
note 28, at 14. But legal problems can arise even by following Stevens's advice. Two
people may think of something with the same name, but be referring to different things.

In the celebrated case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375
(Ex. 1864), two merchants contracted over a shipment of cotton from Bombay to London
on a ship named "Peerless." Unfortunately, there were two ships in Bombay with the
name "Peerless," and the defendant buyer refused to pay for the cotton, claiming he had
meant the other ship "Peerless." The court awarded judgment for defendant based on

mutual mistake. Holmes discussed this case. See HOLMES, supra note 130, at 309;
DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 99, at 35-43; see also Kyle v. Kavanaugh, 103 Mass.
356 (1869) (two "Prospect Streets").
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the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the
true. "153 As a Supreme Court Justice, Holmes strummed the theme again
when he stated: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become
encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further
analysis." 5
Benjamin Cardozo agreed. "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched," Cardozo wrote on the New York Court of Appeals, "for55
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." 1
He warned against allowing the "picturesqueness of the epithets" to lead
us "to forget the essential term to be defined." 56 After he had replaced
Holmes on the Supreme Court, Cardozo noted that "a fertile source of
perversion" in legal theory is the "tyranny of labels. " 1 7 In other words,
we must consider not ideas about the thing, but the thing itself, as Stevens
said.
As these examples illustrate, not to think ideas about the thing but the
thing itself-to think things not words or labels-was a vital strain of
judicial thought while Stevens was studying and practicing law. It is still
key. And it is something all of us, whatever our line of work, need to
bear in mind constantly.
7.

Stress on Language

His awareness of words and what they can do only emphasized to
Stevens the importance of language. He was both a lawyer and a poet,
and felt a double dose of language's power. He stresses, moreover, the
importance of words to poetry in a way that particularly engages a
lawyer's mind. In his introduction to The Necessary Angel, Stevens
defines poetry as "the imagination manifesting itself in its domination of
153. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 443, 460 (1899); see also Law and the Court, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra
note 17, at 145-46 ("We need to think of things instead of words-to drop ownership,
money, etc., and to think of the stream of products; of wheat and cloth and railway
travel.").
154. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
155. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
156. Id. at 95.
157. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934). A superb judicial example
of this Stevensian line of thought comes from a less well-known source. Jack Pope, an
obscure judge on the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, wrote in a 1952 opinion: "One of
the inadequacies of language is that sooner or later, the thing is confused with the symbol
for that thing. When the mind is centered on the verbal description of something instead
of on the thing itself, we conclude that 'Pigs are rightly named, since they are such dirty
animals.'" Gaines v. Bader, 253 S.W.2d 1014, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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words."' 58 Many other lawyers would say much the same thing about law.
In the essay "The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words," Stevens goes
on: "above everything else, poetry is words .... Poetry is a revelation
in words by means of the words." 59 Stevens's focus here on words,
obviously fitting for a poet, still has a lawyerly tinge to it.
Stevens's emphasis on words reminds us of another law-trained writer
well known for his search for le mot juste. Flaubert's most famous
literary attribute was his constant rewriting and revising, his painstaking
quest for precisely the right way of expressing himself. 6 More than
coincidentally, the author of Madame Bovary spent a year studying law at
the Sorbonne when he was twenty-one years old.' 6 1 While there, he was
exposed to the usual law school emphasis on sensitivity to words and their
meanings. After all, the interpretation of statutes, cases, and documents
turns on how drafters express themselves. Might it not be possible that
the study of law helped to instill or enhance in both Stevens and Flaubert
a special awareness of words and language they might not have picked up
elsewhere? Of course their personalities may have made them that way,
but nevertheless the typical law school concentration on words probably
played a role.
8.

Ambiguity

Grey looks at his favorite poet's ambiguous verses and erroneously
argues that Stevens's ambiguity runs counter to legal standards. According
to Grey, law's "primary linguistic virtue is thus the absence of
ambiguity." 62 But that is not necessarily so. There are times when
writing should be clear and precise and times when it should be vague and
ambiguous.
Stevens understood this intuitively. Ambiguity is an
important attribute of certain legal writing, as two of the greatest Supreme
Court Justices in American history explained.
Holmes put it simply. From his legal experience and his familiarity
with the mask of language, Holmes understood how certainty is often an
illusion. "Delusive exactness," he wrote in a 1921 case, "is a source of
158.

WALLACE STEVENS,

Introduction to

THE NECESSARY ANGEL,

supra note 31,

at viii.

159. Id. at 32-33.
160. See MARIO

VARGAS LLOSA, THE PERPETUAL ORGY: FLAUBERT AND MADAME

BOVARY 80-81 (Helen Lane trans., Collins Publishers, 1st ed. 1986)
161. See generally id. at 55, 108-09; JULIAN BARNES, FLAUBERT'S

PARROT

21 (1984); HERBERT LOTTMAN, FLAUBERT: A BIOGRAPHY 43-54 (1989).
162. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 52.

17, 18,
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fallacy throughout the law. "163 By itself, that one short sentence from
Holmes should be enough to refute Grey's overbroad comment. But there
is more.
Consider the majestic generalizations of our Constitution, such as due
process, equal protection, federalism, separation of powers and so on. As
Chief Justice John Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland, the
framers set out only the "great outlines" of the structure they were
creating. 64 They did not try to pin down every detail-a course that
would have produced the "prolixity of legal code," one too rigid to last.
Grey's argument is an example of just what Chief Justice Marshall saw as
a mistake: using precise, detailed language regardless of purpose.
Ambiguity is necessary for growth in the law. The language of the
law cannot, thankfully, be entirely freed from ambiguity. Law would
come to a standstill if every ambiguity were resolved, for there would be
nothing left to interpret. Imagination takes advantage of ambiguity in the
language of the law. The strictly logical and formal rendering of law may
be the right attitude in a discipline that is closed; it is clearly the wrong
one when a discipline is still growing. Holmes, Marshall, and Stevens
knew that.
In being criticized for his ambiguity, moreover, Stevens is in excellent
legal company. Holmes and Cardozo also were criticized for the same
supposed flaw. Holmes, for example, has occasionally been faulted for
having "delighted in ambiguity and metaphoric expression," 65 for being
163. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J. dissenting). In a
letter to diplomat Lewis Einstein, Holmes also wrote: "One cannot be perfectly clear
until the struggle of thought is over and you have got so far past the idea that it is almost
a bore to state .... Therefore I do not regard perfect luminosity as the highest praise.

An original mind really at work is hardly likely to attain it. Those who are perfectly
clear are apt to be nearer the commonplace." HOLMES' EINSTEIN LETTERS 21 (James
Bishop Peabody ed., 1964).
164. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407. (1819). For a recent argument favoring
ambiguity in legal language, see Anthony Lewis, Mr. Clinton's Victims, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1996, at 33. Even Grey thinks that Stevens, by disclaiming certainty in life, by
celebrating ambiguity, carries an important lesson for the many lawyers who divide
everything into right and wrong or pretend such things do not matter. According to
Grey: "Stevens has something to say to [lawyers] about jurisprudence. Lawyers tend to
be absolutists or disappointed absolutists, and Stevens represents something in between."
Quoted in Margolick, supra note 32, at B7.
165. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 410 (1993) [hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOMES]; see also
G. EDWARD WHITE, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 197 (1978).
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"cryptic," 166 and for writing "highly ambiguous" opinions that were
difficult to understand.167 Cardozo has been the object of similar attacks.
His judicial opinions have been described as not being lucid, 6 but
"elliptical, convoluted, at times incomprehensible, "169 "frustrating, elusive,
and occasionally impenetrable." 70 One reads these comments about the
judicial opinions of Holmes and Cardozo and is stunned by how closely
they resemble frequent comments about the poetry of Wallace Stevens.
The critics use virtually the same words. In view of Grey's comments
about Stevens's ambiguity, it is refreshing to know that, for all the
criticisms of them, Holmes is still considered "the most illustrious figure
in the history of American law" 17' and Cardozo the "all-time greatest"
American judge. 172 The best legal writing and the best poetry are both
sometimes ambiguous.
9.

Poetic Style

A notable residue of Stevens's legal mind is his poetic style. It is, as
one might expect from a lawyer, highly formal and structured, controlled
and finely wrought. Stevens chose his words, thoughts and images with
great care, and it shows. No loose thinking or sloppy writing marks his
poetry. Every line of every poem seems to have been worked and
reworked, much as a polished legal document would be. This is not a
criticism, but an observation that may reflect the discipline and rigor of
legal training.
166. WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES supra note 165, at 410 ("a cryptic
quality"); Zechariah Chafee, Mr. Justice Cardozo, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, June 1932, at
41 ("cryptic passages").
167. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1977); see also WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supranote 165, at 480 (Holmes did not sufficiently
consider the need of others to understand); Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Hohnes: A
DissentingOpinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 9-10 (1963) (criticizing Holmes's opinions for,
among other things, being unclear).
168. Cardozo's "was not a lucid style." Anon Y. Mous [Jerome N. Frank], The
Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625, 638 (1943). But see
RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 13 (1990) (calling Cardozo's
opinions "uncommonly lucid").
169. GILMORE, supra note 167, at 75 (1977).
170. Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the
Allegheny College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1987).
171. RICHARD A. POSNER, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES ix (1992).
172. Bernard Weissman, Cardozo: "All-Time Greatest"AmericanJudge, 19 CUMB.
L. REV. 1 (1988).
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Equally a product of Stevens's legal training may be the nature of his
Stevens's poems contain many subtle forms of
poetic arguments.
reasoning. Stevens makes logic jump through hoops to make his poetic
points. This preternatural dexterity with logic resembles how a lawyer
argues. Stevens uses legal arguments in his poetry. The similarity has led
one critic73to note that Stevens often argues "with the rigor of a good
lawyer." 1
In this sense, Stevens's poetry reminds one of the abstract art of
Wassily Kandinsky. Like Stevens, Kandinsky studied law (Kandinsky
even taught law for ten years in Russia). Unlike Stevens, Kandinsky
eventually left the law entirely to pursue an artistic career, in his case nonrepresentational abstract painting. But the rigor of the law helped, as did
the law's method of logical reasoning. Kandinsky credited the law with
teaching him how to think abstractly. "I loved all these subjects [Roman
law, criminal law, Russian legal history and peasant law], and even today
I look back with gratitude to the many hours of enthusiasm, and perhaps
inspiration, which they brought me."' 74
Despite its abstract, non-representational quality, Kandinsky's work
always seems to reflect mental discipline, geometrical forethought, and
careful purpose. Unlike some modernists, Kandinsky's abstract art never
appears sloppy or chaotic. One would, for example, never confuse a
Kandinsky with a Jackson Pollock. Kandinsky, like Stevens, combined
legal distinction with artistic ability. They both believed reason played a
large role in the creative process.
His legal training and work-the lawyer-like quality of his
mind-probably helped more than a little in getting Stevens to submit his
Stevens would
artistic thoughts to the ordering impulses of art.
undoubtedly agree with Flaubert, that other former law student, who once
wrote his mistress Louise Colet: "One must not always think that feeling
is everything. Art is nothing without form."' 75
10. "Poetic Method" for Law
A related but distinct link between law and Stevens's poetry emerges
when we see a "poetic method" in law. Although "style" and "method"
are often synonyms, "poetic method" for law is a term of art that differs
173. ELEANOR COOK, POETRY WORD-PLAY, AND WORD-WAR IN WALLACE
3 (1983); see also RICHARDSON, supranote 23, at 20 (referring to Stevens's use
of subtle legal arguments folded into his poems); VENDLER, supra note 37, at 84.
STEVENS

174. KANDINSKY: COMPLETE WRITINGS ON ART 363 (Kenneth C. Lindsay & Peter

Vergo eds., 1982).
175. Michiko Kakutani, Stop Making Sense, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1996, § 6
(Magazine), at 18 (quoting Gustave Flaubert).
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from the "poetic style" just discussed. In Poethics, his 1992 book on law
and literature, Richard Weisberg includes a crucial preliminary section
176
entitled "The Poetic Method for Law, or How the Law Means."
Weisberg starts with the premise that form and substance are one in
literature, which is what he means by poetic method. According to
Weisberg, the poetic method "always insists on the unity of the words
used with the sense expressed by those words.""7 This is the familiar
notion, expressed by Wallace Stevens and many others, that great poems
and other valuable literary works cannot be wholly "explained" or reduced
to a mere message without robbing the works of their complexity of
structure, texture, and richness of experience. Stevens, as we know,
advocated the non-rational, non-linear aspects of poetry, particularly his
own. As Stevens declared, "My first proposition is that the style of a

poem and the poem itself are one. "178

Weisberg takes this poetic method-Stevens's poetic method-and tries
to discover how it works in law. As applied to law, Weisberg continues,
the poetic method "captures something essential that otherwise goes
unexpressed. " 179 Judicial language, for example, "is always more than the
mere translation of a 'holding' into words."180 Weisberg illustrates his
point by quoting famous lines-known to lawyers, law students, and nonlawyers alike-from judicial opinions by Cardozo, John Marshall, and
Holmes. Thus, concludes Weisberg, legal writing is like poetry in that
law means a certain thing above and beyond a legal rule. Put another
way, the poetic method for law upsets the usual division between legal
form and substance.
A superb explanation of the poetic method for law comes, not
unexpectedly, from one of the great practitioners of literary jurisprudence,
WEISBERG, supra note 55, at 5-10.
177. Id. at 6. Or, as one of Freud's inner circle put it, "the unity of form and
content ... must be regarded as the essence of creative work." OTTO RANK, Art and
Artist, in OTTO RANK, THE MYTH OF THE BIRTH OF THE HERO AND OTHER WRITINGS
170 (Philip Freund ed., Vintage Books 1964) (1932).
178. WALLACE STEVENS, Two orThree Ideas, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS supranote 28,
at 257.
179. WEISBERG, supra note 55, at 6. See also HERACLES' Bow, supra note 43, at
94 (stating that "legal and literary texts alike have a life and complexity that is not
reducible to statements of 'meaning' of this restartable, exhaustible, and scientifically
verifiable kind"); George D. Gopen, Rhyme and Reason: Why the Study of Poetry Is
the Best Preparationfor the Study of Law, 46 COLLEGE ENGLISH 333, at 346-47 (1984)
("Eventually the student of poetry understands what the student of law will have to
understand-that there is no separating substance from form or text from context.").
180. WEISBERG, supra note 55, at 6. See also HERACLES' Bow, supranote 43, at

176.
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Benjamin Cardozo.
Cardozo wrote:

1229

In his discussion of The Growth of The Law,

We see a kindred phenomenon in literature, alike in poetry and in
prose. The search is for the just word, the happy phrase, that
will give expression to the thought, but somehow the thought
itself is transfigured by the phrase when found. There is
emancipation in our very bonds. The restraints of rhyme or
metre, the exigencies of period or balance, liberate at times the
thought which they confine, and in imprisoning, release. 18'
Cardozo is saying, as Stevens said, that language transfigures thought.
Cardozo saw that the process was similar in both law and literature.
This "transfiguration of thought" is yet another connection between
law and Stevens's poetry. Cardozo wrote The Growth of the Law in
1924, one year after Harmonium, Stevens's first book of poetry, was
published. Given Cardozo's stature, it is highly likely that Stevens was
familiar with Cardozo's writings about law and literature, and agreed with
them. But in any event, the attitudes both espoused on poetic method are
strikingly similar. Stevens's view that good poems are hard to explain
(because they merge thought and expression into experience) also applies
to good legal writing. Both unite the message with the medium.
11. Pressure of Reality
Stevens underlines the "pressure of reality," which he views as "the
determining factor in the artistic character of an individual. " 82 For
Stevens, such external reality was represented, at least in part, by his
insurance law job. That work as a lawyer was, in Stevens's own words,
the "determining factor" in his artistic character. It is unlikely to have
been-and was not-invisible in his poetry.
12. Interdisciplinary Approach
For us to study Stevens's poetry for legal influences probably would
not have been alien to him. He occasionally adopted an interdisciplinary
181. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924), reprinted in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozO 225 (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1975)
[hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS]; see also BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, LAW AND
LITERATURE (1931), reprinted in id. at 339-40 ("Form is not something added to

substance as a mere protuberant adornment. The two are fused into a unity.").
182. WALLACE STEVENS, The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words, in THE
supra note 31, at 22-23.

NECESSARY ANGEL,
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approach, perhaps most notably in his essay on "The Relations between
Poetry and Painting." 183 As far as Stevens was concerned, he thought
poetry and painting were both poetry, one in words, the other in paint.
Sad to say, Stevens never wrote expressly on the relations between poetry
and law. We are left to deduce or infer-if we can-his thoughts on that
subject.
No doubt picking up on his essay about poetry and painting, a 1995
exhibit at Baruch College in Manhattan used Wallace Stevens as a way to
explore the links between poetry and art.
Entitled "Painting in
Poetry/Poetry in Painting: Wallace Stevens and Modem Art," the exhibit
tried to show how twentieth-century modern art influenced Stevens's work
and how Stevens's poetry in turn greatly affected later generations of
American artists. A New York Times review of the exhibit described its
interdisciplinary premise as "refreshing," and added that Stevens's
"connection with art has been little examined." 184
As we know, art is not the only discipline whose link to Stevens has
been too little examined. The 1995 exhibit at Baruch College on the
relationship between poetry, painting, and Stevens, unintentionally makes
us want to consider how law, so much a part of Stevens's life, fits into his
personal equation and, more broadly, into the creation of art itself. Just
as modem artists were fundamentally important to Stevens's work as a
whole, so too was his training, work, and thinking as an attorney. Stevens
was affected by the work of at least three law-trained artists, C6zanne,
Kandinsky, and Matisse. 5 Law did play a central role in his poetry, his
poetic theory, and the unusual character of his poetic development.
Stevens's poetry was a product of cross-pollination of several currents in
his culture. We need more such cross-fertilization.

183. WALLACE STEVENS, The RelationsBetween Poetry and Paintings,in id. at 15776.
184. Holland Cotter, The Umbilical Kinship of Painters and Poets, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1995, at C28.

185. See LENSING, supranote 23, at 100-01 ("The sensibility that Stevens must have
seen as closely allied to his own was that of Matisse .... The two were contemporaries;
they came to their work a artists relatively late and after the study of law."); MACLEOD,
supranote 143; WILSON E. TAYLOR, Of a Remembered Time, in A CELEBRATION, supra
note 6, at 100 (Stevens's "interest in paintings was centered on the works of Cdzanne.").
Of course, Picasso-who had no legal training-was an inspiration for the poem "The
Man with the Blue Guitar." Klee was another favorite of Stevens's. The influence of
modem artists on Stevens only reinforces the notion that his poetry should be analogized
as the verbal equivalent of non-representational art.
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E. It Cannot Be Otherwise
The results of our preliminary search for a legal interior made exterior
in Stevens's literary work are surprising only in that they challenge the
widespread views of commentators who have paid insufficient attention to
what Stevens was saying. "It is often said of a man," Stevens himself
wrote in a 1948 essay, "that his work is autobiographical in spite of every
subterfuge."1 86 Then he immediately added, tersely but crucially: "It
cannot be otherwise."18 7 Giving another clue, Stevens wrote in "Nudity
in the Colonies" that "one is most disclosed when one is most
anonymous."' 8 8 Stevens's profession as a lawyer was an important part of
his autobiography. It would blink reality, even fly in the face of common
sense, and allow oneself to be seduced by Stevens's studied professional
anonymity in his poetry to expect that those poems were uninfluenced by
his legal training and profession, by what he did most of every day.
Grey is quite wrong when he asserts that "any connection between
" 89
[Stevens's] poetry and law does not turn on how he made his living. i
And Posner is equally wrong in his dismissive attitude toward any link
between Stevens's poetry and the law. Stevens made his living as a
lawyer and it did have an impact, as he himself recognized, on his literary
output. To read through Stevens's poetry with his legal life in mind is to
discover nuances and subtleties not otherwise readily discernible. As a
result, in Grey's words, "this poet can add to our understanding of
law," 90 though not for the reasons or in the ways Grey puts forward. Are
the examples given here of how Stevens's legal thinking affected his
literary work enough proof for Grey, Posner and those who agree with
them? Perhaps not, for, as Stevens himself once said, "It can never be
satisfied, the mind, never."' 9 ' The proof tendered, however persuasive,
186. 'WALLACE

STEVENS,

Effects of Analogy, in

note 31, at 121.
187. Id.
188. WALLACE

STEVENS,

Nudity In The Colonies, in IDEAS OF ORDER (1952),

THE NECESSARY ANGEL,

supra

reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 145.
189. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 8.

190. Id. at 6.
191. WALLACE STEVENS, The Well Dressed Man With A Beard, in PARTS OF A
WORLD (1942), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supranote 2, at 247.
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is by no means exhaustive, but merely instances' 92 that may help explain
Stevens's double life.
IV. THE DOUBLE LIFE EXPLAINED
Two things of opposite natures seem to depend
On one another, as a man depends
On a woman, day on night, the imagined
On the real
Wallace Stevens, "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction " "'
The way Stevens coupled law and poetry has struck some as a strange,
even perplexing mystery. In the first paragraph of his book on Stevens,
Grey says that the legal profession "generally assumes that nothing could
be more remote from law's theory and practice than poetry." 9 Such
people consider law antithetical to poetry. How, they ask, can a working
lawyer, particularly an insurance lawyer, who makes his living in a
supposedly soulless, philistine and boring world of insurance law, write
beautiful poetry? The question presupposes, of course, an incongruity
between Stevens's poetry and how he made his living, a gulf between art
and law. Even Grey says an "inexplicable abyss divides" Stevens's
professional and literary life. 95
But exactly why does the concept of a lawyer-poet surprise us as some
form of paradox? Why does such a double life intrigue us and seem like
an unlikely pairing, a yoking of disparates? Part of the mystery is that a
poet is seen as an inspired creator, while a lawyer is perceived as an earth192. For example, an article recently published in The Wallace Stevens Journal
creatively examines one of Stevens's early legal cases in the hope of drawing "some
conclusions about the interplay between Stevens the lawyer and Stevens the poet." Steven
Richman, Ships in the Night: Stevens and The Mount Desert, 21 WALLACE STEVENS J.
55, 56 (1997).
One is tempted to allude to another category that has to do more with psychology
than any particular legal theme. In his old age, Stevens was extraordinarily productive
and creative-perhaps uniquely so-in his poetry. "Not a year out of the last twenty" of
Stevens's life is, according to one commentator, "undistinguished by the writing of a
great poem." BLOOM, supra note 57, at 89. This continued flowering between the ages

of 55 and 75 is where we may find Stevens's "lasting eminence," which constitutes a
"glory almost unique in the poetry of the last several centuries." Id. Such productivity
in old age may well be a lawyer's trait. See infra p. 98.
193. WALLACE STEVENS, Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT To
SUMMER (1947), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 380, 392.
194. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 1.
195. Id. at 10.
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bound manipulator of prosaic rules for less than noble purposes. Another
aspect of the problem stems from the prevailing Romantic dogma of two
centuries -- that the creative artist must be an outlaw and pariah engaged
in transgression, violence and madness in order to plumb the depths of his
or her genius. There is a widely accepted myth of the bourgeoisie versus
the artist, that a poet has to be alienated, estranged from society and
defiant about it.' 96 Stevens called this "the caricature in people's minds
that exists there as the image of the poet . . . as an idler, a man without
clothes, a drunk, etc." 197 Such perceptions die hard.
The life and work of Stevens-like Corot, Matisse and Braque-tell
a different story. They do not conform to the outlaw convention, to the
notion of the creative artist as the enemy of all social institutions and
constraints, filled with haughty disdain for the corrupt modern culture of
progress.
"The contemporary poet," wrote Stevens, "is simply a
contemporary man who writes poetry. He looks like anyone else, acts like
the same kind of clothes, and is certainly not an
anyone else, wears
98
incompetent."
People, even admirers, often were taken aback when they met Stevens
for the first time. Clad in subdued three-piece, dark gray suits, and white
shirts and quiet ties, with close cropped, neat white hair, the portly
Stevens struck a decidedly non-poetic image in person. His public
readings were delivered in dull monotones., 9 On the outside he looked
more the bourgeois businessman or middle-class lawyer than a tortured,
Byronic, bohemian, alienated, starving, literary artist. Unlike Gauguin,
for example, Stevens was not a struggling artist-hero who sacrificed the
comforts of bourgeois life to begin his search for artistic and cultural
rejuvenation. Faced with his unpoetic persona and his regular paycheck
for a respectable job, some critics and fellow writers, perhaps moved by
envy, faulted Stevens's work for its lack of emotion.
196. See James Atlas, The Fall of Fun, NEW YORKER, Nov. 18, 1996, at 62, 64.
A good example of the myth at work is George Steiner's comment that the parable
"Before the Law" was written "by a gentleman [Kafka] in a bowler hat going to and from
his daily insurance business, defies my grasp." GEORGE STEINER, No PASSION SPENT
250-51 (1996). Perhaps not coincidentally, Kafka, like Stevens, was a lawyer who

worked for an insurance company.
197. Letter from Wallace Stevens to Harvey Breit, in LETTERS, supra note 12, at
413, 414 (quoting previous letter from Harvey Breit).
198. Id. "Inspiration," as the poet who won the 1996 Nobel Prize for Literature
said on accepting her award, "is not the exclusive privilege of poets or artists. There is,
there has been, there will always be, a certain group of people whom inspiration visits.
It's made up of all those who've consciously chosen their calling and do their job with
love and imagination," including, one supposes, lawyers. SZYMBORSKA, supra note 49,

at 28. However, "there aren't many such people." Id.
199. See BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 193, 198-199.
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Frequently a sore point among critics, Stevens's steady earnings from
his day job-he was derisively referred to as the "money man" 200-bear
directly on the double life. To those critics not acting out of jealousy, it
is, at bottom, a question of art versus commerce, the Muse versus
Mammon. Such critics expressed the conviction that Stevens, faced with
a choice between serving the Muse (art) and Mammon (commerce), had
chosen Mammon, that he was a dull oaf whose soul was content with
money grubbing. In the view of such critics, it was a struggle for the
poet's soul, and Mammon won by a knockout.
In fact, the case is not so clear as that. Stevens did indeed enjoy a
secure income from his insurance law job, even during the Depression, but
his material success was offset by turmoil and tension in his most intimate
relationships. Moreover, it is difficult to say that Stevens neglected his art
when one looks at the formidable output of fine poems he managed
between surety bond claims. It may be truer to say that this time the
Muse and Mammon fought to a draw.
However that may be, what one commentator has dubbed "the
apparent chasm" 20 ' between Stevens's legal work and his poetry may be
just that: apparent, nothing more. To be sure, Stevens divided his life
between the world of insurance law and the world of poetic imagination.
Yet the seeming double life may form two related aspects of the same life.
Even so, it unnerves many of us. We feel the need to at least attempt to
explain the apparent incongruities in Stevens's life. The seeming paradox
becomes more understandable, however, in terms of:
general
considerations, Stevens's own explanation, and other examples of double
lives well lived. We can then be more open to a synthesis of the powerful
case that can be made for the creative artist as someone who can probe the
subtle and elusive condition of the normal because of his or her own
superior normality.
A. General Considerations
The so-called mystery of Stevens's double life is aggravated by
widespread misunderstanding about what it means even to have a double
life. When the concept of a double life is analyzed, however, it seems
much less of a mystery. In fact, it is common, indeed universal.
At the outset we ought to try to define what a double life is. "Double
life" is not in the dictionary, so we have to construct a definition from
200. See, e.g.,

VENDLER,

supra note 37, at 76; John Berryman, 219: So Long?

Stevens, in THE DREAM SONGS. Stevens did not help the situation by saying, "Money
is a kind of poetry." WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supranote 28,
at 191.
201. See BATES, supra note 23, at viii.
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common usage, life experience and general understanding. Basedon these
sources of meaning, the least a double life signifies is one person doing
two activities, especially activities not ordinarily linked. A double life also
connotes an element of secrecy as to one of the two activities, and often
enough it is the secret half of the double life that expresses the person's
truest desires. Occasionally the double life has an aspect of hypocrisy, as
when a clergyman or family-values politician gets caught in a sex scandal.
This definition, minus the scandal, fits Wallace Stevens. Law and
poetry are certainly two activities that, for one reason or another, are often
thought of as very different. Insofar as secrecy is concerned, Stevens tried
not to talk about or otherwise let his poetry intrude into his legal work, so
that many co-workers did not even know he wrote poetry.2 2 To his
colleagues, poetry was a hidden part of Stevens's personality. Certainly
it is arguable that poetry was where Stevens lived more fully than in law.
And even as to hypocrisy, Stevens's poetry may reveal cracks in the
seemingly smooth exterior of his life. All in all, then, Stevens qualifies
as a double life.
Stevens is like a character in a famous short story by Chekhov. In
"The Lady with the Pet Dog," Chekhov the doctor-writer drew on his own
experiences and tapped into his own emotions to knowingly and
perceptively describe the double life in such a way that would have caused
Stevens the lawyer-poet to undergo the shock of recognition. "He had two
lives," wrote Chekhov of his fictional protagonist Gurov, "an open one,
seen and known by all who needed to know it, full of conventional truth
and conventional falsehood, exactly like the lives of his friends and
acquaintances; and another life that went on in secret."
Chekhov expanded on this explanation of Gurov's double life.
And through some strange, perhaps accidental combination of
circumstances, everything that was of interest and importance to
him, everything that was essential to him, everything about which
he felt sincerely and did not deceive himself, everything that
constituted the core of his life was going on concealed from
others; while all that was false, the shell in which he hid to cover
the truth -- his work at the bank, for instance ... all that went on
in the open.20 3

202. See
CELEBRATION,

RICHARD ELLMAN, How Wallace Stevens Saw Himself, in A
supra note 6, at 151 ("Stevens prided himself on the disconnection of his

two careers.").

203. ANTON CHEKHOV, The Lady With the Pet Dog (1899) in A DOCTOR'S VISIT:
SHORT STORIES 157-58 (Avrahm Yarmolinsky trans., Bantam Books 1988).
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Chekhov concluded: "Every man led his real, most interesting life under
cover of secrecy as under cover of night." After reading these passages,
we are not surprised to learn that Stevens had in his personal library at
least two volumes of Chekhov. 204
Part of the problem is underestimating the number of people who live
double lives. In an important sense, we all lead at least two lives -- our
outer life and our inner life. Our outer life is what the world sees on a
daily basis: how we earn a living, how we dress, what our family
situation is. Our inner life, by contrast, is private; it is what goes on
inside our head, our thoughts, feelings, hopes, desires -- often what drives
our outer actions. That inner life is as real and enriching as clamorous
outer reality; the life within is every bit as genuine as the life without. In
Stevens's words, "we live in the mind." 20 5 From this perspective, every
human being has both an exterior and an interior life, each of which is
vital to understanding the whole person.
Many people lead other kinds of socially acceptable double lives.
Anyone with an avocation or an intense hobby may qualify for a double
life. The waiter who is an aspiring actor is only one example. Another,
no doubt more familiar example, is the evening law student who works
during the day. A number of competitors in the Olympic games, for
instance, have day jobs far removed from athletics: the weight-lifting
traveling salesman, the fencing professor, the handball-whiz accountant,
the badminton-playing shopkeeper.20 6 Not everyone subscribes to the
view, "My work is my life." And if asked to choose their job or their
avocation, they probably could not choose and would soldier on in both.
For the creative artist, the double life has particular bite. The artist
may lead a public life that has little obvious connection to his or her work.
It is common, as a matter of history and tradition, for writers to work at
other obscure jobs while pursuing their artistic ambitions. Many closet
writers are waiting tables, driving taxi-cabs, or practicing law, because
they cannot support themselves by their art. Franz Kafka, one of the
greatest modern writers in the German language, was almost an exact
contemporary of Stevens (Kafka was born in 1883, Stevens in 1879) and
a highly respected insurance lawyer. All of these are double lives.
Often there is a public facade, a mask behind which a private
mythology is hidden. 0 7 A major goal of literary biography is, in the
phrase of Jim Morrison's song, to "break on through to the other side"
and to discover the private self-concept that guides a given artist's life, to
204.
205.
206.
Olympic
207.

BATES, supra note 128, at 57.
WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28, at 190.
See Roger Thurow, Remember Amateurs? A Few Still Compete In the
Games, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1996, at 1.
See James Wood, The Story of Ozick, NEw YORKER, May 13, 1996, at 88.
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locate the private dreams of the self, the keys to a deeper truth. To arrive
at the heart of an artist's life, we need to glimpse hidden motives,
rationalizations and concealment of personality; we must try to find the
inner myths and the inner propulsion, because the subject's self-concept
or private myth provides a covert drive and mitigating force that may help
explain the life and the world. 2 8 As Wallace Stevens put it, "We have to
step boldly into man's interior world or not at all. "209
Lawyers, too, by the nature of their profession, lead a double life as
they try to balance a life of study with a life of action. Many of the
greatest lawyers have been scholarly types who often gave up the peace
and quiet of the study for the rough and tumble of the courtroom. To be
drawn away from the active life of advocacy by study is contrary to the
lawyer's notion of moral duty. The ideal was Cicero, a Roman blend of
lawyer, statesman and philosopher, who 210
said in a famous passage that,
"The whole glory of virtue is in activity."
Cicero's comment resembles Justice Holmes's remark that, "The final
test . . . is battle in some form . . . . It is one thing to utter a happy
phrase from a protected cloister; another to think under fire -- to think for
action upon which great interests depend." 21' Many lawyers seek to
achieve the Ciceronian ideal-a double life-of balancing the contemplative
life with the active life. They choose a life of action in the law, but do
not turn their back on the life of thought. Their professional lives become
thought brigaded with action.2
This balancing in the lawyer's life leads directly into the familiar and
longstanding tradition of law and literature. Of course this tradition makes
the seeming paradox of the lawyer-poet dissolve after a moment's thought.
The contemporary antagonism between law and poetry is a child of our
age. The lawyer-poet has long been a familiar figure in cultural life.
208. See LEON EDEL, WRITING LIVES 30, 106, 173 (1984).
209. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supranote 28, at 195; see
also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, 11. 6-7 (Yale) ("the' exterior nor the
inward man resembles what it was").
210. See ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS INAMERICAN CULTURE74

(1984).
"The great end of life is not knowledge but action." Thomas Henry Huxley, Technical
Education (1877), quoted in STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE 335 (1985).
Marx said the same thing: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways:
the point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in BASIC
WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY: KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS 245

(Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959).
211. OLIVER WENDELLHOLMES, George Otis Shattuck, in THE ESSENTIALHOLMES,
supra note 17, at 97.

212. Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(speech brigaded with action).
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Ovid, Virgil, Petrarch, and John Donne studied law before they wrote
poetry. Several great British writers were also lawyers. Even a fictional
nineteenth-century Russian lawyer in one of Chekhov's stories led this
double life: "He liked being a barrister, but he considered novels, not
legal work, his true vocation in life. "213 The fusion of law and literature
in America before the Civil War, brilliantly described by Robert Ferguson,
was particularly pronounced.
As Ferguson points out in his extraordinary 1984 book Law and
Letters in American Culture, a "now forgotten configuration of law and
letters . . . dominated literary aspirations from the Revolution until the
fourth decade of the nineteenth century. "214 Critics of the time trained for
law, and attorneys controlled many of the important journals. Lawyers
also wrote many of the country's first important novels, plays and poems.
Washington Irving (Rip Van Winkle, The Legend of Sleepy Hollow, A
History of New York), Richard Henry Dana, Jr. (Two Years Before the
Mast), James Fenimore Cooper (thirty-two novels, including The Last of
the Mohicans, The Pioneers and The Pathfinder), and William Cullen
Bryant ("Thanatopsis") are only a few of the most notable lawyer-authors.
Both Longfellow and Emerson studied law after college. The lawyer as
writer dominated the literature of the early Republic.
In more modern times, the humanist tradition of the lawyer-poet has
continued. It is often forgotten that Edgar Lee Masters, author of the
groundbreaking Spoon River Anthology and the third pillar (with Carl
Sandburg and Vachel Lindsay) of the "poetic renaissance" in the midwest
during the second decade of this century, was not only a lawyer but for2 1a
number of years was the law partner of the legendary Clarence Darrow.
And then there was Archibald MacLeish, author of much leading poetry,
graduate of Harvard Law School, and legal practitioner for a number of
years. 1 6 Even today Lawrence Joseph (a St. John's University law
professor)," 7 Steven Richman (an active practitioner),21 8 and Henry Stone
213. ANTON CHEKHOv, Three Years, in ANTON CHEKHOv, THE FIANCEE AND
OTHER STORIES 121 (Ronald Wilks trans., Penguin 1986).
214. FERGUSON, supra note 210, at 5.
215. For the best study of Masters as lawyer-poet see Richman, EdgarLee Masters
and the Poetics of Legal Realism, supra note 15. See also STONE, supra note 18, at 186,
189-90. Richman regards Masters as "the forgotten man of law and literature."
Richman, supraat 103.
216. See infra pp. 74-81.
217. See Cohen, supra note 18, at B8; Matthew Goldstein, Law ProfessorHas the
Heart of a Poet, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 1993 at 1.
218. Richman identifies the following other principal American lawyer-poets: Sidney
Lanier, James Russell Lowell, Joaquin Miller, Charles Reznikoff, and John Goldfrey
Saxe. Richman, supra note 15, at 103 n.1.
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(whose privately published collection of poetry, The Fig in Winter, is
charming) are among those who keep alive the fusion of law and poetry.
Recently the lawyer-writer has become a phenomenon -- more
widespread, more famous, and more commercially successful than ever.
John Grisham and Scott Turow are only the most well known of a group
of busy lawyer-writers flooding agents with manuscripts and stores with
books about lawyers and their cases. Sometimes you get the feeling that
if you do not have a law degree, no one in publishing is going to read
your next manuscript. Besides going to class and reading their casebooks,
several of today's law students are busy writing novels and screenplays.219
To paraphrase a famous dark quip by an old Harvard dean about the odds
of surviving law school: look at the person on your right, look at the
person on your left; chances are that by the time all three of you graduate,
one of you will have written a fictional account of a law school
experience. You see the example of lawyers who have become wellknown authors and want to do the same. So much for wonder at the
double life of lawyer and writer.
For the same person to practice both law and literature is, when one
thinks about it, natural enough. Both depend on effective use of language
and understanding of human nature. Lawyers try to persuade by using
words, just as writers use words to move their readers. The lawyer and
the writer need skill in mobilizing language to their ends. Their common
attribute is eloquence.' 2 That is why it should not be surprising that one
may simultaneously be a lawyer and a writer or a poet.
By now, 1997, interest in law and literature has created a rapidly
growing and distinct discipline. During the last twenty-five years or so,
lawyers, law professors, and judges have debated whether those who study
law should also study literature. Books, articles, law review symposia,
new specialized journals, and new organizations have focused on law and
literature. Seminars at bar association meetings and judicial conferences
have begun to discuss the topic. A number of colleges and law
schools-including New York Law School-currently offer courses on law
and literature. It has gotten to the point now where law and literature is
considered one of the schools of contemporary jurisprudence, along with
219. James Barron, PresumedBest Seller, N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1996, at 21 (stating
that "[y]ou wouldn't believe how many people in that law school [i.e., Columbia] are
working on novels and screenplays." (quoting Brad Meltzer, a graduate of Columbia
University School of Law, who wrote The Tenth Justice as a law student)).
220. THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 15; see also HERACLES' Bow,

supra note 43, at 4 ("A lawyer's professional day is largely made up of conversations,
oral and written, in which the object is to persuade another to a particular view. In this
sense he or she is a professional rhetorician, and must be concerned with the possibilities

of rhetoric as a way of life.").
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critical legal studies, law and economics, critical race theory, and feminist
legal theory.22'
All things considered, law and art are not that strange a duo. They
share a fundamental approach, a connecting thread of intellect in various
fields of expression, that may help explain the lawyer-poet and other
lawyer-artists. This basic outlook is: both law and art try to understand
some part of the dark forces and bring them under the direction of reason.
Law and art are organizing activities carried out by the self in response to
a chaotic world. Both require structural form. If you make your life's
work out of passion, then there does not need to be any difference between
law and art. This premise is common to both enterprises and may aid in
understanding Stevens's double life.
B. Stevens's Explanation
Stevens's double life has presented apparent contradictions to almost
everyone who has considered it, except for Stevens himself. Stevens's
explanation of his double life took a number of different forms. First is
what he actually said about it, his private mythology. But to go behind
what he said, we need to look, secondly, at the turmoil in his personal life
and how it contributed to his double life. Third is the evidence contained
in his artistic writing, and fourth is the reality of the double life. Fifth and
finally is a neglected paper by Stevens on the "all-round man." These five
sources flesh out and add ambiguity, nuance, and texture to Stevens's
explanation of his double life.
1. What Stevens Said
For his part, Stevens never made it clear whether he accepted,
admitted, rejected, or denied having a double life. True, Stevens said that
he saw no incongruity between his own legal and poetic worlds, that the
221. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 149-66 (1995). Some of the
leading works of the law and literature movement include: PETER BROOKS & PAUL
GEWIRTz, LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (1996); RONALD
DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature,in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
146-166 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE45-86 (1986); FERGUSON, supra note
210; Posner, supra note 66; IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE (1994); RICHARD
WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984); WEISBERG, supra note 55; JAMES BOYD
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990); WHITE, supra note 121; HERACLES' BOW,
supra note 43; James Boyd White, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); Robert
Weisberg, The Law-LiteratureEnterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988); James Boyd
White, Law andLiterature: No Manifesto, 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); James Boyd
White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature? 102 HARV. L. REV. 2032 (1989)
(book review).
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writing of poetry in no way conflicted with his professional life or manner
of making a living. But he generally tried to keep his literary activities
separate from the office. He did not seek literary publicity and did not
want his office colleagues to regard him as anything but an insurance
lawyer. As an insurance lawyer, he did not have to worry about money,
unlike most poets. His inner life, which so baffled others, was to Stevens,
however, a seamless web.
Being an insurance lawyer and poet were not for Stevens mutually
exclusive activities. He declared in no uncertain terms: "One is not a
lawyer one minute and a poet the next .... I don't have a separate mind
for legal work and another for writing poetry. I do each with my whole
mind."222 Stevens made the whole business seem effortless, and he carried
it off with aplomb. To the outside world, Stevens led an untroubled
existence commuting between his two realms.
Stevens expanded on that theme in a 1942 letter to Harvey Breit. He
referred to something Breit had written "about a point at which I turned
from being a lawyer to writing poetry." To this, Stevens definitively
replied: "There never was any such point." Stevens went on to add: "I
have always been intensely interested in poetry, even when I was a
boy."2
Here, again, we see Stevens forcefully claiming to be both
lawyer and poet simultaneously.
Stevens never said or felt it was "odd" for him, an insurance lawyer,
to do literary things. "Other people say that sort of thing," noted Stevens.
"Is any man supposed to be engaged in business to the exclusion of
everything else?" Stevens asked. "And, if he is, what do people think of
him?" 4 Stevens was proud that he could master more then one thing, and
he scorned others who were unable to do so. 2
In some ways Stevens did not understand the curiosity about his life.
He thought the acute antagonism in America between business and poetry
and the arts in general is overdone. He regarded it as "silly" that
someone's ability to live in both worlds should be so widely doubted on
both sides of the gap between commerce and culture. 6 But lawyers who
worked with him had mixed reactions.
222. Letter from Wallace Stevens to Harvey Breit (July 29, 1942), in LETTERS,
supra note 12, at 413-414.
223. Id. at 413.
224. BRAZEAU, supranote 22, at 163. For reports of other business people-poets,
see, e.g., Paul Helou, Walking Away From CorporateSecurity for the Life of a Poet,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1992, § 13 (Westchester Weekly), at 21; Mukul Pandya, They're
in a Positionto Mix Metaphors With Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, § 3 (Money
and Business), at 5.
225. BRAZEAU, supranote 22, at 58.

226. See id. at 129.
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"A sort of sane schizophrenic" is how one of the lawyers who worked
with Stevens described him. "He had these two compartments in his
mind, poetry and law, and they never got together," the co-worker
explained. If his poetry was incomprehensible, Stevens's legal writing was
"beautifully lucid" and his legal mind was clear and orderly.2 7 In short,
Stevens "was a very difficult person to figure out. 22 8 Other colleagues
did not think he led two separate lives, but saw one mind and one
personality at work in different arenas." 9
When we ask whether Wallace Stevens considered himself a lawyer
or poet first, we should think of the answer in the form of an anecdote told
by Stevens himself. One day the Pulitzer Prize-winning poet had gone
straight from his Hartford law office to a lecture at Yale University. After
sifting through his briefcase, he took out two files. One was his file for
the law and the other was his file on poetry. He had them side by side in
the same bag, like the left and right sides of the same brain."
Stevens sometimes spoke of the value of his legal job and how it
helped his poetry. Were he an academic, Stevens said once, he "would
have had far less reason for writing poetry.""' He liked his job and
thought that other poets who were university professors were "kept
men."' 2 He was glad that he earned his living separately and apart from
his poetry. He was that rare find: a poet unbeholden to a university.
Today, he would be even rarer, as non-academic intellectuals have become
an endangered
species. In a sense his attitude toward academic poets was
3
prescient.
227. See id. at 28. Stevens's clear and orderly legal mind and his lucid legal
analysis bear on his poetry. As Julian Barnes puts it:
"Mystification is simple; clarity is the hardest thing of all .... Not rhyming

is easier than rhyming. I don't mean art should be as clear as the instructions
on a packet of seeds; I'm saying that you trust the mystifier more if you know
he's deliberately choosing not to be lucid. You trust Picasso all the way
because he could draw like Ingres."
BARNES, supra note 161, at 108. By the same token, you trust Wallace Stevens all the
way because he's deliberately choosing not to be lucid.
228. BRAZEAU, supranote 22, at 28; see also id. at 67 ("I've always wondered how
he could separate his mind between poetry and all that's involved in poetry and this
mundane, realistic surety-claims world. They're just two ends of the pole: One is
fantasy and the other is real as real can get."). Stevens does appear to be most puzzling,
most difficult to understand and explain. He is a bundle of contradictions.
229. See BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 56-58.
230. See id. at 172.
231. Id. at 173.
232. Id. at 56.
233. See RUSSEL L. JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS 7 (1987).
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Stevens's legal work gave him a healthy dose of reality, of the
workaday world, which leavened his poetry and provided material and
experience. Stevens understood how art depended on the subconscious,
how difficult (if not impossible) it must be to try to spend all one's time
thinking about poetry. As he once advised a young admirer: "You should
be more in contact with the real things of life, not be so absorbed in
literature."" Stevens's divided life provided for him a needed balance.
The mundane reality of surety claims aided in some way the composition
of beautiful abstract poetry.
Stevens felt that his legal work, like his poetry, required creativity and
imagination. "Poetry and surety claims aren't as unlikely a combination
as they may seem," he said in 1954. "There is nothing perfunctory about
them, for each case is different. "23 That statement echoed an earlier
comment by Stevens along the same lines, in a short essay on "Surety and
Fidelity Claims" in a 1938 insurance magazine. There Stevens, referring
to such insurance law work, wrote: "There is nothing cut and dried about
any of these things: you adapt yourself to each case."236 One commentator
thought Stevens's essay "Insurance and Social Change" could serve as a
"prolegomenon to any future poetry of insurance."' In essence, Stevens
took a creative approach to his law work, no matter how routine it may
have seemed to the uninitiated.
2. Turmoil in Stevens's Double Life
A poet's explanation of his life, no less than his explanation of a
poem, is suspect and should not be accepted at face value. In both cases,
as Stevens seemed to recognize, the Intentional Fallacy entitles us to be
skeptical of what the poet says he meant. 238 Stevens's explanation of his
double life strikes us as a bit of studied insouciance, too smooth and
superficial, slightly simplistic and glib, whether intentionally so or not.
For a thoughtful poet, he seems to be avoiding any deep self-analysis or
introspection about his own life, which seems quite uncharacteristic.
234. BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 142.
235. See Lewis Nichols, Talk With Mr. Stevens, N.Y. TIMEs
1954, at 3.
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236. WALLACE STEVENS, Surety And Fidelity Claims, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra

note 28, at 237-238.
237. BATES, supra note 23, at 158.
238. See W.K. WIMsATT, THE VER1AL

ICON 3-18 (1954). As Stevens himself
wrote: "In the case of a competent critic the author may well have a great deal to find
out about himself and his work." Letter from Wallace Stevens to Hi Simons (Jan. 9,
1940), in LETTERS, supra note 12, at 346.

1244

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Perhaps Stevens's portrayal of the ease of travelling back and forth
from the legal life to the literary life hid some deeper, more personal,
more complex explanation. After all, one of the most fascinating aspects
of Stevens's life and career is his technique for making it appear as if he
had resolved the conflicts within that life and career. But Leon Edel, one
of our finest literary biographers, has told us: "Art is the result not of
calm and tranquility, however much the artist may, on occasion,
experience calm in the act of writing. It springs from tension and passion,
from a state of disequilibrium in the artist's being."3 9
In Stevens's case, tension, passion, and disequilibrium in the artist's
being lurked in abundance just below the superficial calm and tranquility
of his explanation of the double life. His comments about the intrinsic
value of his job and what it contributed to his poetry are to some extent
rationalizations. He became a lawyer because he could not make a living
at literature. Law was a means of earning a living. Deep tension marked
his very decision to go to law school, and in this way New York Law
School played a vital role in the poet's development.
a. Decision to Go to Law School
All was not as calm and serene along the path of his literary-legal
career as the mature Stevens would have us think. In March 1901, when
his fledgling career as a writer was floundering, the twenty-two-year-old
Stevens had a difficult meeting about his future with his father. This is
how Stevens reported it at the time in his journal:
I had a good long talk with the old man in which he did most of
the talking. One's ideas don't get much of a chance under such
conditions. However, he's a wise man. We talked about the law
which he has been urging me to take up. I hesitated -- because
this literary life, as it is called, is the one I always had as an ideal
and Iam not quite ready to give it up because it has not been all
that I wanted it to be.' 4°
What a tense conversation that must have been!
Stevens's journal entry for the next day reveals more conflict with his
father. Stevens found his desire to quit journalism and devote himself
fully to writing "torn to pieces" by his father. Then the common question
of money comes up. "If I only had enough money to support myself,"
writes Stevens, "I am afraid some of the tearing would be in vain." Next
Stevens adds with a final chagrin: "But he seems always to have reason
239. EDEL, supra note 208, at 150.
240. HOLLY STEVENS, SOUVENIRS AND PROPHECIES 101 (1976).
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on his side, confound him." 241 Stevens yielded and, a few months later,
started at New York Law School.
This crucial encounter overflows with tension. First there is the
tension between law and the literary life, the latter being something
Stevens, at least at that time, held up as an "ideal" that he was "not quite
ready" to give up. Then there is the generational conflict between father
and son over choice of career. Finally there is tension over money and
how to support oneself. Thus, from the start of his legal studies,
Stevens's professional choices were fraught with tension and conflict, not
soothingly bathed in emotional peace and quiet.
As things turned out, going to New York Law School was a "critical
juncture" 242 but not an absolute crossroads for Stevens. He did not have
to choose forever between the careers of lawyer and poet; he became both.
To be sure, a number of commentators have criticized Stevens for taking
the wrong turn by becoming a lawyer. And it is true that his decision to
go to law school changed the course of his life and the development of his
poetry. But at least one critic has wisely observed that, "The fork in the
road where he took the wrong turning is a critic's invention, and there is
no point in dawdling there. "243 On the other hand, the circumstances
surrounding Stevens's decision to go to New York Law School were
psychologically important and sufficiently stressful to justify, if not our
"dawdling" over them, then at least our pausing to recount them and
consider their lifelong significance.
b. Home Life
The conflict between Stevens and his father did not end with the
decision to go to law school. That father-son conflict also touched a far
more significant and continuous source of tension and disequilibrium in
Stevens's mature being: his extremely unhappy personal life. Stevens and
his father quarrelled and then broke irreparably over the older man's
strong objections to his son's choice of a wife. 2' The father sensed things
the son did not, and it led to further generational conflict. Eventually
Stevens must have come to understand and appreciate his father's
misgivings, earning his worldly wisdom as he watched all of his romantic
illusions sour in the brine of love's disappointment.
241.
242.
243.
244.
VENDLER,

Id.

See BATES, supra note 23, at 1.
KERMODE, supra note 13, at 1.
See, e.g., BATES, supranote 23, at 52; BRAzEAU, supra note 22, at 254-264;

supra note 111, at 6.
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Stevens, a shy, aloof man, had, by all accounts, few friends and a
troubled, "trying" marriage.245 The interests and sensibilities of Stevens
and his wife Elsie differed greatly. Elsie started out as his muse and
played "an important part" in his verse, love being a condition often
associated with creation. But she did not appreciate his poetry (never a
good sign), had a "sulky response" to it, and did not like his literary
circle.246 To one eminent and usually restrained commentator, this
situation-"of living with an uneducated, limited, suspicious, and
provincial person, one who has no idea of his life project"-was a "real
horror" for Stevens.247
Elsie, a recluse, was neurotic, emotionally unbalanced, suffered from
what her daughter called a deep "persecution complex," and caused awful
scenes. Wallace and Elsie had bad fights and "blow-ups of the nerves."
Because of Elsie, Stevens almost never invited anyone into his home, let
alone entertained there, much to the chagrin and consternation of his
colleagues. He always traveled without her. All of this greatly dismayed
Stevens, as one might expect. It was the tragedy of his life. They never
divorced, but they did not get along for years and became almost
completely incompatible, living in different parts of the same house.248
Stevens had, according to Harold Bloom, "a massively repressed
psychic life" and suffered in silence. 249 But not complete silence, if one
reads Stevens's poems closely. The theme of unhappy love can be found
in a number of them. Such a reading is not a coarse or simplistic
reduction of Stevens's verse to a reflection of some biographical event
with which it has no evident connection. Rather it is a lens through which
we may see, clearly and in an isolated field of vision, his churning soul.
In "Red Loves Kit," he writes, "Unhappy love reveals vast
blemishes."" 0 In "Good Man, Bad Woman" and "The Woman Who
Blamed Life on a Spaniard," he also discusses love gone awry. Perhaps
Steven's most touching line in this vein comes from "World without
Peculiarity," where he (self-referential?) says, "But she that loved turns
245. VENDLER, supra note 37, at 86.
246. BATES, supra note 23, at 10, 49-82.
247. VENDLER, supra note 37, at 88.
248. The descriptions in this paragraph are taken from BATES, supra note 23, at 76;
BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 28, 81, 92, 286-87; Letter from Wallace Stevens to his
daughter (Oct. 7, 1942) in LETTERS, supranote 12 at 422; STEVENS, supra note 240, at
137.
249. BLOOM, supra note 57, at 2.
250. WALLACE STEVENS, Red Loves Kit, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28, at
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cold at his light touch."" Like the man in that poem, Stevens became
She who began as Stevens's
indifferent to the "hating woman."
inspiration ended up rejecting him as a lover, leaving him emotionally
deprived.
His own catastrophic disappointment in romantic love led to bitter
solitude and great personal sadness. In his poetry, Stevens is, according
to one leading critic, "often a despairing lover."' These poems make for
a remarkably intimate portrait of his inner life. His "great subject" is
"desire, its illusions and its despairs."" Once we know about his home
life, we understand better why one might label Stevens a "poet of human
misery" who "knows desire without an object of desire."2, Stevens was,
in short, a tortured and complicated man.
Of such stuff is a poet's emotional turmoil made, in spite of any stoic
pretense to the contrary. Given what was happening at home, Stevens's
He
office and legal work must have seemed like his refuge.
understandably escaped from his marital discord to his job and his poetry.
The world of Stevens's poetic imagination was much more congenial and
pleasant than the actual reality of his personal life. It manifested a
consistent effort on Stevens's part to maintain within himself a stable and
coherent psychological state. In order to maintain this sense of order and
control, Stevens tended to rely on the coping mechanism of writing poetry.
In such circumstances, writing poetry was for lawyer Stevens almost a
form of therapy or sublimation, or both. If no longer a muse exactly,
Elsie was still playing an important part in Stevens's poetry. However
arduous it was for Stevens at once to be a full-time insurance lawyer and
pathbreaking modern poet, it was easier than his dysfunctional life at
home. Those problems may thus actually have energized him.
3. Written Evidence
In his writing, Stevens himself supplies some evidence of turmoil
beneath the calm surface of the double life he described. A poem called
"Mr. Burnshaw and the Statue" even yields a glimpse of the practical,
hardheaded insurance lawyer who competes with his alienated poet's
nature:
A time in which the poets' politics
Will rule in a poets' world. Yet that will be
251. ,VALLACE STEVENS, World Without Peculiarity,in THE AURORAS OF AUTUMN
(1950), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 453.
252. VENDLER, supra note 111, at 32.
253. Id. at 31.
254. Id. at 11; see also BATES, supranote 23, at 79-82.
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A world impossible to poets, who
Complain and prophesy, in their complaints,
And are never of the world in which they live.

s

If this passage reveals something of Stevens's interior life, it may show
that he realized he had one foot in one world and the other foot in another
world. As a poet, did he-we might understandably ask-think he was
"never of the [insurance law] world in which" he lived?
Stevens wrote in "Sailing after Lunch":
But I am, in any case,
A most inappropriate man
In a most unpropitious place.

6

Then again in "The Idea of Order at Key West," Stevens says:
There never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made.

7

Similarly, in "Esth6tique du Mal," Stevens described a man who thinks of
two worlds, "The peopled and the unpeopled. In both, he is/Alone."" 8
Is it possible that in each of these verses Stevens is writing about himself,
from deep within, about a poet in a lawyer's job whose only real world is
made up of the poetry he creates?
In one of his essays, he refers to "poetic-philosophers" and the
"philosophical-poets,"2 9 and one cannot help but think that today he might
say instead lawyer-poets or literary lawyers. If we are correct in reading
his references to "imagination" and "reality" as Stevens's code for poetry
and law, some of his comments reflect on the double life. "It is not
possible to say," he claims, "as between the two [i.e., reality (read law)
255. WALLACE STEVENS, Mr. Burmshaw And The Statute, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS,
supra note 28, at 80.
256. Id.
257. WALLACE STEVENS, The Idea of Order at Key West, in IDEAS OF ORDER
(1952), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 128.
258. WALLACE STEVENS, The Idea of Order at Key West, in IDEAS OF ORDER
(1952), reprintedin id. at 130. In a similar vein, Stevens wrote in an early letter to his

wife: "It seems insincere, like playing a part, to be one person on paper and another in
reality." Letter from Wallace Stevens to Elsie Moll, in LETTERS, supra note 12, at 80.
Such a passage shows the tension of Stevens's double life from another point of view.

259. WALLACE STEVENS,
NECESSARY ANGEL, supra note

The Figure Of The Youth As Virile Poet, in THE
31, at 54-55.
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and imagination (read poetry)], which is paramount. "260 "The nature of
poetry . . . is an interdependence of the imagination and reality as
equals." 26' Elsewhere, he talks of poetry and philosophy:
In philosophy we attempt to approach truth through the reason.
: [I]n poetry we attempt to approach truth through the
imagination . . . We must conceive of poetry as at least the
equal of philosophy . . . The poet, in order to fulfill himself,
must accomplish a poetry that satisfies both the reason and the
imagination.26
More than once, Stevens's lyrics describe internal tension: a "crash in the
mind," 263 "a law of inherent opposites, "2 64 "a war that never ends." 265 Is
it too much to suggest that with these phrases Stevens was indirectly
explaining the true state of affairs about his double life?
4. Reality of the Double Life
Surely Stevens believed in the reality of the double life. It is fairly
easy to come up with the benefits, to see how law and poetry may be
inseparable parts of one life. One may actually help the other over time,
so that the result may be a symbiotic, synergistic relationship. Once he
found his legal niche, he did not have to worry about supporting himself
and his family. His law job was a means to finance his real job, writing
his poetry. By compromising with economic reality, Stevens retained his
freedom and gratified his creative passions without starving.
In addition, the discipline of legal thinking and writing may improve
a poet's technical skills. He could, and did, write poetry somewhat
surreptitiously at the office, as well as on his walks between home and
office. His daily work may also have fed his imagination: "It helps to see
the actual world to visualize a fantastic world. "266 And vice versa: "The

260. WALLACE STEVENS, Imaginationas Value, in id. at 150.
261. WALLACE STEVENS, The Noble Rider and The Sound of Words, in id. at 27.
262. WALLACE STEVENS, The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet, in id. at 41-42.
263. WALLACE STEVENS, The Glass of Water, in PARTS OF A WORLD (1942),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 197.
264. WALLACE STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in PARTS OF A WORLD (1942),

reprintedin id. at 215.
265. WALLACE STEVENS, Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT To
SUMMER (1947), reprintedin id. at 407.
266. WALLACE STEVENS, Insurance and Social Change, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS,
supranote 28, at 234.
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more realistic life may be, the more it needs the stimulus of the
imagination. "267
Above all, perhaps, is the enhancement of artistic creativity caused by
tension and cognitive dissonance. Law sometimes exposes the limits of
logic as well as the limits of precedent, thereby keeping a mental channel
open to the irrational and the new. In Stevens's case, moreover, there
would be the extra tension of practicing law while truly wanting to pursue
something else-poetry. Add to this the lingering generational conflict
with Stevens's father for shoving him into law against his wishes. Throw
in for good measure an extremely difficult marriage. The result is a
convincing picture of a double life.
His signature stress on imagination is precisely an inner quality of
mind. In one poem, he speaks of the "search for reality" being "the
philosopher's search/for an interior made exterior/And the poet's search
for the same exterior made/Interior.",2 68 He talks of "The inner
man/Behind the outer shields" 269 and the "interior paramour."27
Elsewhere he asks, "what self, for example, did he contain that had not
yet been loosed?" 271 These repeated references to differences between
inner and outer lives leave us wondering how accurate was Stevens's
description of his own double life.
But Wallace Stevens was, like most of us, a complex, conflicted, and
contradictory person, filled with inconsistencies large and small. As a
young lawyer, he complained about his taxing and tedious profession,
calling it "the quaintest way of making a living in the world . . . . It is
silly."2 72 He was impatient with associates and clients; they were "the
intolerable people that come and go all day at the office." 27 3 At one point
he wrote, "My cases oppress and depress me."2 74 As he got older, and as
he achieved status and respect as a lawyer, he seems to have enjoyed the
law more. But even then he understandably grew "more jealous of the
demands business makes" and said, "I should like to devote more-all-of
267.
268.
AUTUMN

Jacket Statement from Ideas of Order, in id. at 222-23.
An OrdinaryEvening in New Haven, in THE AURORA OF
(1950), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 465, 481.
WALLACE STEVENS,
WALLACE STEVENS,

269. Id. at 488.
270. WALLACE STEVENS, Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour,in THE

ROCK

(1981), reprintedin id. at 524.
271. WALLACE STEVENS, Prologues to What is Possible, in THE ROCK (1981),

reprintedin id. at 516.
272. Letter from Wallace Stevens to Elsie Moll (Jan. 19, 1909), in LETTERS, supra
note 12, at 124.

273. Letter from Wallace Stevens to Elsie Moll (Feb. 15, 1909), in id. at 131.
274. See

BRAZEAU,

supra note 22, at 12 (quoting a letter dated June 22, 1916).
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my time to the study and writing of poetry."275 Some blame the long
twelve-year gap between Harmonium (1923) and Ideas of Order(1935) on
the significant time commitments required by Stevens's job as an insurance
lawyer. He moaned, "I have no life except in poetry. "276
5. The Whole Man
Some insight into all this may be found in a previously neglected
paper entitled, appropriately enough, "The Whole Man: Perspectives,
Horizons," delivered by Stevens to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in
1954, a year before his death. In that paper, Stevens explores what he
means by an "all-round man," but we can reasonably wonder if, while
supposedly writing about someone else, he has, as many eulogists do,
himself in mind. "I do not think the definition of an all-round man
necessarily includes a man of any actual technical business experience,"
he says.277 "He need not be a banker who collects books or a
manufacturer who reads philosophy."27 8 Or, we might add, a lawyer who
writes poetry. Ultimately, says Stevens, "It is a question of breadth of
character and, say, diversity of faculties," and includes "the general
thinkers, the overall thinkers, men capable of different sights." 279
Stevens goes on to make a key distinction between the theorist and the
technician. Assume for a moment that Stevens, like many others, sees
lawyers primarily as technicians; "most of us are technicians on at least
one side or, say, to some extent. "280 Then he says: "The best technician,
the purest mechanic, is necessarily something of a theorist." 28' Put
another way, the best workaday lawyer has a large perspective, a double
life, if you will. But, writes Stevens, "the man who applies himself to
considerations of first importance must have precedence over the
28 man who
applies himself to things of secondary or lesser importance."
Toward the end of that fascinating paper, Stevens makes what may be
further self-revelatory comments on the double life. He refers to Franklin,
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison as "all-round men," adding, "These
were no technicians, or few." 28 3 What many-sided men the founders seem
275. W. VAN 0' CONNOR, THE SHAPING SPIRIT 19-20 (1950).
276. WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28, at 200.
277. WALLACE STEVENS, The Whole Man: Perspectives, Horizons, in id. at 284.

278. Id.
279. Id. at 284, 288.
280. Id. at 288.
281. Id. at 285-86.

282. Id. at 286.
283. Id.at 287.
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to us to have been, observes Stevens. Did they "have much choice about
it? . . . could Franklin, Washington, Jefferson and Madison have lived
different lives?" 284 Could Wallace Stevens? The all-round man, the manysided man, the man with a double life can do no other; it is what he is; it
is what he does. "A poet writes poetry because he is a poet," Stevens
tells us, and is "impelled to do so. "281 "A man does not spend his life
doing this sort of thing unless doing it is something he needs to do. One
of the sanctions of the writer
28 6 is that he is doing something he needs to do
He needs to write."
....
At one point Grey describes law and literature as "intertwining
webs," 287 and that felicitous phrase is perhaps an accurate description of
the double life. It seems to fit Stevens in particular. One of his coworkers said, "he did not lead two separate lives; they were
intertwined. "288 One line from Stevens is especially illuminating on this
point. "Two things of opposite natures seem to depend/On one another,"
he wrote in "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction." 289 In that passage,
Stevens may be recognizing the symbiosis between law and literature in his
own life. If so, he is not alone.
C. Other Double Lives
Others have lived, and continue to live, the double life of lawyerwriter. Of those living, Louis Auchincloss, Louis Begley, and Jack Fuller
have each tried to explain how they combine their legal and literary lives,
and their explanations may help us understand Stevens's better. Their
examples throw needed light on the benefits and problems of the double
life and how the legally trained creative mind reacts to them. Other
examples could have been chosen, but Auchincloss, Begley, and Fuller are
particularly illuminating.
1. Louis Auchincloss
Louis Auchincloss, the dean of current American lawyer-writers, is
something of a phenomenon. Until his recent retirement from active law
practice at age eighty, he worked in a major Wall Street law firm while
284. Id.
285. WALLACE STEVENS, The IrrationalElement in Poetry, in id. at 224, 227.
286. WALLACE STEVENS, Rubbings of Reality, in id. at 245.
287. See THE PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 67.
288. BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 57-58.
289. WALLACE STEVENS, Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, in TRANSPORT To
SUMMER (1947), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 284, 392.
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publishing over fifty works of literate fiction, literary criticism and
biography. He is still writing. In his autobiographical A Writer's Capital,
Auchincloss tells how he balanced the two parts of his existence.
To a large extent, Auchincloss sounds like Stevens. "People ask me
how I manage to write and practice. Sometimes I think it is the only thing
about me that interests them," writes Auchincloss. 290 "All I can say is that
a great step was taken when I ceased to think of myself as a 'lawyer' or
a 'writer.' I simply was doing what I was doing when I did it. "291 So far,
Auchincloss is pure Stevens.
But Auchincloss had to make some choices, and not without difficulty.
Although he started writing early (an unpublished novel in his junior year
of college), he went to law school for a serious career that men of his
background were expected to follow. He believed "that a man born to the
responsibilities of a brownstone bourgeois world could only be an artist or
a writer if he were a genius, that he should not kick over the traces unless
a resounding artistic success, universally recognized, should justify his
otherwise ridiculous deviation. 292 He finished his second unpublished
novel during the summer following his first year of law school.
With two novel-length manuscripts unpublished, Auchincloss finished
law school and went to work for Sullivan & Cromwell, one of the most
prestigious of Manhattan law firms, where he developed a specialty in trust
and estates. While in the service during World War II, he wrote his third
novel, which was later published. He wrote and published more books as
he was working full time as a lawyer. But he began to worry that he was
slighting his literary talent by writing only in spare moments and on
weekends and evenings. At age thirty-four, he left the firm to devote all
his time to writing.
Two years later Auchincloss returned to the practice of law with a
better idea of the double life. He realized that the experiment with a
single, purely literary life had been a failure and that he missed the law.
Although he wrote two books during this time, the years away from law
"added nothing to my stature as a writer," he concluded. "My writing
hours increased, but both the quantity and quality of my writing remained
290. Louis AUCHINCLOSS, A WRITER'S CAPITAL 125
CHRISTOPHER C. DAHL, Louis AUCHINCLOSS (1986).

(1974); see generally

291. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 290, at 125.
292. Id. at 77. In his novels, Auchincloss sometimes describes how some of his
fictional characters make similar choices. For example, he states that "there was that
brief period in freshman year when I actually contemplated becoming a writer. Soon I
gave up the idea because there were too few financially successful writers; the law has
a much broader peak." Louis AUCHINCLOSS, DIARY OF A YUPPIE 2 (1986). See also
Louis AUCHINCLOSS, THE EDUCATION OF OSCAR FAIRFAx (1995) (protagonist chooses

law over literature as career).
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the same." 293 From then on, Auchincloss has combined the practice of law
with steady writing.
Auchincloss's experiment with the purely literary life bears directly on
Stevens's double life and the notion of the double life generally. It has
been said-wrongly, I think-that the main "influence" Stevens's legal life
had on his artistic life was that it "took too much of his time-time that he
would have loved to have spent in creative writing." 29 4 And even Stevens
at least once said he wished he could spend all his time on his poetry.295
But those facile comments ignore both Auchincloss's own contrary
experience and the subtle forces that affect the psychological wellsprings
of creativity. An avocation, such as Stevens's writing of poetry, is
pursued voluntarily, out of love, as a free play of the spirit, not, like an
onerousjob, out of duty or obligation or financial pressure. (Significantly,
Stevens never kept any money he received for his literary activities.) 96 If
Stevens, as Auchincloss did for a time, had given up the law entirely to
become a full-time writer, his poetry might have been far different and not
as good, assuming the new pressure to write did not make him fall prey
to writer's block.
It is one thing to choose to compose, enthusiastically and joyfully,
poems (or stories or novels or music, for that matter) as a welcome
creative change of pace from routine; it is quite another to be compelled
by external circumstances to have to earn one's living-as on Grub
Street-by each day facing the blank page or computer screen with its
infinite possibilities that decrease with every word written. An important
subconscious but nonetheless real difference exists here between the two
attitudes. It is the difference between play and work. Play is not play
when it becomes a full-time occupation. It is the difference between, on
one hand, neighborhood boys happily engaged in a pick-up game of
baseball and, on the other, highly paid major leaguers straining through a
debilitating 162-game season.
For writers in particular, non-literary work may be therapeutic. To
combine writing with other sorts of work is to steer clear of a danger zone
all too familiar to writers. The ordinary occupations of a busy person
protect a writer against the self-preoccupation that is one of the worst
293. AUCHINCLOSS, supra note 290, at 124-25. Returning to the law, Auchincloss
"felt that I had come home" and "was sure that I would never give up the law again."
Id. at 125. Auchincloss recently recalled these experiences at a forum titled "Law and

Creativity: Is There a Conflict?" at the New York County Lawyers Association on June
12, 1997.
294. WILSON E. TAYLOR, Of a Remembered Time, in A

6, at 92.
295. See O'CONNOR, supra note 275, at 19-20.
296. See BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 172.
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diseases of the literary life. Such protection is needed by the great literary
artist, who explores his or her own spirit to the uttermost. 97
What Auchincloss learned by trial and error, what Stevens may have
intuitively figured out or known from the start, and what the lawyerbashers and critics of the double life may never understand, is that a
double life, with the respite each aspect affords the other, may really be
an integrated life that more easily permits creativity to occur and flourish.
As Stevens wrote in a letter, "having a job is one of the best things in the
world that could happen to me. It introduces discipline and regularity into
one's life. I am just as free as I want to be and of course I have nothing
to worry about money." 298 From this vantage point, Stevens's daily life
as an insurance lawyer may have supplied a crucial, stable, and secure
financial and psychological framework for his modernist, risky forays into
poetry. As with Auchincloss, the practice of law may have gratified a
lower but still essential need on Stevens's personal hierarchy of needs,
thus giving him the emotional security necessary to move up to a higher
rung and take chances with his poetry in order to achieve what
psychologists call self-actualization. 299 Stevens followed the dictum of
Flaubert, the one-time law student turned writer, that the artist should live
an orderly life and be daring in his art. Rather than take away from his
poetry, Stevens's legal life undoubtedly contributed to it.
2. Louis Begley
In some ways, Louis Begley both resembles and differs from
Auchincloss. Like Auchincloss, Louis Begley practices law full-time in
New York City and writes literate fiction. Unlike Auchincloss, Begley did
not write or publish his first book until he was about sixty years old. But
once his first book came out, Begley has enjoyed a growing reputation as
a literary lawyer.
Begley, head of the international law department of a tony New York
law firm, has explained his double life articulately, as one might expect
from the author of four well-received novels (Wartime Lies, The Man
Who Was Late, As Max Saw It and, most recently, About Schmidt).
297. See

ROBERTSON DAVIES, ONE HALF OF ROBERTSON DAVIES 124, 130-131

(1977).
298. See Bates, supra note 23, at 157 (quoting Stevens's letter dated Jan. 7, 1952.)
Otto Rank thought it important for a creative artist to divide his or her "attention among
two or more simultaneous activities ....The second work [e.g., law] is then often an
antithesis in style and character to the first [e.g., poetry], though it may be a continuation
at another level." Without such a second sphere of interest, "periods of disappointment,
depression, and even illness are likely to occur." RANK, supra note 177, at 204.

299. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITYpaSsim (2d ed. 1970).
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Asked if he is a lawyer or a writer, Begley answers (as would Stevens and
Auchincloss), "I am both. "300 But that short answer begets more
questioning. "Isn't being a lawyer bad for being a writer? If you want
to be a writer, shouldn't you stop being a lawyer?" The answers Begley
gives are "no, and no."3'
First, Begley explodes a widely accepted theory. That generally
accepted theory assumes that devoting oneself exclusively to writing fiction
is the "ideal" that will allow a writer to produce more and better work.
If a writer has no pressing financial concerns, the writer will supposedly
have more to concentrate on the work of writing without being distracted
this "ideal," Begley replies:
by having to pursue a different career. 3To
02
"ideal conditions do not suit all writers."
Going beyond the writer's temperament, Begley gets down to practical
reality. "Ideal conditions" hardly ever happen. "Relatively few writers
addicted to writing serious fiction," says Begley, "have been able to live
on earnings from it. "303 Therefore they have worked at various day jobs,
like Kafka at the Prague insurance office. As Begley notes, "Some have
worked as lawyers. " "
Then Begley explodes another myth, this one about the increasing
number of academics and people in publishing who write fiction. "I have
been puzzled," Begley says, "by the view that teaching creative writing
and buying and selling manuscripts are conducive to writing fiction." 05
Begley worries about the "great dangers" of a writer being contaminated
by other people's words. Implying that a profession like law supplies a
better context for the writer who does not have a sufficient independent
income to write full-time, Begley asks: "Is there not something to be said
for living in the world and acquiring and renewing a knowledge
of a
30 6
society that extends beyond university or publishing circles?"
More than that, though, practicing law may actually help one's
writing. "The important fact," notes Begley, "is that most lawyers are
forced to write a great deal, so that if they care about words, they can

keep in training. "307

300. Louis Begley, Who the Novelist Really Is?, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REv., Aug. 16,
1992, at 1.
301. See id.

302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.

305. Id.
306. Id.

307. Id.
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Likewise for the idea of law "drying up one's imagination." On the
contrary, lawyers highly prize imagination. As Begley accurately states,
"when lawyers talk about the qualities that make a good lawyer, they are
likely to put imagination right at the top of the list."3 The mind's eye
can almost see Stevens smile and nod in hearty agreement at this reference
to his favorite concept.
Finally, Begley explores whether "being a weekend writer makes one
a less good full-time lawyer."
His answer is simple and direct.
"Exercising one's cognitive and imaginative faculties cannot be wholly bad
in a profession that calls on its members to use their brains." 30 9 To drive
home his point, Begley makes a telling comparison. "Who knows," he
asks, "writing fiction may be better, from a purely professional, lawyer's
point of view, than playing tennis, skeet shooting or watching the
Olympics on television." 31 ° Writing fiction, Begley argues, "opens up
another part of you, and it's all to the good. You're a better lawyer
because of it. The
more that's in your mind, the better advice you can
311
give to clients."
Begley's comments amplify Stevens's and Auchincloss's. They
remind one of Dr. Johnson's remark that, "Lawyers know life practically.
A bookish person should always have them to converse with. Lawyers
have what the writer wants." 312 And they suggest a mutually beneficial
effect from the double life.
3. Jack Fuller
A recent and fine collection of essays about journalism vividly
illustrates the point. Jack Fuller, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, is a
graduate of Yale Law School and former assistant to the Attorney General
of the United States as well as a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist. His
recent book News Values discusses his own double life. "For most of my
adult life," Fuller writes, "I have made my living in journalism.
Meanwhile, I have published five novels, and I continue to write fiction
to this day. At various times people have suggested there was something
308. Id. As with most propositions, lawyers disagree about this too. According to
Paul Cravath, one of the founders of an eminent law firm, clients don't want attorneys
with "too much imagination, too much wit." See Paul M. Barrett, Cravath Prospersby
Hewing to a Stuffy Status Quo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at BI.

309. Id.
310. Id.; See also Louis Begley, Time Is Everything, NENV YORKER, Oct. 16, 1995,
at 156.
311. See Paul Reidinger, Beyond the Courtroom Thriller, 83 A.B.A. J. 58 (1997).
312.

JAMES BOSWELL,

undated) (1791).

THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 816 (Modern Library
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odd, even conflicted, about this double life."31 3 Shades of a common
reaction to Stevens's double life.
Fuller says that the two lives (for him, journalism and fiction; for
others, law and writing), "far from coming into conflict, support one
another in large and small ways." 31 4 Fuller's credo, which Stevens,
Begley, Auchincloss and others must share, is: "Though I have often been
asked how I can keep writing while doing other challenging things, the
real question is how I could stop and retain my balance. "315
Much of what Fuller says-and much of what he exemplifies- helps
us understand the lawyer-writer. Fuller: "Journalism has provided close
contact with an extraordinary range of human behavior that has helped
feed my fiction." 31 6 Again: "Working on fiction has deepened and
strengthened the journalism, too, because fiction is-like journalism-a
way of discovering truth."117 But, like journalism, law too can provide
"close contact with an extraordinary range of human behavior" that can
influence one's artistic work.
Wrapping up the discussion, Fuller offers an impressive
generalization. "Every waking moment," he says, "we impose order on
the flux of experience by an act of the brain that could be described as
imagination. So it is not surprising that imaginative ordering turns out to
be common to the writing both of fact and of fiction, or that one can
inform the other in fundamental ways. "318
Fuller's explanation of the double life probably would have rung true
with Stevens, as well as pleased him. It is just one more piece of evidence
explaining how the double life works. Together with the examples of
Auchincloss and Begley, it helps show why the "facile dichotomy"
between the insurance lawyer and the poet perpetuated by Stevens's legend
does not bear scrutiny.3 9 Like Auchincloss, Begley, Fuller, and many
313.

JACK FULLER, NEWS VALUES 159

(1996).

314. Id.

315. Id.; cf. W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, THE SUMMING

UP 233 (1938) ("We do not

write because we want to; we write because we must.").
316. FULLER, supra note 313, at 161. Similarly, as John Mortimer has recognized,

law practice is "a good place for a writer: a place of plots, of people not middle class,

of people seen under extraordinary stress." Ian Parker, Son of Rumpole, NEW
Mar. 20, 1995, at 78, 85.
317. FULLER, supra note 313, at 161.

318. Id.
319. BATEs, supra note 23, at

85.
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others, Stevens was at the same time "not one man but many. "320 Just as
he was by turns aloof and friendly, sarcastic and kind, he was also by
turns lawyer and poet. Seemingly irreconcilable characteristics exist in the
same person, but we can realize that one and the same person may at one
and the same time be, in different respects, both lawyer and poet. This
realization leads to a view of life that takes into account its contradictory
complexity, its polyvalence.
D. A Synthesis
After all is said and done, after general considerations, Stevens's
explanation, and other double lives have been studied, perhaps the best
way to explain Stevens's double life is to see it as an attempted Hegelian
synthesis. The thesis is Stevens's role as lawyer. The antithesis in his
role as poet. The attempted synthesis is his seemingly harmonious life as
lawyer-poet:
Thesis: Lawyer
Antithesis: Poet
Synthesis: Lawyer-Poet
Even if Stevens did not himself see his life as a dialectic between law and
poetry, and even if the synthesis analogy is imperfect, it facilitates
understanding.32 ' It enables us to integrate tension and inconsistency into
a coherent whole.
To think of Stevens's double life in terms of synthesis comports with
critiques of his poetry. Helen Vendler, one of Stevens's most sensitive
readers, describes Stevens's "most characteristic form" of poetry as a
"tentative, diffident, and reluctant search for a middle route between
ecstasy and apathy. "M Replace "ecstasy" with "poetry" and "apathy" with
"law," and one might have a reasonable view of Stevens's dual citizenship
320. MAUGHAM supra note 315, at 229 (referring to writers generally).
"It may be that we are all of us a bundle of mutually contradictory selves, but
the writer, the artist, is deeply conscious of it ....It is because [the writer]
is many that he can create many and the measure of his greatness is the number
of selves that he comprises."
Id. at 228-29. There may be a much simpler explanation. As Chekhov said, "Medicine
is my lawful wife and Literature is my mistress. When I get fed up with one, I spend the
night with the other." Tobias Wolf, Introductionto A DOCTOR'S VISIT: SHORT

STORIES,

supra note 203, at ix.
321. Helen Vendler uses a different Hegelian synthesis to explain Stevens's poem
Credences of Summer. VENDLER, supra note 105, at 237.
322. Id. at 13.

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[V/ol. 41

in the neighboring republics of law and letters. Of Stevens's various
poetic tendencies, it has been said they are delicately poised, and that he
tried in his poetry to embrace extremes into a center."2 Such observations
on Stevens's literary work apply equally to his life as lawyer-poet.
Behind any such synthesis, however, may lie a false polarity, the false
poles of law, on the one hand, and poetry, on the other.324 A truer view
has to recognize the variety of imaginative modes at work in a human
being. A broad outlook ought above all to relish the incorrigible plurality
of things. It should be possible for some of us to be lawyers and writers
without being guilty of any kind of inconsistency. We can, if we want,
practice law and write poems or other forms of literature. Each activity
draws its own idioms of judgment, and it is a sign of a life properly lived
that many of these modes are experienced alongside others. Like Cubism,
a modem art form much appreciated by Stevens, life (including Stevens's
own life) reveals a fracturing and faceting of reality and a manipulation of
multiple viewpoints that belie the placid, pretty surface shimmer.
Stevens's own work celebrates such many-sidedness. The man who
wrote "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" must have been
exquisitely sensitive to the many selves contained in a personality. 3
"After all," as he says in one of his letters, "I'm not one thing or another,
but this thing today, and that tomorrow. "326 And again, "There is a
perfect rout of characters in every man."327 Whatever his quirks, Stevens
was a Renaissance man, brilliantly accomplished in the law and in the arts.
Like some of his poetic images, Stevens's life as lawyer-poet itself became
at once a symbol of both unity and disparity. Like the "eye's plain
version" in "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven," Stevens's life is
composed of two halves as hemispheres that can become "amassed in a
total double-thing." 328 But of course law and poetry are only two of the
many ways of looking at Wallace Stevens.
The synthesis represented by the lawyer-poet should come as no
surprise. Each component part-law and poetry-itself depends on
323. See id. at 165, 205.
324. Vendler speaks of the false poles of imagination and reality. Id. at 245.
325. Richard ElIman, How Wallace Stevens Saw Himself, in A CELEBRATION, supra
note 6, at 162.
326. Letter from Wallace Stevens to Elsie Moll (1906-07) in LETTERS, supra note

12, at 94.
327. Id. at 91.

One of La Rochefoucauld's maxims is particularly apt here.

"Imagination," says La Rochefoucauld, using Stevens's key concept, "cannot conceive
such a medley of inconsistencies as nature has planted in every heart." Joseph Epstein,
La Rochefoucauld: Maximum Maimist, NEW CRITERION (June 1996), at 15, 22.
328. Wallace Stevens, An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, in THE AURORAS OF
AUTUMN (1950), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 465, 472.
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synthesis. Poetry has been described as a paradox, an organic whole of
"contraries comprehended," with the imagination of the poet revealing
itself "in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant
qualities."32 9 Likewise, the adversary process in law leads to a judicial
product that takes account of opposite positions; lawworks by opposition.
Thus, for both poetry and law, the core of the experience is the
paradoxical synthesis of welding together elements that seem to belong
apart. The lawyer-poet, built on two such paradoxical syntheses, is just
another example of "contraries comprehended," of uniting what seem,
when looked at separately, to be very different things. The conjunction
of the two contraries, as it brings together the discordant and the
contradictory, can give both a new and larger meaning.
Ultimately, the double life of law and poetry is no paradox. If a
lawyer is interested in more than his or her profession, if a lawyer's
intellectual ambitions are never satisfied by legal work alone, if a lawyer
happens to be a polymath, that is no enigma, but a beautiful and rare thing
to be encouraged and cherished, not criticized or mocked. "That one can
be a poet and a lawyer," wrote one journalist about Stevens,
"simultaneously ennobles and elevates everyone. "330 A lawyer may well
be blessed with a superabundance of interests, energy and talents-as
Stevens was. That happy confluence need not lessen such a lawyer's legal
abilities or accomplishments, although it may mean that for such a lawyer
a life in law alone, like working in the patent office for Einstein, will be
less than completely satisfying. In that case, the need for self-expression
and desire for creative work may overflow the professional banks of the
law and run off into other fertile fields, literature being only one
possibility. There is nothing puzzling about this occurrence, except for the
awe, mystery and tension we rightly experience at any impressive,
multifaceted human achievement. But the tension of that achievement, the
sometimes overwhelming experience of that "total double-thing," may be
too much for some people.

329. CLEANTH BROOKS, THE WELL-WROUGHT URN 1, 18 (1947). See also
HERACLES' Bow, supra note 43, at 114-16. "But here as elsewhere in the history of
thought it is a measure of achievement how much of what seems ineradicably opposed can
be comprehended within a larger order." Id. at 116.
330. Margolick, supra note 32, at B7.
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V. THE DOUBLE LIFE REJECTED

A law of inherent opposites
Wallace Stevens, "Connoisseur of Chaos"33'
The double life of law and art, as Stevens lived it, is not for everyone.
For some, it generates intolerable conflict between "inherent opposites."
Indeed many law-trained creative artists, if they are really good at their art
and think they can support themselves financially, leave law for art. In a
famous letter written in 1860, the French novelist Emile Zola wrote his
boyhood friend Paul C6zanne, who was then an unhappy law student:
If I were in your place, I'd have
the thing out, risk all for the
sake of all, not drift vaguely between
two such different futures, the
studio and the bar. I pity you.
You must be suffering from these
vacillations.
One thing or the other -- be a
real lawyer or else be a
real artist, but don't linger
on as a being without a
name, wearing a paint-soiled
toga.332
Buoyed by his friend's encouragement and example, C6zanne at long last
rebelled against his father's well-intentioned but overly rigid plans.
Cezanne rejected the double life.
Another, more recent example of someone who ultimately chose "one
thing or the other" was twentieth-century lawyer-poet Archibald MacLeish.
Unlike his slightly older contemporary Wallace Stevens, MacLeish totally
abandoned law for art. The first thirty years of MacLeish's emotional life
were marked by a persistent and increasing tension between law and
literature. As many generations of students have learned, educators are
fond of asking them on exams to "compare and contrast" people, events,
and ideas. MacLeish and Stevens are useful people to compare and
contrast on the double life of law and literature.
331. WALLACE STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in PARTS OF A WORLD (1942),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 215.
332. See GERSTLE MACK, PAUL CtZANNE 93-94 (1936) (quoting Emile Zola).
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When Stevens died, MacLeish even wrote and dedicated a poem to
him.333 It is a beautiful poem about the creative process from one eminent
lawyer-poet to another. In the thirty-six lines of "Reasons for Music,"
MacLeish concisely and compactly tries to articulate the irresistible
impulse he feels to write verse. It is a poem about poetry as the neverending "labor" to "impose" order and form on the "confused, fortuitous
flowing away of the world." "Why be poet?" MacLeish asks, and
immediately responds, as if the answer were self-evident, even stressed
with a crucial exclamation point: "Why be man!"
A few lines later, MacLeish puts his basic question another way.
"Why do we labor at the poem?" he muses. His prompt reply further
attempts to explain the urgent mystery of artistic expression. "The heart's
necessity compels me: Man I am: poet must be."
What a superb answer! "Man I am: poet must be." This terse and
captivating line by MacLeish, made up entirely of simple, short, nicely
cadenced words, closely resembles Stevens's comments about a poet being
"impelled" and "need[ing]" to write poetry. MacLeish's formulation of
the thought is essentially Descartes with a humanist twist. Instead of "I
think, therefore 3I 34am," MacLeish in essence says: "I am human, therefore
I write poems."
This, then, is the provocative, sensitive poem that Archibald MacLeish
wrote for Wallace Stevens.
Why do we labor at the poem
Age after Age-even an age like
This one, when the living rock
333. Archibald MacLeish, Apologia, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1508 (1972).

MacLeish's most famous line of poetry-"A poem should not mean/But be" (from "Ars
Poetica")-parallels Stevens's thinking and closely resembles a later comment by Stevens:
"Picasso expresses surprise that people should ask what a picture means and says that
pictures are not intended to have meanings. This explains everything." Wallace Stevens,
The Relations between Poetry and Painting, in THE NECESSARY ANGEL, supra note 31,
at 167.
334. MacLeish's quasi-Cartesian theme in a poem to another lawyer-poet is all the
more meaningful from yet another point of view. Like MacLeish and Stevens, Ren6
Descartes, the great philosopher and mathematician, earned a law degree before going on
to the accomplishments for which he is best remembered. See, e.g., MICHAEL SEAN
MAHONEY, THE MATHEMATICAL CAREER OF PIERRE DE FERMAT 48 (1973); BERNARD

WILLIAMS, DEsCARTES 15 (Penguin Books 1986) (1978); Roger Kimball, What's Left of

Descartes?,NEW CRITERION, (June 1995), at 9, 11. The mathematician Fermat was also
a lawyer. MAHONEY, supra, at 1, 15-16, 18, 20-21, 23, 48. Copernicus, too, started
out as a lawyer studying canon and civil law at the University of Bologna (1496-1501)
and then, after having switched to medicine for a while at Padua, took a degree in canon
law in 1503 from the University of Ferrara.
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No longer lives and the cut stone perishes?
H61derlin's question. Why be poet
Now when the meanings do not mean?
When the stone shape is shaped stone?
Dfirftiger Zeit? -- time without inwardness?
Why lie upon our beds at night
Holding a mouthful of words, exhausted
Most by the absence of the adversary?
Why be poet? Why be man!
Far out in the uttermost Andes
Mortised enormous stones are piled.
What is man? Who founds a poem
In the rubble of wild world -- wilderness.
The acropolis of eternity that crumbles
Time and again is mine -- my task.
The heart's necessity compels me:
Man I am: poet must be.
The labor of order has no rest:
To impose on the confused, fortuitous
Flowing away of the world, Form
Still, cool, clean, obdurate,
Lasting forever, or at least
Lasting: a precarious monument
Promising immortality, for the wing
Moves and in the moving balances.
Why do we labor at the poem?
Out of the turbulence of the sea,
Flower by brittle flower, rises
The coral reef that calms the water.
Generation of the dying
Fix the sea's dissolving salts
In stone, still trees, their branches immovable,
Meaning
the movement of the sea.335
From its prefatory dedication to its internal essence, the poem throws light
on the phenomenon of law-trained creative artists. It may even help
explain how the same mind can be drawn to legal thinking and to wanting
insistently to impose one's personal vision of life on the chaos of the
universe.
335. Archibald MacLeish, Reasons For Music: For Wallace Stevens (1954),
reprintedin THE MENTOR BOOK OF AMERICAN POETS 444-45 (Oscar Williams & Edwin
Honig eds., 1962).
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MacLeish hinted at this explanation when he spoke about "Reasons for
Music" at a HarvardLaw Review dinner in 1972. He described it as a
poem that "took its metaphor from the ceaseless labor of that tiny architect
by whom, life after life, generation after generation, each building on the
shoulders of those who went before, the coral reef is raised that calms the
water."336 Then the law-trained MacLeish asked meaningfully: "But
this-is it a metaphor which contains my life as poet?-yours as
lawyers?-both?" 3 3 MacLeish was in a position to know. For, like
Stevens, MacLeish was on his way to success at the bar, when, unlike
Stevens, he left law entirely for literature.
After graduating Yale in 1915, MacLeish, at his father's urging, went
to Harvard Law School, but only as a compromise. As an undergraduate,
he had successfully tried his wings with verse, even delivering the class
poem at graduation, just as future Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., and Joseph Story had done at their college graduations.
Much as he loved literature in college, though, MacLeish did not think he
could support himself by a life in poetry. The alternative for MacLeish
was a double life-an ideal one, you might think-in which he would earn
a living at the law and "write immortal lines between clients. "33
MacLeish sailed through Harvard Law School. At the end of his first
year, he finished near the top of his class and made Law Review. His
second year was interrupted by a stint in the army in France during World
War I, from which he returned to finish up his legal studies in high style.
He graduated in 1919, first in his class, with a prize as the student who
"ranks highest in scholarship, conduct and character, and gives evidence
" 339
of the greatest promise.
Law school did not stifle MacLeish's poetic impulses. He wrote
poems about the law and other subjects (often women), sometimes on the
inside covers of his casebooks. While still a law student, MacLeish even
had his first book of poems published. So intent on the literary life was
MacLeish that as a law student he resolved, "Never to practice law if I can
escape it. " 34 It was a resolution he would break, but only in the short
run.

At first, he tried to combine his two interests. Right after law school,
he taught international law and constitutional law to Harvard
undergraduates, while he wrote poetry in his free time. He turned down

life

336. MacLeish, supranote 333, at 1508.
337. See id.
338. ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, REFLECTIONS 18 (1986). For facts about MacLeish's
see SCOTT DONALDSON, ARCHIBALD MACLEISH: AN AMERICAN LIFE (1992).
339. DONALDSON, supra note 338, at 100.
340. Id. at 78.
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a full-time teaching position at Harvard Law School because he thought it
would interfere with his writing.
Then, after considering a career in journalism (Stevens, too, had
dabbled in journalism), he accepted an offer to work at Choate, Hall and
Stewart, a patrician Boston law firm. In the teeth of his earlier resolution,
but needing the money, he practiced law for three years, even while he
still taught law at night and continued to write poetry.
MacLeish had as much success in the practice of law as he did in the
study of it. "I was a pretty good lawyer," MacLeish recalled, immodestly
but accurately. "It was quite clear that I was going to be a good operating
lawyer. "34 He was a litigator, writing briefs, arguing in court, assisting
senior partners at trial, and even trying some cases himself. MacLeish
enjoyed the game. He found law "a very exciting intellectual discipline"
and "a very enlarging experience. "342 "Nothing I have ever done is more
fun than the preparation of a brief or a good question," he enthusiastically
wrote to his law school friend Dean Acheson.343
Not so; writing poetry turned out in the long run to be more fun.
MacLeish's surface enthusiasm for practicing law was heavily tinged with
haunting doubt and inner conflict, and his very success as a lawyer
brought on the crisis of his life. For years he had been swaying
indecisively between law and literature, just as young Cezanne had swayed
between law and painting. Torn, MacLeish had tried to make them
coexist, but eventually found it impossible.
Law, he said much later, "is a means of earning a living, and
probably having a pretty good intellectual time doing it"; poetry "is
something that involves your entire being. And they just don't blend. I
kept pushing this out of my mind but it was constantly there. "31 Precisely
here is where MacLeish and Stevens differ, for law and poetry did
"blend" for Stevens.
MacLeish was convinced that he was born to write, not to make a
success as a lawyer. He continued to have what he called "a profound
suspicion of the practice of law" and the materialistic considerations that
kept him on the job.345 Some critics have harbored those same suspicions
about Stevens.
Law and literature had become, for MacLeish,
incompatible.
Later in his life, long after Stevens's death, MacLeish had a different,
more tolerant attitude. Although he understood the difference between
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

MACLEISH, supra note 338, at 20.
Id. at 17.
See DONALDSON, supranote 338, at 108 (quoting MacLeish).
MACLEISH, supra note 338, at 18 (emphasis added).
See DONALDSON supra note 338, at 108.
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"the practice of the art of poetry" and a "life at the bar," MacLeish asked,
"is the difference between the law as [law school] teaches it and poetry as
a man pursues it as deep and as wide as all that?"34 6 One difference noted
by MacLeish was that lawyers "use words as signs standing for meanings
whereas poets use them not only as signs but as sounds and visible objects,
as images, as metaphors. " 3 1 But such a difference, thought MacLeish,
was not fundamental.
MacLeish then asked what law and poetry are each about. "The
business of law," answers MacLeish, "is to make sense of the confusion
of what we call human life-to reduce it to order but at the same time to
give it possibility, scope, even dignity." 348 As for the business of poetry,
it is, according to MacLeish, "precisely to make sense of the chaos of our
lives. To create the understanding of our lives. To compose an order
349
which the bewildered, angry heart can recognize. To imagine man."
Finally, MacLeish tied the two themes together. "Invent the age,
invent the metaphor. Without a credible structure of law a society is
inconceivable. Without a workable poetry no society can conceive a
man." 350 That was MacLeish's view when he was eighty years old.
But a half century earlier, at age thirty, having practiced law for only
three years, MacLeish felt that either he must get out of the law then or
not at all. He thought that if he stayed in the profession any longer, it
would, because of mounting professional responsibilities, be impossible to
break free. MacLeish talked it over with his wife and decided that they
would (as the young Wallace Stevens had planned) go to Paris where he
would do nothing but write poetry. He would see once and for all if he
really had the makings of a poet. So the next morning, MacLeish went in
to give notice to his employer, and at the same time he was offered a
partnership in the firm.
346. MacLeish, supra note 333, at 1506.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1508.

349. Id.
350. Id.

351. Timing, as they say, is everything, and the timing of MacLeish's announcement
that he was leaving the law was exquisite. "What happened then is like a badly written
play." MACLEISH, supranote 338, at 21. That is an understatement. But it is a story
worth retelling, especially to law students on this occasion.
MacLeish got in early and walked down to the office of the senior partner, Mr.
Choate. Mr. Choate's secretary said, "Well, how did you know I wanted you? I was
just picking up the telephone." MacLeish said, "May I see Mr. Choate?" She said, "Go
in; they are expecting you."
Alarmed and confused, MacLeish opened the door and saw the whole firm standing
around the wall. He did not understand what was happening. Mr. Choate, obviously
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MacLeish had crossed his personal Rubicon. He had made public the
resolution of his longstanding internal conflict between law and poetry.
He demonstrated his willingness to give up a promising legal career. And
he kept to his decision even when a meddling aunt asked him: "Why
should a first-rate lawyer become a second-rate poet?" 352 But MacLeish
had to write poetry, so off to Paris he went for six years to give full vent
to the literary imagination and expressive gift that made him famous.
On his return from Paris, MacLeish established personal contact with
Stevens, to whose poetry he was drawn. He once spent an hour chatting
with Stevens in his office in Hartford. "You can write the waste of time
off to charity,"
MacLeish wrote to Stevens afterwards. "It meant a great
" 353
deal to me.
The contact with Stevens probably meant a lot to MacLeish for a
number of reasons. Beyond the likely affinity of two poets of the same
time and place, they shared something else even more rare. They both
were poets who had trained for the law.
Although MacLeish gave up the law and Stevens did not, it is hard to
imagine them not sensing similar interests and tensions in each other.
Perhaps they even spoke to each other about law school, legal thinking and
law practice, and how those experiences affected their poetry. Perhaps
they even discussed the respective paths they chose, one accepting the
double life, one rejecting it, and why. Maybe they privately but
vigorously debated whether or not law and poetry can ever "blend." Now
pleased, said, "Archie, I think I'm going to tell you that we've decided to ask you to join
the firm." Of course, making partner is a major event, the high point, in many a young
lawyer's life. Hopes, dreams, and the aspirations behind years of incredibly hard work
hang in the balance. For most associates, being invited to become a partner is the end

of the quest, the brass ring. Not for MacLeish.
Having decided the night before to move to Paris to write poetry full-time, MacLeish

thought to himself, "either you speak up now or never." He took a deep breath and said,
bravely or foolishly, depending on your point of view: "Mr. Choate, I came to tell you
that I'm giving up the law." Silence, consternation and embarrassment. Imagine the egg
on the senior partner's face; imagine how far his jaw dropped. Poetic justice, one might
say. MacLeish was so scared that he did not disclose until later that he was actually
leaving the law to do something as weird as write poetry.
Many years later, MacLeish recalled the turning point incident with relish. Choate's
face "turned scarlet," reminisced MacLeish, "and he wouldn't speak to me for two
months. He never really forgave me. I don't blame him either .... Well, it was a very
dramatic business." Maybe even a bit apocryphal. Did MacLeish really have no hint he
would be offered a partnership that day? But still, there is nothing quite like telling the
senior partner who is offering you a partnership to stuff it. MACLEISH, supra note 338,
at 21. MacLeish's reflections are the source for this entire incident.
352. DONALDSON, supra note 338, at 119.
353. Id. at 153.
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that would have been a conversation of interest to the law and literature
movement.
They may have sharply disagreed over the different paths they each
took. Tension between them grew. For some reason, Stevens disliked
MacLeish, refused to attend readings or gatherings if MacLeish were
there, and even "turned purple with rage whenever you mentioned
MacLeish's name." 3 ' Perhaps Stevens got so angry precisely because
MacLeish rejected the double life that Stevens had embraced.
Oh, to have been a fly on the wall of Stevens's office when MacLeish
came to visit! From that vantage point, we may have even overheard them
talking about the relationship between legal thinking and artistic creativity.
After all, it was MacLeish who, in the fullness of his maturity, saw such
a relationship. He spoke of a crucial artistic vision: "[t]he vision of
mental time, of the interminable journey of the human mind, the great
tradition of the intellectual past which knows the bearings of the future. "55
Then he described the link between law and poetry. "No one," said
MacLeish,
not the most erudite or scholarly man, who has
failed to see that vision can truly serve the
art of poetry or any other art, and by no
study better than the study of the law can the
great sight be seen. The law has one way of
seeing it. Poetry has another. But the
journey is the same.356
The sameness of that wonderful journey can now be explored.
VI. STRUMMING THE BLUE GUITAR:
LEGAL THINKING AND ARTISTIC CREATIVITY
It made him realize how much
Of what he saw he never saw at all
357
Wallace Stevens, "The Comedian as the Letter C"

Wallace Stevens is just one example of a little studied but fascinating
phenomenon-the law-trained creative artist. If Stevens's case represents
354. See id. at 26;

BRAZEAU, supra note 22, at 119.
355. MacLeish, supra note 333, at 1510.

356. Id. (emphasis added).
357. Wallace Stevens, The Comedian as the Letter C, in
reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 36.

HARMONIUM

(1950),
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a special theory of artistic creativity and the law, perhaps we can now
borrow from science and attempt to start to formulate a general theory of
artistic creativity and the law. After all, the overall number of creative
artists who have had legal training really is, as we have seen, unusually
large: poets such as Ovid, Virgil, Petrarch, Donne, Stevens, MacLeish,
and Masters; painters such as C6zanne, Matisse, and Kandinsky;
composers such as Tchaikovsky, Handel, Schumann, Stravinsky, and
Sibelius; and writers such as Tolstoy, Flaubert, Balzac, Kafka, Stevenson,
Fielding, Thackeray, Cooper, Scott, and Henry James, to name just a few.
More creative artists in different fields than we would have any right to
expect had some background in law. And the list will continue to grow
as the legal backgrounds of other artists come to light.
It is impossible to think of any other profession or line of work that
has produced so many creative artists. Even medicine-which trained such
literary luminaries as W. Somerset Maugham, Anton Chekhov, William
Carlos Williams, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., and Walker Percy-cannot
come close to matching what must fairly be regarded as the extraordinary
profusion of legally trained creative artists in so many fields ranging from
art to music to literature. The number alone is noteworthy.358
Not only is the sheer number of law-trained artists remarkable, but it
is also counterintuitive, a surprise, an unlikely pairing, particularly as to
358. But see Paul Theroux, A. Burgess, Slightly Foxed, NEw YORKER, Aug. 7,
1995, at 64, 73. Anthony Burgess, the English writer, is quoted as asking: "Isn't it
interesting, the number of writers who went to medical school ....

The list is endless.

And yet can you name a single writer who went to law school?" When a dinner guest

mentioned Robert Louis Stevenson, Burgess snapped: "To please his father. He despised
the law. But there's no one else." When another person brought up Anthony Trollope,
Burgess replied: "I was thinking of a writer who actually practiced law in the way that
Chekhov practiced medicine. You can't name one." John Mortimer? Burgess: "Are
you suggesting that he is a writer ...

because if you are, I would find that insulting."

Burgess is of course monumentally wrong here. For Burgess to belittle the number
of writers who at one time studied law betrays shocking ignorance of the longstanding
symbiotic, synergistic relationship between law and literature. It was, after all, Burgess
himself who in a biography of Shakespeare accepted the controversial view that the Bard
at one time was a law clerk. See ANTHONY BURGESS, SHAKESPEARE 47-48 (Ivan R. Dee
1994) (1970).
But one does not know for sure if Burgess's position, as depicted in Theroux's
article, was meant seriously or even if the incident ever happened. Theroux's piece was
labelled "Fact and Fiction," and his ex-wife wrote to The New Yorker to say the alleged
dinner party, which she allegedly hosted, never occurred. Anne Theroux, "Letter to the
Editor," NEw YORKER, Sept. 18, 1995, at 14. Approximately a year later Paul Theroux
published his account of the Burgess dinner party as part of his book MY OTHER LIFE,
which he admitted was a false memoir, a work of fiction. But even if the characters and
facts are fake, Theroux says the "mask is real," which may mean that Bizarro Burgess's
comments should be attributed to Theroux. Either way, they are wrong.
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composers and painters. We are less surprised, perhaps, about creative
prose writers with legal backgrounds. A lawyer's primary weapon is
wielding the written word, and therefore a lawyer's expected verbal
facility would make a natural bridge to the writing of prose fiction. With
respect to poets, the surprise factor increases, because poetry is that much
further removed from legal prose. And as for composers and painters, the
surprise is nothing short of complete. No obvious or even apparent nexus
exists between studying law and composing music or painting pictures.
Hence the overall feeling of genuine surprise on discovering how many
creative artists in different fields have as their common denominator some
legal background.
Despite the fundamental importance of this pattern, despite the
apparent evidence of some nexus between legal training and artistic
creativity, virtually nothing has been written on the subject. No complete
list or study exists of creative artists who studied law. As a result,
compiling such a catalogue largely depends on serendipity: an inadvertent
stumbling on a biographical reference, a discovery made by chance.
Creativity is highly prized but little understood. We celebrate it, we try
to cultivate it, yet we know hardly anything about it. Little as we know
about creativity in general, we know nothing about law and artistic
creativity." 9 To borrow from one of Stevens's poems, a study of this
subject "is not written yet/Nor half begun. "360
A. Need for a New Theory
To understand and make sense of the examples of Stevens and other
law-trained creative artists, we may need to develop new ways of thinking
about those phenomena. If we are to be true to Stevens's outlook, we
have to pick up our own blue guitar and go behind things as they are. The
roster of law-trained artists is simply too long and too impressive not to
ponder. Induction tells us there is a pattern here, but the pattern's
359. For many different views on creativity, see, e.g., TERESA M.

AMABILE,
SILVANO ARIETI, CREATIVITY: THE MAGIC SYNTHESIS
(John Brockman ed., 1993) (1976); JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE
WORLDS (1986); JEROME BRUNER, ON KNOWING: ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND (1962)
(1979); HOWARD GARDNER, ART, MIND AND BRAIN (1982); HOWARD GARDNER,
CREATIVE MINDS (1993); HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND (1983); HOWARD
GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1993); DANIEL GOLEMAN ET AL., THE CREATIVE
SPIRIT (1992); ARTHUR I. MILLER, INSIGHTS OF GENIUS (1996); ANTHONY STORR, THE
DYNAMICS OF CREATION (1972); FRANK J. SULLOWAY, BORN TO REBEL: BIRTH
CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT

(1996);

ORDER, FAMILY DYNAMICS AND CREATIVE LIVES (1996); Daniel Goleman, Pondering
the Riddle of Creativity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, § 2, at 1.
360. Wallace Stevens, The Comedian as the Letter C, in HARMONIUM, (1950),
reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 33.
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Rather than be, in Stevens's phrasing,

"rationalists, wearing square hats," we yearn to be rationalists in

sombreros. 36' This means we have to try to find the links, the legitimate
and unforced connections, among apparently unconnected things, among
the disparate details. We need to see the artistic and aesthetic quality of

law.
A number of familiar partial explanations come readily to mind.
Financial security, parental pressure and upward mobility are each a
possible explanation why so many creative artists started out studying law.
So is the possibility of law as nothing more than a false career start.362
For some, the attractions of the artistic life-la vie de Boh me-prove
stronger than the call of the law. 363 Then there is the role of the law
school, both past and present, as something more than a vocational
training ground, often a graduate finishing school in the liberal arts for
"able, ambitious college seniors who cannot think of anything else they
want to do. "364 Finally, a long tradition of law and the humanities may
help explain some of the lawyer-artists.
Although each of these possible partial explanations has some
plausibility, they all seem unpersuasive and less than completely satisfying.
They strike us as superficial. None of them singly or even all of them
together convince to any significant degree. They do not get to the heart
of the matter.
361. Wallace Stevens, Six SignificantLandscapes, in id. at 75.
362. See e.g., HarvardLawyers Who Find They Are in The Wrong Line, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1995, at 8; Amy Stevens, Why Lawyers Are Depressed,Anxious, Bored
Insomniacs, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1995, at BI; John Heilpern, What I Learned at
Oxford: Never Give In to Nostalgia, N.Y. OBSERVER, June 26, 1995, at 23 ("But I
found that three years of law at Oxford ... heightened my enthusiasm for practically

anything else.").
363. See generally JERROLD SEIGEL, BOHEMIAN PARIS (1986). Henry Murger,
author of Scenes de la vie de Boh~me, on which Puccini's opera was based, was a
messenger boy in a lawyer's office before he became a writer. Id. at 34.
364. Derek C. Bok, A Flazved System, HARVARD MAGAZINE (May-June 1993) 38,
70. Bok adds: "With such lukewarm beginnings, it is not surprising that many students
tire of their studies." Id. Henry James, the great American writer, is a good example.
He attended Harvard Law School for a year, from 1862 to 1863, for not very clear
reasons. According to his biographer,
"Law, nevertheless, appeared to have been for him the only acceptable
alternative in 1862 .... Once he had excluded the clergyman, the scientist,

the doctor, what remained but the lawyer? The law was the one field which
seemed eminently 'practical.' It represented 'life' and the 'world.' In reality
it was the avenue of least resistance, for the moment, for a shy, observant
young man who asked only to be just 'literary.'"
LEON EDEL, HENRY JAMES: THE UNTRIED YEARS 193 (1953).
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A deeper, truer and more encompassing explanation may lie
elsewhere. We need to examine the possible correlation between legal
training and artistic creativity. Obviously studying law does not make one
a great artist (it does not necessarily make one a great or even a good
lawyer), but we can inquire if the type of mind attracted to the arts is, in
some sense as yet unclear, similar to that attracted to law. We can try to
determine if art somehow flows from the legal cast of mind. These are
important questions that turn on nothing less than the nature of legal
thinking, the meaning of artistic creativity and the link-if any- between
the two.
A hint of this link was glimpsed, if only briefly and in passing, almost
seventy years ago by one of our most literary of judges. In his 1928 book
The Paradoxes of Legal Science, Cardozo glancingly referred to a
"kinship" between "the creative process in law" and "the creative process
in art." 65 The bridge between the two is, according to Cardozo, Stevens's
favorite concept. "Imagination," wrote Cardozo, "is for each the faculty
that creates. "366 Unfortunately, Cardozo, like lawyer-mathematician
Fermat with his famous Last Theorem, 367 did not elaborate on this
maddeningly-terse and poetically-vague but nonetheless brilliantly
illuminating and highly suggestive comment. We can attempt the task of
elaborating on and taking the first steps toward trying to prove what we
might call Cardozo's kinship theorem, with a little help from Wallace
Stevens.
Stevens uses a happy metaphor in "Angel Surrounded by Paysans,"
where he writes: "I am the angel of reality ... I am the necessary angel
of earth, since, in my sight, you see the earth again." 368 Just suppose that
the "necessary angel" -- the mysterious, hidden catalyst -- that explains the
large number of law-trained creative artists is the relationship between
legal thinking and artistic creativity. Put another way, entertain the
possibility that for some people law is the "necessary angel" for artistic
365. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928), reprinted in
supra note 181, at 286.
366. Id.
367. See AMIR D. ACZEL, FERMAT'S LAST THEOREM: UNLOCKING THE SECRET OF
AN ANCIENT MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM (1996).
Around 1637, Fermat wrote a
mathematical theorem in the margin of a book, adding, "I have discovered a truly
marvelous proof of this, which, however, the margin is not large enough to contain."
For hundreds of years, generations of mathematicians tried to supply the "truly marvelous
proof" referred to by Fermat. It was not proven until 1995, but entire branches of
mathematics grew up as a by-product of efforts to prove the theorem. Will generations
of lawyers try to prove Cardozo's kinship theorem?
368. Wallace Stevens, Angels Surrounded by Paysans, in The Auroras of Autumn
SELECTED WRITINGS,

(1950), reprintedin COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 2, at 496.
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creativity, that legal training is linked with artistic creativity. Stevens
said, in connection with this poem, that "reality and contact with it are the
great blessings."369 Was not working as a lawyer Stevens's (and others')
contact with reality?
Resist the temptation to reject this novel hypothesis too early, to
summarily dismiss the notion of connecting law and creative art. Suspend
disbelief until you study the evidence. Keep an open mind. Remember,
"The blue guitar surprises you." Consider the great explanatory power of
this provisional theory, as you listen to the strumming of the blue guitar.
Here is a synopsis of the new theory. Legal thinking primarily
involves logical analysis and narrative. These two fundamental ways of
legal thinking mirror the two basic modes of cognitive functioning.
Mature and creative thinking must accept uncertainty in the law, which
closely parallels the important theory of artistic creativity embodied in
Keats's "negative capability." The upshot is the conclusion that legal
thinking and artistic creativity have something deep in common.
B. Nature of Legal Thinking
The explanation for much of what we have been considering may lie
in the nature of legal thinking. We need to investigate a lawyer's methods
and channels of thought. Many nonlawyers are fascinated and puzzled by
the legal mentality. How does it differ from the thinking of musicians,
writers or scientists? How do lawyers make legal arguments? What do
lawyers mean when they say the holding of one case should embrace the
different facts of another?
For centuries people have observed the changes that occur-and not
all necessarily for the better-when one studies law. Burke's memorable
comment that the study of law sharpens the mind by narrowing it is only
the most famous. Most of us are personally familiar with the obnoxious
law student (no one in this room, of course) who will argue about
anything, who will endlessly debate the meaning of words, and who will
chop logic to overcome common sense. Yet during the last several
decades, law professors have boasted and prided themselves on their
ability to take new college graduates with mush-filled minds and in the
first year of law school make them think like lawyers. What does it mean
to "think like a lawyer?"
Thinking like a lawyer involves several qualities. A client comes into
the office with a problem, describes it to the lawyer, who listens and asks
questions. At this early stage, the lawyer is trying to find out what
happened, to learn the facts, to develop the story. Once the client's
version of the facts emerges, the lawyer must analyze it to see what must
369. BLOOM, supra note 57, at 302.
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be done. Such analysis may involve legal research, considerable thought
and practical judgment.
Practical judgment is a special ability and is essential for success as a
lawyer as well as a statesman. It involves the capacity to grasp the unique
combination of characteristics that constitute a particular situation. It is a
talent for integrating and synthesizing changing data into a single pattern
with their implications, to see them as symptoms of past and future
possibilities, to see them pragmatically. It requires what has been called
natural wisdom, imaginative understanding, insight, perceptiveness and
intuition. It shows itself as practical wisdom, a sense of what will
"work," and what will not. It is akin to the gifts of artists or creative
writers, especially the great psychological novelists.37
After the analysis is complete, the lawyer recommends a course of
action to the client. The recommendation will often take the form of
telling the client what should be done, and what will happen along the
way. Suppose, for example, the lawyer tentatively advises starting a
lawsuit, and the client accepts that advice. The attorney then does more
investigation-talks further to the client, seeks out witnesses, examines
relevant documents-all for the purpose of drafting a formal complaint that
tells the client's story in the form of a claim for relief. Yet the complaint
is also the product of careful analysis, knowing which claims to assert and
which not, which elements must be pleaded and how, and so on.
At some point in the litigation, the lawyer will probably have to write
a brief or research a memorandum in connection with a motion. That
brief will itself combine various legal skills. The brief's statement of
facts, so crucial to an outcome, is primarily narrative with an edge to it.
It sets forth the relevant facts-it tells the story-in the best light possible.
The brief's legal argument consists of analysis, of finding the law and
applying it as persuasively and cogently as possible, of reasoning by
analogy in case analysis. But even a legal argument combines analysis
with literary skill.
A trial, that most dramatic of legal events, couples story-telling and
analysis. Preparing witnesses, giving opening and closing statements, the
substance and sequence of witnesses' testimony, the nature and order of
questions on direct and cross-examination, the use of documentary and
demonstrative evidence-all these are designed to narrate the most
compelling version of events possible. At the same time, throughout the
trial there will be evidentiary issues, procedural points and substantive
disagreements that require argument and analysis by the lawyer. Litigation
is filled with this variety of legal thought processes.
From these few examples, and others we can all readily conjure up,
it is clear that the successful lawyer must master more than one type of
370. See Berlin, supra note 52, at 27-30; see generally KRONMAN, supra note 52.
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thinking, some of them very different and even apparently inconsistent.

Two primary components loom large in legal thinking:

analysis and

narrative. The lawyer must obviously be skilled at arguing and giving
reasons, in systematic or theoretical explanations, for this is the core of
most legal reasoning and argument. As is becoming increasingly evident
these days, the lawyer must know how to tell a story.37' James Boyd
White, one of the modem pioneers of law and literature, claims that, "The
lawyer is at heart a writer, one who lives by the power of his
imagination."3 72 White even goes so far-some say too far-as to suggest
that telling "a story that will claim to tell the truth in legal terms" is "the
central act of the legal mind. " " According to White, "the life of the
lawyer is at its heart a literary one.""
The complete lawyer must master both types of discourse (narrative
and analysis) and harness them to his or her ends. This is no easy task.
We deal, in White's words, with "discordant modes of thought and
3 75
expression" and "incompatible, uncommunicating sides of oneself."
The lawyer has to learn how to reconcile these apparently inconsistent
thought processes. That is the essence of legal thinking.
C. Two FundamentalModes of Thought
The two basic tasks involved in legal thinking-narrative and
analysis-roughly correspond to the two fundamental modes of thought
recognized by the recent cognitive revolution in psychology. These two
371. See generally WEISBERG, supranote 55, (recommending study of literature as
a means of filling ethical void in current legal theory and practice); BROOKS & GEWIRTZ,
supra note 221 (exploring use of legal storytelling); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIvE,
AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV L. REV. 4 (1983) (discussing general
jurisprudential importance of narratives); Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990) (including extensive bibliography on narrativism); Kim L.
Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (introducing
symposium issue on narrativism in legal scholarship); Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz
of Hoon"; The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEX. L. REv. 589 (1988) (relying on
literary sources to stress the importance of human voice in lawyering).
372. WHITE, supranote 121, at 758. Or as another law professor put it, "in some
ways, and for some purposes, it is useful and illuminating to look on law as art."
CHARLES L. BLACK, THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 18 (1986).

373. Id. at 859. Telling a story may well be the central act of mind itself, legal or
otherwise. According to a recent study, we use "storying" and metaphor to understand
everything, and this storying, literary mind comes first, before all other kinds of thought,
even language itself. See MARK TURNER, THE LITERARY MIND (1996).

374. HERACLES' Bow, supra note 43, at 77.
375. WHITE, supranote 121, at 859.
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types of thinking supply different ways of processing experience, of
building reality. These two modes were recognized early on by William
James, when he wrote:
To say that all human thinking is essentially of two kinds -reasoning on the one hand, and narrative, descriptive,
contemplative thinking on the other -- is to say only what every
reader's experience will corroborate.3 76
One is what psychologist Jerome Bruner calls the paradigmatic or scientific
mode, the other the narrative mode.377
The two modes of thought are very different. The scientific mode
tries to constitute the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description
and explanation. It relies on logic, mathematics, and sciences. When
used imaginatively, it is marked by good theory, careful analysis, logical
proof, sound argument, and empirical discovery guided by reasoned
hypothesis.
By contrast, the narrative mode focuses less on logic and more on
intuition. If the scientific mode is Apollonian, then the narrative mode is
Dionysian. The imaginative application of the narrative mode produces
good literature, illuminating stories, riveting drama, and plausible
historical accounts. It describes and reveals human intention and action
and their changes and consequences. The narrative mode characterizes the
humanist-the historian, the literary critic, the philosopher, the interpreter
of culture-and of course the artist-the poet, the
storyteller, the painter,
378
the dramatist, the composer or maker of music.
Both these modes of thought, with all their irreconcilable differences,
are, as we have seen, part of what it means to think and practice as a
lawyer. At times the lawyer uses the scientific mode; at other times the
lawyer relies on the narrative; often the lawyer uses both modes during the
376.

See JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS xiii (1986) (quoting

William James).
377. See id. at 11-14. See also JEROME BRUNER, ON KNOWING: ESSAYS FOR THE
LEFT HAND (1979). Others disagree with these theories. Howard Gardner, a leading
student of creativity, favors a theory of multiple intelligences, comprising seven (not two)
abilities, which Gardner believes are distinct and relatively independent intelligences. In
addition to: (1) linguistic intelligence and (2) logical-mathematical intelligence, which
correspond to the two fundamental modes noted by William James and Jerome Bruner,
Gardner finds: (3) spatial intelligence, (4) musical intelligence, (5) bodily-kinesthetic
intelligence, (6) interpersonal intelligence and (7) intrapersonal intelligence. Gardner
points out that conventional tests of intelligence measure only the first two, and sometimes
the third, of the multiple intelligences. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF
MIND (1983); HOWARD GARDNER, ART, MIND AND BRAIN (1982).
378. See BRUNER, supranote 377, at 11-14.
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same task. Law and economics typifies the scientific mode, law and
literature the narrative mode. Law, in short, bridges the two fundamental
modes of thought; it spans tasks that employ the scientific and narrative
modes side by side, if not simultaneously.
This hybrid scientific-narrative quality of law has certain important
consequences. It means that legal thinking is not completely akin either
to science or to the humanities and the arts. A good lawyer is adept at
both logical argument and storytelling. Success at the law requires no
less. Armed with such varied skills, a lawyer could make a less surprising
transition from law to another discipline. Thus we should not be that
shocked or taken aback when we discover, as we have, that many lawyers
have from time to time become creative artists outside the law.
D. Jerome Frank and Legal Thinking
To go a step further in testing our hypothesis, we need to find another
link between legal thinking and artistic creativity. This can be done by
connecting the thought of an American Legal Realist and an English
Romantic poet. By now, many books have been written on legal thinking,
but one of the best, Law and the Modem Mind by Jerome Frank-a law
professor, New Deal administrator, federal appellate judge, and leading
Legal Realist-was published over sixty-five years ago in 1930. Its
publication turned out to be a major event in the legal world, and it
remains important and perceptive.
Frank's highly controversial and influential book focused on certainty
and uncertainty in the law. He attacked law as an inductive science and
the related theory that judges do not make law but merely discover
preexisting law. He argued that there is a widespread yearning among
lawyers and non-lawyers for certainty in the law. To great effect, Frank
canvassed the legal literature to demonstrate the general craving for
certainty. The "basic legal myth," according to Frank, is that "law either
is or can be made approximately stationary and certain. "379 But-and here
is the first of Frank's two great insights-that is a myth because certainty
in the law is unattainable.
Such inevitable uncertainty in the law is not, thought Frank, a bad
thing. On the contrary, "It is of immense social value."3 10 It is, rather,
"the overeagerness for legal certainty and denials of legal contingency
[that] are harmful. "38 By fatuously insisting on "illusory certainty,"
people elevate logic to a more important role in the law than reality, actual
circumstances and experience.
(Echoes of Wallace Stevens!)
379. JEROME FRANK, LAWv AND
380. Id. at 7.
381. Id. at 239.

THE MODERN MIND

13 (3d ed. 1935).
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Scholasticism, verbalism, and word-magic assume unwarranted authority.
Law must reject the craving for certainty "if it is to meet the needs of
modern civilization. 382
This baleful yearning for legal certainty is due in part, argues Frank
in an intellectually daring thrust, to a childish view of law as an authority
Here Frank makes his second great
figure, a father-substitute.
contribution, using basic Freudian psychology to explain a widespread
fundamental emotional attitude to the law. One must remember that in
1930, when Frank published Law and the Modem Mind, psychology was
in its early and crucial stages of development and Freud's influence and
acceptance in America were nowhere near what they have become decades
later. Concludes Frank, "That childish longing is an important element in
the explanation of the absurdly unrealistic notion that law is, or can be
made, entirely certain."383
From this penetrating insight, Frank went on to argue that mature
legal thinking must accept uncertainty in the law. The "modem mind,"
he wrote, "is a mind free of childish emotional drags, a mature mind. "31
The complete liberation of lawyers from the claims of legal certainty will
come only through this liberation from the emotional attitudes of the child.
"Hallucinatory satisfaction will cease being sought in law when men learn
to cease regarding law as the embodiment of fatherly authority. "385 Only
by preventing the conversion of law into a substitute for fatherly authority
can thinking about law become "realistic, experimental-adult. "386
Frank explicitly underscored how the spirit of creativity in the law is
adult and "involves an abandonment of the spirit of the child which
demands a guaranteed, certainty-insured world." 387 He compared legal
thinking with scientific creativity. Although lawyers should learn scientific
logic, "it is far more important," writes Frank, "that they catch the spirit
of the creative scientist." That spirit, explains Frank, "yearns not for
safety but risk, not for certainty but adventure, . . . thrives on
experimentation, invention and novelty and not on nostalgia for the
absolute, . . . devotes itself to new ways of manipulating protean
particulars and not to the quest of undeviating universals. "388 In short,
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 99.

387. Id. at 98.
388. Id. at 98. As Frank's biographer noted in 1985, Lav and the Modem Mind
"addressed problems still unresolved" and its issues "remain" alive and well. ROBERT
JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER 66-67 (1985). That statement
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mature legal thinking requires-in Frank's thesis-a temperament capable
of living comfortably with uncertainty.
E. Link to Keats's "Negative Capability"
Frank's central thesis in Law and the Modem Mind, that mature legal
thinking requires living with uncertainties, closely resembles a famous
theory of artistic creativity, Keats's- concept of "negative capability." On
December 21, 1817, John Keats wrote a letter to his brothers about a
conversation on "various subjects" with one of his friends. As the
conversation proceeded, Keats said that "several things dovetailed in my
mind, and at once it struck me what quality went to form a Man of
Achievement especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so
enormously. I mean Negative Capability, that is when a man is capable
of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching
after fact and reason."389 Keats then referred to such "half-knowledge" as
perfectly acceptable.
Negative capability is one of those fundamental ideas exhaustively
analyzed by literary critics and scholars.3 90 As explained by Keats, it is
an element of intellectual power. It is a willingness to remain in
uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts; it is an aspect of intelligence, of
seeing the full force and complexity of the subject. It refuses to be fixed
in a final judgment. To remain content with half-knowledge is to remain
content with contradictory knowledge. Negative capability is the faculty
of not having to make up one's mind about everything, the ability to
entertain conflicting points of view at the same time, and it is essential for
any creative artist, whether writer, poet, composer or painter. Negative
capability, which eschews the armor of systematic certainties, makes
possible the artistic vision of life.
Negative capability is the unstated major premise of Jerome Frank's
book. It explains more generally the quality he sought in legal thinkers.
Each of his judicial heroes-Cardozo and especially Holmes-exemplifies
negative capability in the law. They vividly illustrate the legal aspects of
negative capability, the ability to weigh conflicting hypotheses and to
tolerate ambiguity and complexity of motivation. Had Frank thought of
it, no doubt he would have mentioned negative capability.
remains true. See HERACLES' Bow, supra note 43, at 58 ("One never knows all the law;
one never feels wholly confident about any step taken in the law. The lawyer lives in an
uncertain and indeterminate world.").
389. WHITE supra note 121, at 927.
390. See e.g., id. at 18, 236-37, 249, 253; Lionel Trilling, The Poet as Hero: Keats
in His Letters, THE OPPOSING SELF 33 (Harvest/HBJ 1979) (1955).
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This clear and close connection between Frank's Law and the Modem
Mind and Keats's negative capability is powerfully suggestive. It implies
that the characteristics of creativity in the law are essentially the same as
in the arts. More important, the unexpected link makes one wonder if
mature legal thinking, as described by Frank, has some special affinity
with artistic creativity. One might almost conclude that legal thinking has
something structurally deep and intellectually powerful in common with
artistic creativity.
In this light, references to negative capability by legal writers take on
added meaning. A comment by Grey about Wallace Stevens and negative
capability becomes more trenchant. Grey describes negative capability as
"the ability to hold conflicting generalizations in mind at the same time,"
and says it is "the special poet's virtue. " 39 "In this century," writes
Grey, "Wallace Stevens has carried forward perhaps more than any other
poet in English the Shakespearean and Keatsian tradition of negative
capability."392 It was no accident. Nor is it an accident that James Boyd
White uses Keats's letter about negative capability as an epigraph to a
chapter on "The Education of a Lawyer." 93 Keats's concept of negative
capability prepares one well for the mental jousting required
by law, for
39 4
learning to approach cases from multiple perspectives.
F. The Necessary Angel
Before hastily jumping to any conclusions, let us recapitulate what we
know about any connection between legal thinking and artistic creativity.
First, we know that there is an unexpected correlation between legal
training and a surprising number of creative artists in several different
fields. This pattern shows itself in fields not dependent on verbal facility
alone. We also know that the literature is fairly blank on this subject. We
can well understand how young artistic people may be steered against their
wishes or nature toward a safe, upper-middle class profession such as law
391. THE

PRACTICE OF POETRY, supra note 12, at 7.

392. Id.
393.

WHITE,

supra note 121, at 927. See also White's comments about the lawyer

practicing under "conditions of radical uncertainty" and living in "an uncertain and
indeterminate world." HERACLES' Bow, supra note 43, at 49, 58. Cardozo as well cites
Keats as an example of learning being "the springboard by which imagination leaps to
truth." Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 181, at 286.
394. Gopen, supra note 179, at 338. As Gopen puts it, negative capability "is the

ability, when you are faced with multiple possibilities for interpretation (even mutually
exclusive possibilities), not to succumb to the compulsion to choose one at the expense

of the others." Id.
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for practical reasons having to do with earning a living, parental desires,
or upward social mobility. Many people with first-rate artistic talent have
made careers in law (or other fields) because of the career uncertainties of
the arts world. The resulting anxiety may itself contribute to creativity.
Indisputably, several of our law-trained creative artists left the law.
A cynic or skeptic might therefore be tempted to brush aside the long list
of law-trained creative artists as mere fugitives from the law. But that
dismissal would be unjustified and too facile. True, such artists rejected
the legal life, and escaped to a life they found more congenial and
conducive to the nurturing and flourishing of their art or their personality.
For them, the law was perhaps just an early error on a long career path.
Yet some of them look back on their legal training with pleasant
memories, although, to be fair, some look back with horror and disgust.395
For some, lessons learned in law school actually affected and improved
their art. And others, such as Stevens, never left the law.
A most provocative approach to this issue comes from Anthony Julius,
a full-time practicing English lawyer with a doctorate in English literature,
and author of a critically acclaimed book on T.S. Eliot.396 Julius has
thought much about the differences between lawyers and poets and the
395. Flaubert, for example, found the study of law to be a bitter experience. In a
letter dated May 21, 1842, he writes: "May the devil strangle jurisprudence and those
who invented it! Axiom as to the study and profession of law: the study of it is a beastly
bore and the profession ignoble." A month later, on June 25, 1842, he writes: "The law
is killing me, brutalizing me, tearing me limb from limb, it is impossible for me to toil
away at it . . . .I just can't go on: I'd rather kill myself." And a few months later
(Aug. 1, 1842): "Law sends me into a state of moral castration strange to conceive."
LLoSA, supra note 160, at 109. As his revenge, Flaubert portrayed lawyers in his writing
in a bad light.
Schumann, in contrast, vacillated in his attitude toward his legal studies. Most of the
time, he felt, as he wrote to his mother, "frigid jurisprudence smashes you down with its
ice-cold definitions from the very beginning and can't please me at all." PETER
OSTWALD, SCHMANN: THE INNER VOICES OF A MUsIcAL GENIUs 34 (1985).
Other
times he said the law "tastes excellent" and he felt "the true dignity of jurisprudence."
Id. at 51. But the positive attitude was short-lived. He later wrote "The law continues
to chill and disfigure me." Id. at 56. See also Walker, supra note 15, at 6-8.
Even after Kandinsky gave up law for art, he had nice things to say about his former
profession. "Today," he wrote in 1912, "I know just how much I accumulated during
those years, and I am grateful." KANDINSKY, supranote 174, at 343. He acknowledged
how law had given him a thorough grounding in abstract thinking. In his Reminiscences,
Kandinsky told how his law studies "trained me to acquire the necessary gift of
immersing myself in the finer realms of the material, otherwise known as the 'abstract."'
Id. at 362. Reading law, he felt, "helped me acquire the capacity for abstract thought."
Id.
396. See ANTHONY JULIUs, T.S. ELIOT, ANTI-SEMITISM AND LITERARY FORM
(1995).
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careers of those who leave the law to write poetry. He has concluded that
law and the creative arts are separated by a deep, profound, and old
antagonism. He sees this antagonism as the basic theme in English
literature, citing novels, plays and poems hostile to lawyers and legal
processes. In these literary works, law is damned, portrayed as a
destroyer, laying waste to lives.397
Rather than enhancing artistic creativity, law-according to
Julius-does just the opposite. "Law inhibits the imagination," declares
Julius, "it seeks to regulate a realm in which nothing should be
forbidden." 398 For Julius, law is the "enemy" of literature, which
"resists" its control. Citing Ovid and Petrarch, both of whom studied law
before achieving fame as poets, Julius says they are common examples of
creative types who view law as "a career to spurn." Both criticized the
practice of law as tawdry, mercenary and dishonest compared to the more
pure writing of poetry. For the same reasons, to reverse the career path
and switch from
poet to lawyer would, in Julius's words, be a "betrayal
399
of vocation."
But Julius's approach, however reasonable it seems, concentrates on
the apparent and avoids the plate tectonics beneath the surface. Even
Julius has to admit that law and poetry have since ancient times often been
"rival careers."" Why these particular rivals? Why not business and
poetry, or medicine and poetry? What is it that links law and poetry?
Julius really does not say. Julius, moreover, proves too much. Were he
correct about the tensions between law and literature, his own career
would be more one-dimensional; he would not be the successful lawyerwriter he is. Julius's own double life of law and literature therefore belies
his approach.
Attending law school does not necessarily mean one has to practice
law. European law schools, especially in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, were places where young gentlemen went as much for
culture and contacts as for vocational study, really graduate schools in the
liberal arts. 4" The alternatives often were limited to medicine or theology,
so that the liberal arts student without a scientific or religious bent was
pushed toward law as the only possible choice. Some of this exists today
in America, where law school is often three years of postponing a decision
397. See Julius, supra note 108, at 17-21; Anthony Julius, Crack the Lawyer's
Voice, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 29, 1996, at 8 (book review).
398. Julius, supra note 108, at 20.
399. Id. at 18-20.

400. Id. at 18 n.51.
401. See THEODORE
64-137 (1990).

ZIOLKOWSKI, GERMAN ROMANTICISM AND ITS INSTITUTIONS
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on what to do with one's life. 4 2 All of this means that many people went
and go to law school who end up having nothing to do with law.
At the same time, we cannot ignore the long tradition of law and the
humanities. Law and the humanities have gone hand in hand for centuries,
even millennia. Against such a background, it would be natural to expect
a revolving door between the two fields. The shuttling back and forth has
occasionally been quite noticeable. Law and letters simply go together.
But all this is common, uncontroverted ground. Probably equally
uncontroverted, though perhaps more newly discussed, is the notion of the
lawyer's thought process relying heavily on imaginative use of the two
basic modes of thought-analysis and narrative. This insight has led some
astute commentators to see the hand of the lawyer but to hear the voice of
the creative artist. After all, analytic thinking and argumentation-two of
a lawyer's fundamental skills-are necessary conditions for creativity. A
work of fiction or poetry, a musical composition, even a painting is a type
of argument.
One possible link is the urge and capacity, common to creative artists
and good lawyers alike, to think abstractly, to see a system. For example,
Kandinsky, a founder of abstract expressionist art early in this century,
was a distinguished law professor in Russia for ten years before becoming
a painter. In his memoirs, he wrote that the study of law "helped me
acquire the capacity for abstract thought."
Hildegard Behrens, a
contemporary opera singer who graduated from law school, recently
credited the study of law with her learning how to approach and resolve
problems systematically. "That's the connection with opera .... You go
step by step in law, and that's what you do in opera, too . . . . The
intellectual training and discipline that it takes to solve a juridical case are
very good for the approaches to a role."'
Lawyers also have a special and ambivalent feeling for the past as
represented by precedent. Although by temperament lawyers may seem
deferential to precedent, often enough they, like the lawyers in "Notes
toward a Supreme Fiction" who disbelieve in the statue of General Du
Puy, reject precedent.'
Just as studying and practicing law may
unexpectedly teach the limits of logic and rationality, so too studying and
working with legal precedents for years may reveal the limits of precedent,
may subtly and paradoxically induce a reactive turn of mind that yearns to
rebel against the past. This reaction is all the more likely when some of
402. This is not a new phenomenon. Richard Carston, a character in Dickens's
Bleak House, studied law because he could not think of anything else to do.
403. See Barry Paris, The Force, OPERA NEWS, Apr. 5, 1997, at 9. Diva Behrens

also took part in the June 12, 1997 forum titled "Law and Creativity: Is There a
Conflict?" at the New York County Lawyers Association.
404. VENDLER, supra note 105, at 105.
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our greatest judicial heros are those-such as Holmes and Cardozo-who
found impressive ways not to be bound by precedent but to make
precedent. 405 Legal education's stress on precedent may unintentionally
breed, more than anything else, skepticism of such precedent. 4°6 Those
who deal all the time with precedent quickly learn not to worship it, but
to manipulate it, to distinguish it, to avoid it. This attitude may be
conducive to revolutionary thinking, and it is at least more than a
coincidence that the revolutionary artists Cezanne, Matisse, Kandinsky,
Stravinsky and even Stevens were all trained as lawyers and thereby
learned how to overturn or ignore precedent when necessary.
Age of peak creativity may be another similarity between law and the
creative arts. Creativity in different fields requires different talents, which
may be influenced by age. 7 Certain creative talents tend to be confined
to youth. Mathematicians and physicists are well known for doing their
most creative work before age thirty. In comparison, artists-such as
Stevens-are more likely to do their best work when they are older.
In law, practical wisdom earned from experience is a highly sought
virtue. Gray hair on a lawyer betokens a veteran who supposedly can give
better advice based on the hard lessons he or she has learned. There are
no child prodigies among trial lawyers. A lawyer typically does not find
his or her stride until age forty, and really does not achieve eminence until
his or her mid-fifties or later. Assuming good health and a clear mind,
405. The "tyranny" of precedent, Cardozo once wrote, "breeds rebellion, and
rebellion an emancipator." Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, reprinted in
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 181, at 287. But, as might be expected, American law
often masks its most revolutionary changes. "Holmes, like every revolutionary, merely
sought to sugar over his more startling heresies with a frosting of antique learning."
GILMORE, supra note 99, at 20 n.36. Cardozo innovated in the guise of following
precedent. The more innovative the decision, the more Cardozo's opinion strained to
prove that no novelty -- not the slightest departure from prior law -- was involved. As
Cardozo turned the law of New York upside down, he made the result seem inexorable.
See GILMORE, supra note 167, at 75-77; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION 251-91 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1976); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW
INAMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 119-38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985) (1980); cf.
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). As Justice
Douglas once confessed, "I would rather create a precedent than find one." WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 179 (1980).
406. One of our most prominent, popular, and successful lawyer-writers has
described such skepticism in the single most famous fictional treatment of the first year

of law school. "Thinking like a lawyer involved being suspicious and distrustful. You
reevaluated statements inferred from silences, looked for loopholes and ambiguities. You
did everything but take a statement at face value." SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 93 (1977).
407. See Alan Wolfe, Up From Scientism, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 23, 1996, 29, at
32 (book review).
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lawyers can continue practicing until their energy ebbs, often well into
their seventies or eighties. For both lawyers and artists, then, the highest
levels of creative achievement may occur late in life, perhaps reflecting
something in common about the nature of the abilities needed for creativity
in those fields.
To this mix we add the similarity between Jerome Frank's idea of
mature, creative legal thinking and Keats's generative concept of negative
capability. The result is a bubbling intellectual brew that suggests a
necessary relationshipfor some people between law and artistic creativity.
A cartoon from The New Yorker Magazine illustrates the point.4 °8

iiIN
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Drawing by Lorenz; D1989
The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.
408. THE NEW YORKER BOOK OF LAWYER CARTOONS 63 (1996).
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But humor should not hide a fundamental truth. As Aristophanes and
George Bernard Shaw knew, satire is often the best and most telling way
to drive home a serious and controversial truth. The lawyer/actor,
lawyer/filmmaker and lawyer/playwright in the cartoon show the
"necessary angel" at work.
To say that this is merely a tentative, provisional conclusion is only
to underscore the obvious. To find a connection between legal thinking
and artistic creativity will rub many people the wrong way. They and
others may ridicule it as self-aggrandizing on the part of the always
grasping legal profession. And, to be sure, the evidence is hardly clear
and convincing, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. But, all the same,
something curious is going on here, something that has evaded scrutiny for
far too long. The question is what.
A candid, open-minded, fair appraisal of the uncontested facts leads
to the controversial conclusion that, in Wallace Stevens's apt metaphor,
law is, in some sense, for some people, the "necessary angel" for artistic
creativity. This is, of course, only a preliminary conclusion based on
incomplete evidence and limited analysis. Much more has to be studied
and thought about, debated and discussed, before the issue of law and
creative art can be laid to rest. But the inquiry has to start somewhere and
sometime, and there is nothing wrong with here and now.
VII. THE GREAT THINGS IN LIFE
You know then that it is not the reason
That makes us happy or unhappy
Wallace Stevens, "Of Mere Being " 4 9
Many of these strains of thought merge in the life of Wallace Stevens.
He is the literary lawyer par excellence, the epitome of the breed, the
climax of the line. He combined two lives in one, with significant and
impressive accomplishments in both law and literature. His example sheds
light on the meaning of a double life and how it can and should be lived,
if only by contrast with those who reject it for a life of pure art. We
study Stevens and wonder: how did he do it? how are we to reconcile the
lawyer and poet? But it turns out that there is no need to, because there
is no conflict.
We now have a better idea of what manner of man we have
encountered, the nature of his temperament and genius. The two sides
coexist in Stevens. To practice law is to deal with the possibilities of
409. ,VALLACE STEVENS, Of Mere Being, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28, at
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texts, and that is precisely the province of poetry. This analysis alters our
view of Stevens. His life and work emerge as more influenced by the law
than conventional wisdom has it. These conclusions force us to retire
familiar notions of Stevens's poetry being untouched by the law.
Questing for the key that unlocks the door to Stevens's double life also
opens doors to many other law-trained artists. It by no means denigrates
Stevens's achievement to say that he is not unique in being a creative artist
who had legal training. But his life experience illumines theirs and
suggests many lines of inquiry. If more creative artists have a legal
background than we ever thought possible, now we have some provisional
explanations why.
More significantly, perhaps, the double lives of Wallace Stevens and
other lawyer-artists lead to a new theory about the hidden and mysterious
link between legal thinking and artistic creativity. It may be no accident
or coincidence that legal training and artistic creativity are linked more
often than we would ever have thought. Something about the nature of
legal thinking has an affinity for artistic creativity.
Now we can decide who was right, Holmes, when he said "the law is
not the place for the artist or the poet," or Flaubert, when he declared,
"Every lawyer carries within himself the debris of a poet." Based on our
investigation, it seems pretty clear that Holmes, a towering figure in
American law, was wrong here. Given Holmes's stature, his famous
comments on law and art, the affinity uncovered between Stevens and
Holmes, and what strike us as extraordinary parallels in their lives, it is
highly instructive to consider Holmes's own life in the law. A fair review
of Holmes's legal career demonstrates that it was as much literary as legal,
that he owes his legal reputation largely to his literary skills. As Richard
Posner says, "In part at least, Holmes was a great judge because he was
a great literary artist. ""' To say that the law is not for artists or poets is
therefore to say that the law is not for the likes of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
From the start, Holmes wrote his way to success. Holmes began as
his college class poet and ended up as poet sage of the Supreme Court.
After law school, Holmes wrote several articles, essays and book reviews
for the A meican Law Review, of which he soon became editor. A major
writing project was his revision of Kent's Commentaries, a classic at the
time. And it was his lectures on The Common Law and his book based
on them that catapulted Holmes onto the highest state court in
410. POSNER, supra note 171, at xvii. According to Posner, Holmes is "one of our
greatest writers," whose "true greatness is not as a lawyer, judge or legal theorist" but
as a "writer-philosopher." Id. at xvi-xvii. "His distinction as a lawyer, judge, and legal

theorist lies precisely in the infusion of literary skill and philosophical insight into his
legal work." Id. "Moreover, no judge in American history has written with such literary
flair." WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supranote 165, at 488.
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Massachusetts. From then on, prose-poems that took the form of judicial
opinions, law review articles and speeches continued to make, enhance and
then cement his reputation. Holmes's main stylistic distinction as a jurist
was "the poet's gift for metaphor. " 4' Holmes's own life therefore
undercuts his statement about law's inhospitability to artists and poets. 2
Yet Holmes's comments about poets and artists not being suited for
the law may be a personal warning born of his own life experience. Great
as his lifetime legal achievements were, law was not Holmes's first love,
just as it was not Stevens's; for both men, it was literature.
Literature was in Holmes's environment and, in a sense, in his genes.
Born in Boston in 1841, Holmes grew up during what has been famously
called the "flowering of New England. " 41' He would meet and talk with
literary figures like Emerson, Longfellow, and Hawthorne. Holmes's
father was himself a celebrated writer, the author of the bestselling
Autocrat of the Breakfast Table, a much published essayist and poet, and
a founder of The Atlantic Monthly.l4 For his part, Oliver Wendell
411. See POSNER, supra note 172, at xiii. "Holmes was a 'poet,' conceiving of his
work as a process in which the individual thinker sought his own relationship to his
material and expressed that relationship in an original, idiosyncratic manner." WHITE,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 165, at 480-81. Holmes had "a penchant
for what could be called a 'poetic' approach to his intellectual tasks." Id. at 480.
412. See generally LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1991); MAx LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES xix-1 (Modern Library 1953) (1943); SHELDON M. NOVICK,
HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989); POSNER, supra
note 171, at ix-xxxi; WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supranote 165. These
standard books are the sources of the biographical facts about Holmes in the following
paragraphs.
According to one of his recent biographers, who made the comment in a book about
Holmes's friend Henry James, Holmes's "ambition" as a young man was "to be a poet
and a man of letters." SHELDON M. NOVICK, HENRY JAMES: THE YOUNG MASTER 14344 (1996). See also id. at 98, 164. In his biography of James, Novick alleges that in
1865 James had a homosexual encounter -- his first -- with Holmes. Id. at 109-110. The
evidence cited to support this rather startling allegation is unimpressive, and the
conclusion requires multiple leaps of imagination and a too willing suspension of
disbelief. See Millicent Bell, The Divine, the Unique, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT,
Dec. 6, 1996, at 3-4 (book review).
413. See generally VAN WYCK BROOKS, THE FLOWERING OF NEW ENGLAND
(1936).
414. Holmes Sr. makes some acute observations about law and art. "You can hire
logic in the shape of a lawyer," he wrote, "to prove anything that you want to prove."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES SR., THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE 11 (World's
Classics 1904) (1857). As to the feeling induced by music and art, in contrast, "It has
its seat in the region of sense rather than of thought." Id. at 113. Wallace Stevens would
no doubt agree.
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Holmes, Sr., actually presents an interesting case of the physician-writer;
he was an eminent doctor who taught medicine at Harvard Medical School.
He wrote on the side and it is for his writings that he became primarily
known. Dr. Holmes's strong personality profoundly affected his son.
One way Dr. Holmes influenced Wendell (as young Holmes, Jr. was
called) was in the choice of a career. After Holmes returned from fighting
in the Civil War, in which he was wounded three times, it was his father
who-as Stevens's father would-leaned heavily on him to go to law
school. Like Stevens, Holmes himself later recalled that he had been
"shoved into the law" by his father.41 5 It is beginning to look as if the
great Holmes has much in common with Flaubert, Stevens, Cezanne,
Matisse, and Schumann and others in how they all ended up studying law.
Like those others, Holmes, the war hero who bravely faced enemy fire,
submitted to his father's wishes and, subordinating his literary ambitions,
studied law under circumstances bound to produce tension.
Such tension led to the expected result. Holmes-our great legal hero
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.-disliked the study of law. He found legal
study prosaic, had difficulty finding inspiration in the law, and referred to
the "dust of the law. "4 6 Now doesn't that make you feel better? You are
not alone; Holmes felt the same way.
"When I began," Holmes once wrote, "the law presented itself as a
rag bag of details," 417 and "a thick fog of details. " 4 ? He went on: "It
was not without anguish that one asked oneself whether the subject was
worthy of the interest of an intelligent mind. "'19 Elsewhere: "One saw
people who one respected and admired leaving the study because they
thought it narrowed the mind."4 20 The study of law struck Holmes at the
415. Letter from Holmes to Harold Laski (May 18, 1919), in HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS 205 (Mark De Wolfe Howe, ed., 1953); WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, supra note 165, at 466. Holmes Jr., made the same point in different ways.
Thus Holmes, Jr. said his father "kicked him into the law" and "put on the screws to
have me go to the Law School." Id.
416. See Letter from Holmes to Laski, supranote 415, at 87.
417. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey by European
Authors in the ContinentalLegal HistoricalSeries (1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS,
supranote 17, at 298, 301-02.
418. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Commencement Address at Brown University -1897, in id. at 164.
419. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey by European
Authors in the ContinentalLegal Historical Series (1913), in id. at 302.
420. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey by European
Authors in the ContinentalLegal Historical Series (1913), in id. at 302.
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start as finding oneself plunged in "a black and 42frozen night, in which
there were no flowers, no spring, no easy joys." 1
It was against this background and experience that Holmes later spoke
of art and the law. Holmes here reminds us of how our other law-trained
artists reacted to law school. His letters, with their recoiling from dry
law, could have been written by any one of them, or perhaps by any one
of you. And yet, Holmes persevered. He finished his legal studies,
graduated, became a lawyer and practiced for fifteen years before being
appointed to the faculty at Harvard Law School. Holmes was able to do
so without breaking down psychologically because in a way he, like
Wallace Stevens, never abandoned literature.
Holmes's ambivalent attitudes toward the law continued for some time.
Even in middle age, Holmes still talked of the tension and, much as
Holmes tried to give the impression of having resolved his doubts, at age
forty-four, he still seems to be justifying to himself his life choice.
"What a profession it is!" he says of the law. 422 But then we get a
frisson of his old uncertainty. "No doubt everything is interesting when
it is understood and seen in its connection with the rest of things. " '
Does that mean law by itself is uninteresting? "Every calling is great
when greatly pursued." 424 Is that a comment about ordinary lawyering?
Then he goes on, and as he does so, one wonders if Holmes is trying to
convince himself as much as his listeners: "But what other [calling
besides the law] gives such scope to realize the spontaneous energy of
one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of
life-to share its passions, its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as
witness and actor?" 4" Is Holmes still trying to justify his choice of life's
work? Are we all?
In the same speech, Holmes comments on those who retreat from
becoming lawyers. "Those who, having begun the pursuit [of the law],
turn away uncharmed," Holmes said, knowing how close he came to being
one of them, "do so either because they have not been vouchsafed the
sight of her divine figure, or because they have not the heart for so great
a struggle." 426 Then, in a startling passage, Holmes compares law
favorably to literature. "To the lover of the law, how small a thing seem
421. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Commencement Address at Brown University -1897, in id. at 164.
422. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Our Mistress the Law (speech 1885), reprinted in
LERNER supra note 412, at 29.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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the novelist's tales of the loves and fates of Daphnis and Chloe! How pale
a phantom even the Circe of poetry. "427
Something of the same mood came upon Holmes a year later, in 1886,
when he lectured on "The Profession of the Law" to Harvard
undergraduates. Toward the end of his talk, he posed the "main question"
thusly: "What is all this to my soul? You do not bid me to sell my
birthright for a mess of pottage; what have you said to show that I can
reach my own spiritual possibilities through such a door as this? How can
the laborious study of a dry and technical system, the greedy watch for
clients and practice of Shakespeare's arts, the mannerless conflicts over
often sordid interests, make out a life?" 418 These are the questions that
beset Holmes as a law student and young lawyer, and that beset Stevens,
Flaubert, Matisse, C6zanne, and MacLeish as well. They may well beset
many of you right now.
Holmes admits that these questions "may prove unanswerable," and,
perhaps most important of all, "have often seemed to me unanswerable." 429
But then he says, "And yet I believe there is an answer." 43 What is that
answer? According to Holmes, he can give his answer "no longer with
doubt," although one wonders. "A man may live greatly in the law as
well as elsewhere," Holmes answers, "that there as well as elsewhere his
thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; that there as well as
elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of
heroism, may wear his heart out after the unattainable." 4 3'
These statements by Holmes are of immense importance. They reflect
a long and difficult inner struggle between his passion for literature and
philosophy, on the one hand, and his duty to law, on the other. Given the
unpleasant way in which Holmes describes his early study of law, we are
permitted to wonder whether Holmes has truly resolved all those early
doubts as conclusively as he says. At one point, he concedes: "We are
all close to despair." 432 Even his beautiful but over the top descriptions
of the mature study of law seem to be made in part to convince himself.
To use one of Holmes's favorite phrases, one "can't help" but think that
Holmes is justifying to himself why he took one path rather than another,
427. Id.
428. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 17, at 218.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 219.
432. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Speech (1900), reprintedin THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES,
supra note 17, at 80; see also id. at 78 ("We cannot live our dreams.").
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and that the path not taken would have been less interesting and less
rewarding intellectually.
Holmes and Flaubert have some distinct similarities and differences in
their lives. The beginning of the path taken by Holmes resembles the start
of the trail followed by Flaubert. Like Holmes, Flaubert was interested
in literature and, like Holmes, Flaubert had a physician father who forced
him to study law.433 But there the similarities end. Unlike Holmes,
Flaubert's legal career never got off the ground because he flunked out of
law school.
In contrast to most of today's law schools, the Sorbonne faculty of law
gave Flaubert a second chance. He had the opportunity to retake the
examinations, which he planned to do-until an extraordinarily important
event interfered with his plans. In January 1844, Flaubert had his first
epileptic seizure. Doctors prescribed prolonged bedrest and quiet. This
medical incident ended his legal studies. He dropped out of law school.
Flaubert's law school illness has caused much debate. The prevailing
view seems to be that the illness had a psychosomatic aspect to it, that by
getting sick, Flaubert had avoided a fate he could not abide: practicing
law for the rest of his life. The epileptic seizure allowed Flaubert to
escape from law school. The illness also allowed Flaubert to escape to his
literary life. He retired into a family-supported invalidism, where he
found solitude and stability for his writing. The seizure and its aftermath
thus became the catalyst for his literary career.
But Flaubert's law school experience, truncated as it was, still affected
his writing. In addition to whatever enhanced sensitivity to words law
school gave him, Flaubert peopled his books with lawyers. He used his
literary talent, as some of you might do, to take revenge on the legal
profession for the painful experience of law school. His fictional legal
characters are invariably earthbound, base and sordid. It is as if
unsuccessfully studying law engendered in Flaubert a bitterly humorous
attitude toward the whole profession.
Given this background, it is perhaps ironic that Flaubert should have
been the one to write, "Every lawyer carries within himself the debris of
a poet." Even so, he was probably correct, at least for the most part,
when he wrote it. (I say "for the most part" because I have known a few
distinctly unpoetic lawyers.) The desire to do justice, may, in the final
analysis, be a poetic yearning or sensibility.434 The law needs more, not
433. See LLOSA, supra note 160, at 55, 108-109.

434. Professor Charles Black has noted "the deadly peril of loss of the poetry of
law." According to Black, "The poetry of law is the motive for solving problems, the
sacred stir toward justice, our priceless discontent at the remoteness of the perfect law."
CHARLES L. BLACK, THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE 31 (1963).

"to keep the poetry of law alive."

Therefore, we need to try

Id. See also WEISBERG, supra note 55, at 34-47.
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fewer, artists and poets. We need more judges like Holmes and his
equally poetic successor on the Supreme Court, Cardozo. "[J]udges of
our highest courts should have the poetic touch."4 35 We need more
lawyers like Wallace Stevens and Archibald MacLeish. One thinks of
another illustrious New York Law School graduate-Supreme Court Justice
John Marshall Harlan-as a shining example of a cultured and civilized
judge43with
a beautiful and lucid literary style and the sensitivity of a
6
poet.

Referring to Flaubert's quotation about lawyers being poets manqu~s,
writer Julian Barnes in 1995 asked (in a short story): "Is this piece of
wisdom any truer than its opposite: that within every poet there lurk the
remnants of a lawyer?" 43 7 But, like Jesting Pilate, Barnes did not stay for
an answer. Using Stevens's metaphor, we might rephrase Barnes's
provocative question as: is law sometimes, for some people, the
"necessary angel" for artistic creativity? Even if we cannot answer either
question with absolute certainty, we can now say, with growing confidence
after threading the law and the creative arts, that within more creative
artists than we ever had a right to imagine, there lurk the remnants of a
lawyer. More needs to be done on this theme, but the mere correlation
itself is impressive.
The more we think on this theme, the more consistency we may find
in the attitudes and statements of Holmes and Flaubert. No discrepancy
may in fact exist between saying, on one hand, that the law is not for
poets and, on the other, that every lawyer contains the debris of a poet.
For all their surface differences, these statements of Holmes and Flaubert
may mean no more than that the study and practice of law tend to
435. Oscar Cox, Cardozo'sLawandLiterature, 17 CORNELLL.Q. 189 (1931) (book
review); see also WHITE, supra note 121, at 761-806 (chapter entitled Is the Judge Really
a Poet). "Language is the gate of perception, and its masters therefore see farther than
the rest of us .... To the literary side of Holmes we owe the poetic concreteness, the

metaphoric vividness, of his opinions." POSNER, supra note 171, at xxiii. But see Pierre
N. Leval, Judicial Opinion as Literature,in BROOKS & GEWIRTZ, supra note 221, at 206
(objecting to judges' use of literary and dramatic rhetoric).
436. As one might expect from a judge with a poetic sensibility, Justice Harlan's
majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), has been called the leading
opinion of the Court recognizing "the communicative power of speech's emotive
content." Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the
Subordinationof Groups, 1990 ILL. L. REV. 95, 101.
Harlan, unlike Stevens, received an honorary degree from New York Law School
in 1955 and had an all-day New York Law School symposium and an entire double issue
of the New York Law School Law Review devoted to his life and career. See Centennial
Conference in Honor of Justice JohnMarshallHarlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1 (1991);
see also TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1992).
437. Julian Barnes, Experiment, NEW YORKER July 17, 1995, at 62.
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subordinate and lessen poetic sensibilities. Neither is necessarily saying
that law entirely wipes out or permanently eradicates poetic impulses, only
that such impulses are likely to ebb under the law's sway.
But lawyers must not be emotionally dead; they desperately need
poetic sensibilities. Law depends on feeling and passion as much as
thought and analysis.438 In law, as well as elsewhere, thought and reason,
unless matched by feeling, are delusive things. Often enough one
"senses" a correct legal conclusion before being able to articulate, explain,
or support it in terms of legal authority, doctrine, or reasoning. This
"hunch," "sensation" or "intuitive flash of inspiration" 43' is at bottom a
poetic, artistic sensibility, however submerged.
To keep that sensibility alert and responsive, lawyers can and must
learn not to allow their profession to drown and diminish their inner lives.
They can take pains not to lose their capacity to feel. After all, Flaubert's
reference to the debris of a poet implies that at least an ember of poetic
fire smolders in every lawyer's heart. For some lawyers, such as Wallace
Stevens, that poetic ember on occasion flares up or glows brilliantly,
dazzling the rest of us with its incandescence.
At least once when that poetic ember was aglow, Stevens himself let
slip his true view of the double life of law and literature, even if, as usual,
he expressed it obliquely but memorably. Part of the continuing humanist
tradition of the lawyer-poet, he illustrated with his life one of his most
important lines. It is not, strictly speaking, poetry; nor, for that matter,
is it law. But it is wise counsel, beautifully phrased. Perhaps it is a
mature and successful lawyer-poet's pithy summing up of the art of the
double life.
"None of the great things of life," Stevens wrote to his daughter Holly
when she wanted to leave college, "have anything to do with making your
438. See William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and The Progress of the Law, 42
the greatest threat to
due process principles is formal reason severed from the insights of passion."). Using
language that Stevens would have understood, Brennan, in the same speech, said law
depends more on a "range of emotional intuitive responses" than "lumbering syllogisms
of reason." Id. See also BLACK, supra note 434, at 30 (the "artist in law" should
"continually explore, with disciplined imagination, the means to justice within the legal
system, and that at the same time to be continually responsive to the demand for reasoned
justification within that system. The continued search for creative resolution of this
tension is one of the main things the art of law is about.").
439. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, New York State Bar Address (1932), in SELECTED
WRITINGS, supra note 181, at 26-27. Elsewhere, Cardozo wrote, "The law has its
piercing intuitions, its tense, apocalyptic moments." CARnozo, The Paradoxesof Legal
Science, in id. at 286.
REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 948-77 (1987) ("In our own time ...
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living."'4 Remember that line, especially when you are working seventy
hours a week. It should be posted, in big letters, in every law school and
in every law firm in the country. At the hourly rates now charged by
lawyers, an attorney who takes time away from billable hours to write
poetry (or anything else) might think that he or she was guilty of grand
larceny. But no one has been indicted for that double life. "None of the
great things in life have anything to do with making your living." What
a wonderful, extraordinary thought, even if it opposes the mood of the
modern temper.
Stevens himself deserves the last word, and, as befits him, an
imaginary one at that. In this era of imaginary conversations in high
places, we can indulge ourselves and imagine what Stevens, that advocate
of the imagination, would say if he were here with us today, which, of
course, in a sense he is, if only in spirit. Poets do not die, not really; they
leave behind their transfigured body in the poems they wrote. No doubt
Stevens would be pleased to be recognized by his law school alma mater,
albeit belatedly. But he knew that recognition-honors and awards-have
nothing to do with the greatness of poetry. "The role of awards and
honors in the life of a poet," he said on receiving the National Book
Award for poetry in 1955, "is simply to bring him back to reality."" If
we cannot bring Stevens physically back to reality, we can at least try to
make his spirit a reality.
Stevens would accept our salute as a token of the New York Law
School community, while knowing "there is no true satisfaction for the
2 With his wry and facetious sense of humor, and
poet but poetry itself."44
a casual reference to his recurring theme, Stevens might say to us
something like: "I must be imagining this." Then he might add, in all
seriousness: "What are you doing now to instill imagination, that most
crucial of mental attributes, the quality I championed most, what are you
doing to cultivate imagination among today's law students?" How we
answer that question will truly reflect how we honor or dishonor Wallace
Stevens, lawyer-poet, New York Law School class of 1903.
440. Letter from Wallace Stevens to his Daughter (Oct. 26, 1942), in LETTERS,
supra note 12, at 26.
441. Wallace Stevens, On Receiving the National Book A ward for Poetry (1955),
in OPUS POSTHUMOUS, supra note 28, at 289. Stevens's view of awards and honors
should not deter, impede, or delay the campaign for his honorary degree from New York
Law School.

442. Id.
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Lawyer-Poet Wallace Stevens (1879-1955) as he looked while
attending New York Law School from 1901 to 1903.

